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Abstract
This thesis focuses on how the economic status of children is related to their 
parental income.
I begin by measuring the intergenerational earnings mobility of sons in a 
comparative framework. I compare the extent of earnings mobility for sons in the 
UK, US, West Germany and Canada, and consider how mobility has changed 
across time in the UK and US. I find that while it is difficult to statistically 
distinguish between estimates, it appears that the UK and US are less mobile than 
the other countries. When looking over time, there is definitive evidence that 
mobility for sons in the UK has declined, while there is no such evidence for the 
US.
There is a clear connection between the persistence of income inequality 
across generations and the unequal distribution of educational attainments. I show 
that part of the decline in mobility in the UK is due to increasingly unequal access 
to higher education.
The majority of the literature on intergenerational mobility stresses the 
relationship between individual earnings and parental income. But economic well­
being also depends on the earnings and income of partners. If partner’s income is 
strongly connected with parental income this will reinforce individual earnings 
persistence. Assortative mating is the extent to which people with similar 
characteristics form couples, and this has a crucial role here in explaining the link 
between partners and parents.
The final section of this thesis explores the role of assortative mating in 
intergenerational mobility. For the UK, I demonstrate that the increasing 
association between parental incomes and the earnings of daughters-in-law 
substantially adds to the relationship between sons’ and their parents’ family 
incomes. For Canada, I am able to link the incomes of both sets of parents for the 
couple. I demonstrate that the association between parental incomes within the 
couple is a new measure of assortative mating and show that couples who are less 
similar in terms of their parental income are more likely to separate.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Intergenerational mobility is concerned with the relationship between the socio­
economic status of parents (often their income) and the economic outcomes of 
their children as adults. Most commonly, this is measured as the association of 
incomes across generations. A strong association between incomes across 
generations indicates weak intergenerational income mobility, and is often 
regarded as in violation of the norms of equality of opportunity. If an individual’s 
income is strongly related to his or her parents’ income, this means that a child 
from a poor family has limited opportunities to escape his or her start in life; 
consequently inequality perpetuates. This has implications for economic 
efficiency if the talents of those from poorer families are under-developed or not 
fully utilised, as those from poorer backgrounds will not live up to their 
productive potential.
The connection between intergenerational mobility and equality of 
opportunity means that the extent of the association between the incomes of 
parents and children is a topic of strong policy interest. Indeed, a recent piece in 
the Economist has pointed to the identification of high intergenerational mobility 
with the concept of the ‘American Dream’,
Americans believed that equality of opportunity gave them an edge 
over the Old World, freeing them from debilitating snobberies and at 
the same time enabling everyone to benefit from the abilities of the 
entire population. They still do1.
Most people would agree that equality of opportunity is an important goal; 
nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a world with no link between incomes across 
generations. Genetic transmissions alone are likely to lead to a positive 
association between the earning power of parents and children2 and the 
transmission of family culture and other learning within the family will lead to 
children from better off families being better equipped to succeed. These effects 
may be more important than the direct influence of income, through richer parents 
being able to make more investments in goods and services for their children.
1 Economist December 29th 2004.
2 For example, Perisco, Postlewaite and Silverman (2004) describe the positive earnings premium 
to being tall and of having tall parents.
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As Corak (2004) points out, this means that the policy implications of the 
study of intergenerational mobility are unclear. If intergenerational income 
inequality is solely a consequence of the automatic transmissions of ability and 
other attributes within the family, the reduction of these inequalities would require 
strong intervention by the state. Our understanding of this can be improved by 
making comparisons of the levels of intergenerational mobility across time, place 
and groups. With comparisons in hand, it is possible to assess mobility as 
‘relatively weak’ and ‘relatively strong’, and therefore begin to consider potential 
explanations for differences in intergenerational mobility.
Making comparisons of mobility is at the heart of much of the empirical 
work in this thesis; in order to do this convincingly, careful attention to 
methodology is paramount. One of the themes which runs through my research is 
how the available data can be best used to avoid the biases inherent in measuring 
intergenerational persistence, or at least how careful estimation can be used to 
ensure that biases are similar across the groups under comparison.
The majority of my analysis is focused on the measurement of the 
intergenerational elasticity, p  and the intergenerational correlation, r. These 
parameters are obtained from the estimation of a double-log regression (see 
equation (1.1)) of the earnings of sons (or in the later chapters daughters and 
children’s partners), ln^.”" on the income of their parents, \nYiparerus. Larger p
and r indicate less intergenerational mobility. Issues concerning the theoretical 
motivation behind this model and its measurement will be considered in detail in 
Chapter 2.
Differences in the variance of InK between generations will distort P 
which is why the intergenerational partial correlation is also considered 
throughout. This is obtained simply by scaling p  by the ratio of the standard 
deviation of parents’ income to the standard deviation of sons’ income, as shown 
in equation 1.2.
\nYison= a  + /3\nYiparenls+£i ( 1.1)
\nYpar,n'1 ( 1.2)
r = Corr
ln Y P‘ren“ , InY'
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The first two chapters of my empirical analysis (Chapters 3 and 4) are 
concerned with measuring the intergenerational earnings mobility of sons in a 
comparative framework. There are two motivations here; the first is simply to 
describe how intergenerational mobility varies over time and place. For example, 
do levels of intergenerational mobility in the US, compared with Europe, match 
up with the story of the ‘American Dream’ described above? The second 
motivation is more analytical, by comparing intergenerational mobility across 
countries and over time, it is hoped that more can be understood about how 
intergenerational mobility varies across different institutional and policy 
environments.
More formally, comparisons of r  over countries and time are equivalent to 
estimating r. and rk where j  and k indicate different time periods or countries.
Making comparisons is equivalent to estimating {rk - r - ) ,  the exercise then is to
consider the differences in other characteristics which could explain the 
differences found in mobility. In Chapter 5, I consider the role of education in 
explaining changes over time in mobility (between rt and rl+l) for the UK.
Chapter 3 studies intergenerational mobility for sons in the US, the UK, 
West Germany and Canada, where sons’ earnings are measured around 2000, 
when they are aged approximately 30. A previous limitation of cross-country 
comparisons has been the difficulty of comparing results from different studies, as 
methodological factors may be responsible for the differences found between 
studies. My aim in this chapter is to fill this lacuna and demonstrate the extent to 
which the conclusions from a comparative study differ from those which can be 
drawn from the current literature.
There is a clear connection between the persistence of income inequality 
across generations and the unequal distribution of educational attainments. Young 
people from well-off families get more education than their poorer peers, and this 
is one of the reasons for their higher earnings. The extent to which education is 
responsible for intergenerational persistence depends on how strongly educational 
attainment is tied to family income background and on the rewards to education in 
the labour market. In Chapter 3 ,1 expand the descriptive aspect of my analysis by 
decomposing the levels of intergenerational persistence for the UK, US and West
12
Germany. This involves comparing the extent to which persistence is associated 
with differences in education levels.
Chapter 4 considers changes in mobility over time for the UK and US. In 
the UK this analysis relies on comparing two sources of data, the 1958 and 1970 
British birth cohorts. The analysis for the US relies on the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. The advantage of the US data is that information is available for all 
cohorts of individuals bom between 1949 and 1970; however the limitation is that 
the effective sample sizes are small compared with those available for the UK.
The objectives in this chapter are similar to those for the cross country 
comparisons of levels of mobility, and once again measurement issues are 
paramount. While the changes in intergenerational mobility in the two countries 
are interesting in themselves, there is a clear expectation that by comparing trends 
across two countries it is possible to learn more about how policy or institutional 
changes underpin the trends. A particular aspect of interest is the strong growth in 
cross sectional inequality experienced in the two countries over the time period 
under consideration. The literature has tended to posit an informal link between 
cross-sectional income inequality and intergenerational income persistence (Hout 
2004); it is therefore particularly interesting to discover if increasing inequality is 
associated with falls in mobility.
In Chapter 5 I return to the role of educational attainment and study its 
contribution to intergenerational mobility and its change over time in the UK. 
Considering the role of educational attainment is highly relevant in a policy 
context. Education is assumed by many to be ‘a great leveller’. Consequently, 
attempts to improve the education of children from poor backgrounds are one of 
the main ways that Governments intervene to weaken intergenerational 
persistence. Chapter 5 therefore makes the most policy oriented contribution.
My analysis in Chapter 5 is two-fold. The objective of the first part of the 
chapter is to model the changing relationship between family income and 
educational attainment between the 1970s and the present. This enables me to 
assess both how the connection between family income and education are linked 
with changes in intergenerational mobility in the UK, and to develop an insight 
into patterns of intergenerational transmission among more recent cohorts. I find
13
that differences in education by parental income are an important reason for 
intergenerational persistence. In the second part of my analysis, I attempt to 
understand what leads to gaps in educational attainment by family income. My 
objective is to separate the effects of ability and family culture from the direct 
effect of income.
As discussed in the opening paragraph, the concepts of intergenerational 
mobility and persistence are concerned with the correlation between economic 
status across generations. The first three empirical chapters of the thesis are 
concerned with individual-level intergenerational mobility, with the outcome 
measure being the earnings or education level of young adults. But economic 
well-being is a broader concept than individual earnings and is likely to depend on 
the earnings and income of partners as well as the individual’s own income. The 
second section of my thesis (Chapters 6 and 7) adds an analysis of household 
formation to my investigation of intergenerational mobility.
If partners’ incomes are as strongly correlated with parental income as the 
individuals’ own earnings are, this will reinforce individual earnings persistence 
and mean that family income persistence is even stronger. This is the premise 
behind the consideration of the role of household formation in intergenerational 
mobility explored in Chapter 6 for the UK, and Chapter 7 for Canada. The 
relationship between partners’ earnings and parental income is mediated through 
assortative mating; the extent to which couples match on the basis of having 
similar characteristics, and I explore this explicitly in both chapters.
In Chapter 6 I model family income mobility in Britain for the 1958 and 
1970 cohorts. I consider the role of partnership formation in adding to 
intergenerational family income inequalities, and illustrate the role played by 
wives and partners in contributing to trends in intergenerational mobility. 
Previous studies of this topic have focused on the importance of husbands in 
contributing to the persistence of income for women; in this chapter I perform a 
symmetric analysis for both men and women. This draws attention to the role of 
partners in contributing to the intergenerational persistence of men; an aspect 
which has not previously been stressed.
14
It is clear that household formation and assortative mating has an 
important role in generating the strong persistence in family income in the UK. In 
the final empirical chapter of this thesis I am able to compare the findings 
obtained in the UK with a similar analysis for Canada. This reintroduces the 
comparative aspect of the earlier chapters.
The unique data used to capture intergenerational relationships in Canada 
enables a new dimension in assortative mating to be explored. The Canadian 
Intergenerational Income Data is based on linked tax returns and includes 
information on the incomes and earnings of couples, as well as the incomes of 
both sets of parents during the couples’ teenage years. A new measure of 
assortative mating is proposed; the link between the incomes of parents-in-law. 
This shows that the interrelation between household formation and 
intergenerational mobility is two-sided. Not only does household formation affect 
intergenerational mobility through partners’ earnings, but parental characteristics 
also influence how couples match.
The final dimension of my interrogation of the Canadian data is to explore 
how matching on parental incomes varies according to different characteristics. I 
test insights from search models of household formation, specifically the 
hypothesis that individuals with higher search costs match more weakly on 
parental income. I also assess if couples who are well matched on parental income 
are less likely to separate.
This thesis therefore provides a thorough consideration of a number of 
interlinked aspects of intergenerational mobility, in the UK and in other countries. 
I emphasise a comparative approach throughout, and discuss how 
intergenerational mobility varies across countries, time, and gender. In addition, 
several of my chapters discuss how education acts as a transmission mechanism 
between the incomes of parents and children; this enables me to focus more 
sharply on the policy implications of my findings.
In the next chapter I precede the empirical chapters with a review of the 
literature. This develops the economic approach to explaining intergenerational 
persistence and demonstrates the ways that the measurement of mobility has 
developed in order to minimise the biases inherent in its estimation.
15
Chapter 2: Literature Survey: The Theory and Measurement of 
Intergenerational Persistence
2.1 Introduction
Much of the empirical work included in this thesis focuses around the estimation 
of P  in the following regression;
In Y[hlldren =a  + p \nY lparen,s +e( (2.1)
where In Ytch,ldren is the log of some measure of earnings or income for adult 
children, and In Ylparen,s is the log of income for parents, i identifies the family to 
which parents and children belong and et is an error term, f t  is therefore the 
elasticity of children’s income with respect to their parents’ income and ( l - f i )  
can be thought of as measuring intergenerational mobility3.
Hypothetically, P  = 0 represents a case of complete mobility where the 
incomes of parents and children are completely unrelated and f t  - 1 represents a 
case of complete immobility where the proportionate earnings advantage of 
parents is precisely mirrored in their children’s generation. If p > \  the income 
advantage of parents is magnified in the child’s generation, meaning that over 
generations the incomes of dynasties become increasingly unequal. In general, 
empirical estimates of p  tend to lie between 0 and 1, implying that an initial 
income advantage will be wiped out over several generations - regression to the 
mean.
In this chapter, I provide a survey of the literature to set the scene for the 
empirical chapters that follow. I discuss the theoretical motivation behind the 
estimation of equation (2.1) in the case where In is the child’s individual 
earnings and for the broader case considered in Chapters 6 and 7, where 
In Yich,ldren is the child’s partner’s earnings or his/her family income. I also highlight
the role that human capital plays in the theoretical models of income persistence 
across generations; this motivates the investigation of the role of education as a 
transmission mechanism which occurs in Chapters 3 and 5.
3 The regression approach to measuring connections across generations dates back to Galton’s 
(1886) consideration of height.
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This thesis is to a large extent based on empirical studies of 
intergenerational mobility, it is therefore very important to fully understand the 
difficulties and biases inherent in measuring intergenerational persistence. As the 
empirical side of the literature has developed, researchers have continued to 
improve the methodology used and to consequently obtain better estimates of 
mobility. I therefore review what the literature has taught us so far about 
measuring intergenerational mobility, and obtaining an unbiased and consistent 
estimate of in equation (2.1)
I also summarise a selection of the results from the empirical work carried 
out thus far. I focus on the studies with the most convincing methodologies, and 
those with the most relevance to my own work. I show how the estimates of 
intergenerational mobility in the US have evolved as measurement methods have 
improved, before demonstrating the extent to which the current literature indicates 
variation in intergenerational mobility over countries and across time. I also 
review the current literature on persistence between parents and daughters and 
children’s partners and their parents, which is a much less developed area of 
study. My approach to this review is to examine the theory, measurement and 
empirical work for individual mobility first, and then to follow this with a 
discussion of assortative mating and family income mobility.
2.2 The Theory of Individual Income Persistence
In this section I review how economic theory interprets intergenerational 
transmissions, and discuss the insights gained by modelling intergenerational 
transmissions within a utility maximising framework.
The main economic model of intergenerational mobility is formulated in 
Becker and Tomes (1986). In their model, parents choose the optimal investment 
to make in their children by maximising their utility function. Equation (2.2) 
shows that parental utility (Uil_l ) is generated by parents’ own consumption
( CJf_,) and the consumption of children in the next generation ( Cit). The extent to 
which parents care about their children’s consumption is represented by the 
parameters; if s  = 0 parents care only about their own consumption, while if
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71 - 1 they care only about their children’s consumption, ^therefore indicates the 
extent of parental altruism.
£/,,_! = (1 -  log Cif + n  log Cit (2.2)
The income of children is determined by the amount of human capital which 
parents have invested (/.,), the return on these investments (</>), their endowments
( Elt), the return to endowments ( rj) and by an error, uit which represents market 
luck, as shown in equation (2.3).
The children’s endowment Eit, will also be influenced by intergenerational
factors. A proportion of the endowment is transmitted from parents to children 
regardless of investment decisions. This is shown in equation (2.4) where h 
represents the extent of the endowment’s heritability within the family.
As parental income is a function of parents’ own endowments (through 
equation 2.5), the inheritance of endowments alone will be sufficient to generate 
intergenerational persistence in income.
Parents decide on the level of human capital on the basis of their degree of 
altruism, the resources they have available, and the return to the investment. In 
their discussion of the contribution of economic theory to the understanding of 
intergenerational mobility, Grawe and Mulligan (2002) emphasise the importance 
of price. It is the sensitivity of parental behaviour to prices (the costs and benefits 
of human capital investment), which marks out economic models of inheritance 
from those which are simply due to the transmission of endowments.
The implications of the human capital investment model for the 
relationship between earnings and consumption across generations depend upon 
the budget constraint faced by parents. If capital markets are perfect, parents can 
borrow on their children’s behalf and pass the debt between generations. In this 
framework investment in human capital will be unaffected by parental income,
Yu = 01 it + T]Eit + uit (2.3)
(2.4)
Ylt_x=(pElt_x+e, (2.5)
18
and the intergenerational transmission of earnings will be equal to the heritability 
of endowments. Earnings will regress to the mean across generations because 
endowments are not fully inherited. However, parents will offset this by asset 
transfers to children; this implies that consumption does not regress to the mean.
In this case, the relationship between the child’s income and their parental 
income is determined entirely by the heritability of endowments and by the 
reward to endowments for parents and children - combining equations (2.3), (2.4) 
and (2.5) gives equation (2.6).
>7 (2.6)
<P
If the returns to endowments are equal across generations, the intergenerational 
correlation of income will simply be equal to h , the heritability of endowments. It 
is also clear that human capital is unrelated to parental income, consequently this
T)
aspect is included in the error, such that coit = <j)lit +—heit_l + w„.
<P
If capital markets are imperfect, so that parents cannot borrow to finance 
human capital, the model has rather different implications. All investments in 
human capital must be funded from parental income, and some parents will not be 
able to make the optimal investment. This adds a new dimension to the 
intergenerational income relationship, for constrained families, human capital will 
be a function of parental income. In this case, intergenerational transmissions will 
be due to both endowment transmissions and human capital investment.
In a model with credit constraints, there will be two groups of families 
with quite different intergenerational transmissions. The first group will be 
unconstrained and will therefore behave like families under the intergenerational 
permanent income model; earnings will regress to the mean while consumption 
will not. For the second group, who are constrained, earnings will regress more 
slowly to the mean. The extent of intergenerational persistence for the second 
group will be strongly dependent on the returns to human capital, expressed as $ 
in equation (2.3).
Both Goldberger (1989) and Mulligan (1997, 1999) point out that 
economic models are unhelpful if they cannot be distinguished from a mechanical
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approach to persistence driven only by endowments. Mulligan (1999) takes 
several of the predictions of the credit constraint model to the data. In particular 
he attempts to identify families who are borrowing constrained and discover if 
they differ from unconstrained families in the ways predicted by Becker and 
Tomes. His results are mixed.
In an alternative approach, Grawe (2004a) has emphasised the interaction 
between income and ability in leading to credit constraints. Credit constraints 
exist when financial limitations mean that families cannot afford optimal 
investments; this will occur when sons have high ability relative to their parental 
income. Quantile regressions show up variation in the intergenerational 
relationship by son’s earnings, conditional on parental income. If a son’s earnings 
are high compared to parental income, we can assume he is bright. Therefore 
more intergenerational persistence at higher quantiles is indicative of credit 
constraints. Grawe finds no evidence of credit constraints in Canada on the basis 
of this test.
Many empirical models of intergenerational persistence stress the 
importance of educational attainment, doubtless in part, because of Becker’s 
emphasis on human capital investment. However, as I have shown in this 
discussion, noting the importance of education does not have much theoretical 
weight. This is because the relationship between educational attainment and 
family income can be due to either differences in inherited endowments or 
differences in parental investments; it is not straightforward to distinguish 
between the two explanations. In Chapter 5 I discuss the mediating role of 
education and attempt to separate the role of income from endowments in 
generating education differences by parental income.
Solon’s (2004) model builds on the Becker and Tomes approach to 
highlight the factors which may underlie differences in intergenerational mobility 
across countries and over time. The crucial development made by Solon is that the 
role of the state in making investments in children is made explicit. In Solon’s 
model there is no transfer of debts or bequests, parental income must either be 
consumed or spent on the human capital of children. This is equivalent to Becker 
and Tomes (1986) imperfect capital market formulation.
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A child’s final human capital depends on his or her endowments, the 
investments made by parents and the investments made by the state. Parents’ 
investments are substitutes for government investment; more progressive 
investment by the government means a weaker connection between final human 
capital and parental income. The connection between human capital and parental 
income will be stronger if endowments are strongly heritable across generations, 
if parents’ investments in human capital are more efficient, and if expected returns 
to investment are higher.
To sum up, some intergenerational persistence is always anticipated if 
income-earning endowments have an inherited component. Additional 
intergenerational persistence will occur if capital markets are imperfect so that 
parents are unable to make optimal investments in their children’s human capital. 
In this case, the return to human capital is responsible for the transmission of 
differences in human capital into differences in sons’ adult incomes. It is therefore 
clear that stronger returns to human capital will lead to more persistence in 
incomes across generations. Solon’s model adds the role of government 
investments to this story. Consequently, when considering differences in 
intergenerational mobility across time and place, differences in government 
education policy and differences in the returns to education seem natural starting 
points; both of these will be considered in the body of the thesis.
2.3 Measurement Methodology
The parameter of interest is the intergenerational elasticity (fi) which is the 
regression coefficient on father’s economic status in a model of son’s adult 
economic status (both are generally measured by either earnings or income)4. A 
higher elasticity indicates that fathers’ incomes are more closely linked to sons’ 
economic success, meaning higher intergenerational inequality. The 
intergenerational elasticity is estimated by running a linear regression of sons’ 
income of parents’ income, as in equation (2.7).
4 In this thesis I am concerned with persistence from parents to sons, daughters, and sons-in-law 
and daughters-in-law. Many of the same issues are relevant throughout, so here I discuss the 
relationship between fathers and sons as this has received most attention in the literature.
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In Y'm = a  + f}\n +e: (2.7)
Given the theoretical discussion provided in the previous section, it is clear 
that the variables we would like to use in this regression would be fathers’ and 
sons’ permanent incomes. The difficulties caused by the fact that permanent 
income is not observed are a recurring theme throughout the intergenerational 
literature.
The standard model of measurement error which underpins the discussion 
of this issue in Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), states that current income is 
related to permanent income as shown in equation (2.8), such that current income 
( y'it) deviates from permanent income according to some random error. This 
measurement error takes the same form for both the child’s and parents’ 
generations.
y * = x +“. (2-8)
Under classical measurement error assumptions , it is straightforward to 
show that measurement error in the dependent variable (the child’s income) will 
not affect the bias of the estimate of /?, although it will lead to a loss of precision 
and larger standard errors. However, measurement error in the explanatory 
variable has more serious implications, and will lead to inconsistent estimates of
/?. Indeed, the estimated parameter, f t , will be an underestimate of the true /?, as
shown in equation (2.9), where crj and cr] are the variances of permanent income
and the error respectively.
p  lim f t  = P
a t  (2.9)
_ 2  2 
G y  + C T u
It is clear that the magnitude of the ‘signal to noise’ ratio is crucial to 
obtaining accurate estimates of intergenerational persistence. If the variance of
error contained in y * f is small compared to the true variance then ft  will be
5 These assumptions are that yt- and ui{ are uncorrelated, and that measurement error is 
uncorrelated across generations
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close to /? and we will have a good estimate of intergenerational persistence. 
Minimising the extent of measurement error is a priority for intergenerational 
mobility research, and it is an issue that both Solon (1992) and Zimmerman 
(1992), and indeed many papers which follow them, consider in detail.
The first step taken to overcome this problem is to model current income 
as a function of permanent income and age, as in equation (2.10). If the age and 
age-squared of both fathers and sons is added to the regression the age-related 
difference between current income and permanent income will be conditioned out. 
I therefore add appropriate age controls to all my models. Nonetheless, this is 
likely to move the estimates only a small step closer to reflecting permanent 
income.
In Y’m = In Y‘m +8 + /U„ + yK  + e„ (2.10)
Another contribution made by Solon and Zimmerman is to draw attention 
to the impact of unrepresentative samples for estimates. Owing to the problems 
involved in obtaining any information about incomes in two generations, 
unrepresentative samples were a feature of the early empirical studies of 
intergenerational mobility. Behrman and Taubman (1985) use a sample of fathers 
drawn from white male twins who served in the military, while Sewell and Hauser 
(1975) use a sample of Wisconsin High School Seniors from 1957. The 
pioneering study of intergenerational mobility in the UK (Atkinson 1981 and 
Atkinson et al 1983) used a sample of parents living in York in 1951 and excluded 
higher income families. Solon (1992) points out that measurement error bias will 
be compounded if the samples of fathers are not representative, as this will lead to 
a reduced variance of income. In equation (2.9) which demonstrates the impact of 
measurement error, s2 will be the estimate of a 2 and if s2 < a 2 there will be a
lower ratio of signal to noise, exacerbating attenuation bias. The use of nationally 
representative samples has become standard in more recent mobility studies.
The studies by Solon and Zimmerman seek to alleviate the twin 
difficulties of homogenous samples and measurement error. Both studies are 
based on nationally representative samples (the first from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, the second from the National Longitudinal Surveys), and both
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seek to minimise measurement error by averaging father’s earnings over four or
five years of annual data. Under the classical measurement error model there will
be a fall in the attenuating factor as more periods of data are used to generate the
0 .2
average, as shown in equation (2.11). As T approaches infinity, will converge 
to zero and ft  will approach the true value of .
p \im j3  = /?
a )  (2.11)
I shall discuss the results from Solon’s and Zimmerman’s papers in detail 
below. However, what is clear from these papers is that measurement error in 
father’s earnings can produce estimates of the intergenerational elasticity that are 
biased downwards; what is less clear is whether a four or five-year average of 
income is sufficient to overcome this problem. An alternative solution to the 
classical measurement error problem is to use instrumental variables (IV). A valid 
instrument is correlated with father’s permanent income but uncorrelated with 
measurement error; in addition it should not appear in a structural model of sons’ 
economic status.
The obstacle to using instrumental variables in this context is that almost 
every variable that is correlated with parents’ permanent income might also have 
an independent impact on sons’ status. Both Solon and Zimmerman are aware of 
this problem and point to the unambiguous upward bias that is generated by using 
an invalid instrument which is positively correlated with sons’ earnings. As using 
current income (or some short time-average) for the explanatory variable will lead 
to a downward bias, the ‘true’ value of /? must lie between these two estimates. 
Both Solon and Zimmerman experiment with instrumental variables techniques 
and find that their results substantially increase.
Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) use these insights to estimate 
intergenerational mobility for the UK using the National Child Development 
Study. In this study, only a single measure of father’s earnings is available (at age 
16) and so time averaging to reduce measurement error is not possible. Instead, 
variants on the instrumental variables approach are used. The authors use several
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combinations of father’s education and social class as instruments for father’s 
earnings, but appreciate that these estimates are likely to be biased upward.
In order to try and overcome the upward bias inherent in the IV approach, 
the authors also use a ‘prediction’ approach and predict permanent income from 
permanent characteristics such as education and social class for fathers and 
children (in this case estimates are computed for both sons and daughters). 
Current earnings are comprised of permanent and transitory elements, but both of 
these break down into explained and unexplained components.
y \  = f . + S x . +  yxu + w. (2.12)
Permanent income is estimated as Sxt which means that the unexplained 
part of permanent income ( / )  is excluded from this estimate. If the unobserved
parts have a different intergenerational correlation; then the estimated relationship 
between fathers’ predicted earnings and sons’ predicted earnings may be a poor 
measure of the true relationship between permanent earnings. The direction of this 
bias is unclear.
In my earlier discussion of Solon’s (1992) work, I noted that using five- 
year averages may not be a sufficient to estimate permanent income. As first 
noted by Zimmerman (1992) and emphasised by Mazumder (2001) transitory 
errors will be serially correlated, meaning that averaging over just a few years will 
not reduce measurement error sufficiently. This topic is taken up in rigorous way 
in a new paper by Haider and Solon (2004). The starting point of the article is that 
the classical measurement error formulation stated in equation (2.8) is 
inappropriate as the relationship between permanent income and current income 
varies through the lifecycle. As described by Mincer (1974), age-eamings profiles 
are steeper for those with more human capital (higher permanent incomes), so at 
young ages current income is low compared to permanent income for those with 
high permanent income, while at older ages current income is higher compared to 
permanent income for those with high permanent income. With this in mind, 
Haider and Solon re-express the relationship between current and permanent 
income. The coefficient At will be <1 at young ages and >1 at older ages.
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y \ = \ y , + uu (2.13)
This formulation applies to both fathers and sons and has implications for 
estimation through both the independent and dependent variables. In the case 
where the dependent variable used is the true permanent income measurement, 
error in the explanatory variable leads to the probability limit shown below in 
equation (2.14); this is also true in the classical measurement error case.
~ C o ty T .y T ' )  <214>
V a i i y ^ )
However, in this case, the variances and covariances are now functions
of4 ,  as shown in equation (2.15). This means that rather than leading to an
unambiguous downward bias, measurement error in the explanatory variable can 
lead to upward bias if Af is <1 and Var(uit)/Var(y()is  sufficiently small.
Cov(y*t*er,y[“l*r) _ XVar(y!“k" )  (215>
Var(y *?"“') A,, 2Var(yf‘h")+Var(ull)
In the classical model of measurement error, error in the dependent 
variable does not affect the bias of the results. This result also changes if the 
relationship between permanent and current income varies across the lifecycle. 
Assuming that fathers’ incomes are measured perfectly, equation (2.16) shows 
that /? will be multiplied by>^f, ; there will be an upward bias if Act>l and a
downward bias if Ac,< 1.
-  Cov(yfather yf*") (2-16)
Var(yf
It is clear that these biases will be affected strongly by the age at which 
incomes are measured in the two generations. The data used for intergenerational 
mobility often focuses on young sons and older fathers. This combination is likely 
to lead to downward bias through both the dependent and explanatory variables, 
and possibly substantial under-estimation. To minimise the extent of measurement
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error, incomes for both generations should be obtained when the respective At =1
for both generations (which may be at different ages). Haider and Solon (2004) 
attempt to estimate this point using social security data and find that A 
approaches 1 at around age 42, but they do not have sufficient data to discover if 
this age varies across generations.
Grawe (2003) and Reville (1995) provide some empirical analysis of how 
estimated intergenerational persistence varies with the age of the father and son. 
Grawe finds strong evidence from several international datasets that measuring 
fathers’ eamings at older ages leads to a reduction in the estimate. He also finds 
more limited support for the hypothesis that estimates of p  rise with the age at 
which sons’ eamings are measured. Reville uses data from the PS ID only, and 
concentrates on the age at which sons’ eamings are measured. He finds evidence
that f t  rises substantially with age, particularly between age 27 and 31. Reville’s 
evidence further supports Haider and Solon’s explanation as he shows that the rise 
in estimates closely tracks the eamings differential between college graduates and 
others at that age group. This implies that Acthlldrises as the higher educated reap 
the returns to their degrees.
Throughout this review I have focused on the slope coefficient (or 
intergenerational elasticity) as the measure of interest. In Solon’s (1992) original 
formulation, he couches the relationship in terms of the correlation. If the 
distributions of incomes are the same across generations then the correlation is 
equal to the slope coefficient, but if the distributions of income are not equal 
across generations this will not be true. In a regression which includes controls for 
age the partial correlation will be equal to the coefficient on father’s eamings 
times the ratio of the residual standard deviations.
(2.17)
r = Corr = 6 —________
\n Y * " ‘" \a g c ,la Y u"\age  ”  ^ j ^ \ n Y ,m \age
The impact of changing variances is another way in which age affects the 
estimates of intergenerational mobility. The variance of income grows throughout 
the lifecycle, so if sons are observed at a younger age than their fathers, the
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variance of fathers’ eamings will exceed sons’; consequently ft will be an 
underestimate of the partial correlation, r.
Many developed countries have experienced strong increases in income 
inequality since the 1970s (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Putting aside 
lifecycle effects, it is therefore likely that the variance of sons will have increased 
compared to their fathers; this would lead to a higher coefficient compared with 
the correlation. Both of these concerns mean that throughout my estimations I 
report both the elasticity and partial correlation estimates.
The interpretation of the coefficient is that it describes the proportion of 
fathers’ eamings that are transmitted between generations. If /? =.4 then 
comparing two fathers, one with double the eamings of the other, the son of the 
richer father will earn 40 percent more than the son of the poorer father. The 
absolute size of this eamings advantage will obviously depend on how wide the 
eamings distribution is. The partial correlation measure (r) is based on 
standardised distributions. A partial correlation of .4 means that if the first father 
earns one standard deviation more than the second father; the first son will earn .4 
of a standard deviation more than the second.
As I have emphasised, the primary difficulty with measuring 
intergenerational mobility is the lack of information about the permanent income 
of fathers and sons. This has been the main theme of this section and it is returned 
to repeatedly in my empirical analyses. As we shall see, particularly critical issues 
are the time-averaging of parental income, the interpretation of /? when variances 
change between generations, and the age at which the incomes of parents and 
children are measured.
2.4 Summary of Current Findings on the Intergenerational Mobility of Sons
The methodological discussion in the previous section is extremely helpful in 
understanding the biases in the current literature on intergenerational mobility. In 
this section I use this knowledge to discuss some the empirical results generated 
by the literature so far. I explore these in three sections, the development of the 
US literature, a review of the international evidence and a review of what is 
known about changes in intergenerational mobility over time. The first of these
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enables me to explicitly show how methodological innovations have affected the 
understanding of intergenerational mobility, while the second and third sections 
provide a background to the questions considered in Chapters 3 and 4, 
respectively.
The Evolution o f the US Literature
Due to the difficulties of collecting good, representative data on the permanent 
incomes of parents and children, many of the early studies of intergenerational 
mobility for the US yield low estimates of the extent of intergenerational mobility. 
When Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes were writing in 1986, the literature indicated 
estimates of around .2, from this they conclude that “aside from families 
victimized by discrimination, regression to the mean in eamings in the United 
States and other rich countries appears to be rapid” (Becker and Tomes, 1986, 
p.S32).
Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of a selection of papers on 
intergenerational mobility in the US, to illustrate how this literature has 
developed. Behrman and Taubman (1985) is an example of the early literature as 
discussed by Becker and Tomes. The sample is based on an unusual and 
homogenous sampling frame; the fathers are white twins who served in the armed 
forces. Also, the measure of fathers’ eamings is based on a single year. The 
intergenerational elasticity observed in this data is low, at just .23, implying that 
fathers pass 23 percent of their eamings advantage on to their sons.
Next in the Table is Solon’s (1992) study. This uses data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, which began with a national probability sample in 
1968 and followed the original sample members into new households. This means 
that Solon is able to use information on fathers’ eamings when young men are at 
home in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and obtain information about sons’ 
eamings in the last year of data available, 1986. When a five-year average of
fathers’ eamings is used as the explanatory variable, is .41.
The other results reported in the paper suggest that the use of a nationally 
representative sample has more impact on the results than using the five-year 
average of father’s eamings. When a single year of fathers’ eamings is used,
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estimates of /? vary between .29 and .41; already considerably larger than the .2 
discussed by Becker and Tomes (1986). In order to explore the implications of 
sample homogeneity, Solon restricts the sample to just those sons who complete 
high school, the estimates using father’s 1967 eamings fall from .39 to .26 when 
the sample is restricted in this way.
Zimmerman (1992) uses data from the National Longitudinal Surveys 
(NLS) and his results confirm many of Solon’s findings. The original National 
Longitudinal Surveys ran from 1966 to 1981 and captured several groups; 
including ‘Mature Men’ and ‘Young Men’, fortunately 896 of those in the 
‘Mature Men’ sample could be matched with their ‘Young Men’ sons. Fathers’ 
eamings are obtained from the early years of the survey while the sons’ eamings 
are obtained from the later years. Zimmerman experiments with averaging fathers’ 
eamings by up to four years, and obtains an estimate of the intergenerational 
elasticity of .54, even higher than obtained by Solon.
Both Solon and Zimmerman experiment with IV techniques, and I also 
report these results in Table 2.1. In Solon (1992), father’s years of education is 
used as an instrument for his permanent eamings, this leads to a higher elasticity 
of .53. Zimmerman (1992) uses social status measured by the Duncan Index. 
Using this instrument increases the coefficient on father’s 1967 eamings in a 
regression of sons’ 1981 eamings from an estimate of .54 using the four-year 
average of income, to .67 in the IV model.
The final set of results reported in this Table is the estimates from 
Mazumder (2001). This paper averages father’s income over a very long period in 
order to get close to a true measure of lifetime income. Mazumder uses a matched 
social security dataset and averages father’s eamings over 16 years. This leads to 
a high estimate of around .6. However, the top-coding of his data means that 
substantial imputation is made by race and education group. This is, in effect, a 
form of IV estimation and may lead to an upward bias on the estimates.
This summary has made it clear that taking account of methodological 
improvements has led to a change in the consensus about intergenerational 
persistence in the US. In contrast to Becker and Tomes’ reading of the literature 
that P  was around .2, Solon’s 1999 summary states that “All, in all .4 or a bit
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higher...seems a reasonable guess of the intergenerational elasticity in long-run 
eamings for men in the United States.” (p. 1784)
Comparing International Estimates
In Chapter 3 I present new estimates of intergenerational mobility for Canada, the 
UK, the US and West Germany. My discussion so far has highlighted the 
importance played by methodology in establishing good estimates of 
intergenerational mobility. One of the main focuses of my empirical work on this 
topic is to ensure that the methodologies used are as comparable as possible. In 
this section I motivate my own analysis by discussing a selection of papers which 
measure intergenerational mobility in countries other than the US. I present the 
studies which have been carried out for one or two countries in Table 2.2 (many 
of which were also reviewed in Solon, 2002) before discussing papers which have 
explicitly tried to conduct international comparisons across many nations.
The papers outlined in Table 2.2 consider mobility in Canada, West 
Germany, Sweden, Finland and the UK. Studies have also been carried out on 
developing countries, but I restrict my discussion to developed countries to focus 
on the results most relevant to my own work .
If the consensus estimate in the US is “.4 or a bit higher” then a first 
glance at the evidence presented in Table 2.2 suggests that this is at the high end 
of the spectrum, although the UK also appears to have strong intergenerational 
income persistence. The studies indicate lower mobility in the Nordic countries 
and Canada, while mobility for Germany falls in the middle.
In the second-to-last column of Table 2 .2 ,1 indicate the approach taken to 
measurement error in each study. As we have seen, this can be crucial, and means 
that we may be reluctant to compare studies which are not comparable on this 
basis. Both Couch and Dunn (1997) and Bjorklund and Jantii (1997) are explicit 
in their desire to produce estimates for their chosen countries (Germany and 
Sweden respectively) which are comparable with those they produce for the US.
Couch and Dunn (1997) compare estimates from the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The 
results of this exercise produce very low, but quantitatively similar, estimates of
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the intergenerational elasticity of eamings between fathers and sons of .11 for 
Germany and .13 for the US. These low estimates are likely to be a consequence 
of the young ages at which sons’ eamings are measured in both countries. My 
earlier discussion of Haider and Solon (2004) has demonstrated that estimates 
obtained at young ages tend to be downward biased; but it is less clear whether 
the extent of lifecycle bias will be equal across the two countries. Wiegand (1997) 
shows that when later eamings data are used for West Germany, the measured 
elasticity rises substantially to around .25, so comparing single country studies 
indicates that mobility is higher in West Germany than in the US.
At the time when Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) were putting together their 
study there was no data available for Sweden which included the incomes of two 
generations. They overcome this by using a two-sample instrumental variables 
approach. They have matched information on sons’ eamings and fathers’ 
education for Sweden, but no information on fathers’ eamings. Fathers’ eamings 
during the child’s teenage years are predicted using information on the 
relationship between eamings and education from another dataset. Sons’ eamings 
are then regressed upon this prediction. Subject to certain assumptions, this 
estimator will be upward biased in the same way as other IV estimators. 
Therefore, to draw comparisons with the US, Bjorklund and Jantti repeat Solon’s 
(1992) PSID analysis to be comparable with their Swedish data. The elasticities 
from this approach are .28 for Sweden compared with .42 for the US.
Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) provide the first evidence that mobility in 
Scandinavian is higher than in the US. In Table 2.2 I also include results from 
Osterbacka (2001) using Finnish census data. This study relies on just two years 
of father’s eamings and shows a very low, but precisely estimated elasticity of 
.13. The picture of high mobility in the Scandinavian countries is confirmed by 
Bratberg et al’s (2004) study of Norway (which I shall discuss in more detail in 
the next section) and by the preliminary results from the intergenerational 
comparisons in Bjorklund et al (2004).
Results from Canada using matched tax data (Corak and Heisz, 1999) also 
indicate high mobility, with elasticities of .23, closer to the .2 of the early US 
analyses than the more recent literature. There may be a concern that conclusions 
on Canada are reliant on a single dataset but it is difficult to find a methodological
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reason why the US and Canadian results differ so much. Estimates are based on 
five year averages of fathers’ annual eamings and the authors go to some lengths 
to show that the data is representative.
The knowledge on intergenerational mobility in the UK is summarised by 
the entries in the Table for Atkinson (1981) and Dearden, Machin and Reed 
(1997). We may worry about the limitations of Atkinson’s data as all the fathers 
were resident in York and only a single week’s information on eamings was 
collected. Both of these aspects tend to lead to downward biased estimates. 
Nonetheless, the estimate of ft is high by international standards at .36. Dearden, 
Machin and Reed (1997) attempt to overcome measurement error problems by 
using a variety of techniques, as discussed above. The results vary, but in general 
are quite high, with the elasticity between fathers and sons at .58 when father’s 
education and social class are used as instruments. On the basis of this evidence it 
seems reasonable to conclude that in the US and UK mobility is limited compared 
with other countries.
As stressed by Solon (2002) methodological differences mean that it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions based on a comparison of studies of one or two
countries. Grawe (2004b) attempts to be more systematic. In this study, Grawe
computes average and quantile regression measures of mobility for many
countries, including several for developing countries. Grawe’s emphasis is on the
quantile regression results which allow mobility estimates to be derived for
different points of the sons’ distribution. Depending on the data available, Grawe
uses a mix of OLS, IV and two-stage IV; although this has benefits in terms of
bringing many datasets into play, we may continue to worry about comparability.
>
Grawe’s solution to this is to make only pair-wise comparisons based on the 
country of interest compared with results from the same estimation approach for 
the US. Grawe’s conclusions are that any differences found between the results 
from the developed countries pale into insignificance compared with those 
between developing and developed countries. In Ecuador, it is not possible to 
reject the hypothesis that the intergenerational elasticity is greater than 1.
Corak (2004) provides a review of the international evidence, but unlike 
Solon (2002), makes some assumptions to enable stronger conclusions to be 
drawn from the current literature. Building upon Grawe’s approach, Corak
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attempts to account for the biases introduced by different methodologies by 
studying how results from different approaches vary for the US (the country for 
which the most estimates are available). The author then scales his preferred 
estimates from other countries up or down depending on the likely biases. This 
scaling takes account of many of aspects I have shown to be important; the 
father’s age when his eamings are observed, the number of years used to generate 
the fathers’ eamings variable, and whether the estimate relied on IV methods or 
not.
On the basis his assumptions, Corak concludes that for the UK and US /?is 
around .5, for France .4, for Germany and Sweden .3 and that Canada and the 
other Nordic countries have /3s of around .2. This summary is not inconsistent 
with the conclusions I derived from my review of the literature in Table 2.2. 
However, concerns may remain as to whether Corak’s assumptions reasonably 
account for the differences in methodology between the articles he reviews. In 
particular, the results reported adjust only slightly for the upward bias resulting 
from the use of instrumental variables, as a consequence estimates from France, 
Sweden and the UK may be inflated compared to those from other countries6.
The studies reviewed in this section have indicated that the US, UK and 
France appear to have the highest levels of intergenerational income inequality (of 
developed countries) while the Scandinavian countries and Canada appear rather 
mobile by comparison. However, worries remain that these results may in part 
owe to differences in the methodologies used. Chapter 3 will provide additional 
evidence on international comparisons for some of these countries based upon 
explicit attempts at comparability. As a consequence, I will provide new evidence 
on the correct interpretation of the current literature, providing new evidence to go 
alongside Corak’s (2004) analysis.
6 Solon’s (1992) and Zimmerman’s (1992) results imply that IV estimates are upward biased by 
25%, but the Swedish TSIV results from Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) are adjusted only from .27 to 
.26 to take account of this.
34
Evidence on Changes in Intergenerational Mobility for Sons
In Table 2.3 I review a number of papers which investigate changes over time in 
intergenerational mobility. The majority of studies which have looked at changes 
have focused on the US, with fewer looking at other countries.
One of the contributions made by Chapter 4 is to explore the way that 
taking alternative approaches to the data alters the results on changes in mobility 
for the US; so I save more extensive comments on the methodologies used in the 
US papers until then. The results from Mayer and Lopoo (forthcoming), Corcoran 
(2001) and Fertig (2002), all based on the PS ID, appear to indicate a rise in 
mobility in the US. Apparently, parental income has become less strongly 
associated with outcomes for sons. Levine and Mazumder (2002) broaden the 
study of changes in intergenerational mobility by adding data from the NLS and 
the General Social Surveys; different conclusions are drawn from these datasets, 
but neither is ideal for the purpose. Using the PSID once more, Lee and Solon 
(2004) take a slightly different approach from the other studies, using all the 
observations available on individuals to increase the effective sample size. They 
find no evidence of a change in intergenerational mobility.
Studies of changes in intergenerational mobility have also been carried out 
in other countries. Ermisch and Francesconi (2004) have measured changes in 
social mobility in the UK using occupation-based indices. They find that the 
intergenerational connection between occupational status has declined over time. 
Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) use a two-step approach similar to Bjorklund and 
Jantii (1997) to look at how mobility has changed in Canada for adults in the 
General Social Surveys of 1986 and 1994; they find no clear trend.
Two studies of changes over time have been carried for Nordic countries. 
The analysis presented in Bratberg et al (2004) for Norway compares 
intergenerational elasticities estimated when individuals are in their early 30s for 
the 1950 and 1960 cohorts. The authors find a slight decline in intergenerational 
associations for sons. Osterbacka (2004) considers this question for Finland, and 
finds no clear trend. Both Bratberg et al (2004) and Osterbacka (2004) confirm 
the impression that income persistence is particularly low in Scandinavia; the 
estimates from Bratberg are in the region of .15, although there is evidence that
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they rise to around .22 when obtained at age 45, again showing evidence of 
lifecycle bias.
Taken together, the evidence from the current research on 
intergenerational mobility points to an increase in mobility over time. In Chapter 
4, I revisit the evidence for changes in intergenerational mobility in the US and 
provide new results on changes in intergenerational mobility in the UK.
2.5 Theoretical Background to Assortative Mating and Family Income 
Persistence
In the latter part of this thesis I bring children’s partners into my analysis and 
model the relationship between sons’ and daughters’ family incomes and their 
parental income. A motivation behind this investigation is that the 
intergenerational persistence of family income is closer to a measure of the extent 
to which welfare is correlated across generations. As partner’s eamings contribute 
to the child’s family income the extent of intergenerational persistence is 
dependent upon how closely partner’s eamings are associated with an individual’s 
family background. This, in turn will be related to the extent of assortative 
mating; if couples match closely on traits which are correlated with their parents’ 
incomes, links between partners and parents-in-laws will result.
While the literature on this topic is much less developed than the research 
I have outlined on individual mobility, there are a number of theoretical papers 
which set the scene for the research I undertake here, and I outline these below. I 
begin first with the literature on assortative mating and then show the implications 
of assortative mating for intergenerational mobility. There are clear difficulties 
with measuring the contribution of assortative mating to intergenerational 
persistence. Many of the crucial variables are unobservable or, at least, 
unobserved for some of the population. I touch on these difficulties before closing 
this chapter with a survey of the limited empirical work that has already been 
undertaken on this topic.
Sociologists have traditionally dominated research on marriage and a 
focus of their work has been the investigation of the extent to which 
characteristics influence who marries who. The main aspects explored in this
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literature are marriage within and between racial, religious and socioeconomic 
groups; in all cases individuals tend to marry individuals like themselves. In a 
recent review of this literature, Kalmijn (1998) underlines three hypotheses which 
result in positive assortative matching: the preferences of the partners, the 
intervention of ‘third parties’ (such as parents) and the way the marriage market 
operates, which governs who individuals meet when they are ready to marry. As 
we shall see, the economic approach to assortative mating tends to emphasise the 
importance of individual preferences, but the formulation of my empirical work is 
sufficiently general that there is room for groups and institutions to have an 
impact.
The early mathematical models of marital sorting were based on 
assignment models. The idea is akin to all singles being placed in a room together 
and then leaving at the end of the evening paired-off forever. In Gale and Shapely 
(1962) individuals have a single ranking of partners which is common to all in the 
marriage market. In this case, a pure sorting equilibrium will result - the nth 
ranked woman and the nth ranked man will be matched, and so on throughout the 
distribution.
Becker’s model (1973, 1974) has a richer description of the benefits of 
marriage and is more strongly rooted in economic theory. For Becker, all potential 
marriages have an output Z. Z includes the eamings of both partners, the gains 
from the division of labour within marriage, as well as the utility from rearing 
children and from receiving affection within the family. In a utility maximising 
framework, all individuals will be seeking the marriage with the highest possible 
Z. In a sorting model with no frictions, pareto efficiency will mean that men and 
women will sort into partnerships which maximise the total amount of Z. The 
mathematical properties of submodularity and supermodularity state that output is 
maximised if ‘likes’ are matched when male and female traits ( Ah andA^,) are 
complements in producing Z.
a 2Z(At , / U : (2.18)
dAhd \
‘Unlikes’ are matched when male and female traits are substitutes in producing Z.
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(2 . 19)
From this follows the prediction that couples will be positively matched on 
characteristics like education and ability that are complements in the production 
of high quality children and negatively matched on wage rates as these are 
substitutes in the production of market goods. Of course, the strong correlation 
between education, ability and wages, means that it would be very difficult to 
separately identify a negative relationship between the wage rates of couples. 
Moreover, Lam (1988) argues that in the presence of household public goods, 
wage rates should be positively correlated, even conditional on other 
characteristics.
Recent papers have developed Becker’s model of the marriage market in 
search-theoretic terms. It is quite clear that in reality marriage allocations are not 
frictionless, it takes time to meet a partner and search is not costless. Burdett and 
Coles (1997, 1999) and Shimer and Smith (2000) all explore the implications of 
uncertainty and search costs for the marriage market. Different assumptions about 
the nature of the output from marriage and the way that utility is shared within 
couples lead to different implications for assortative mating. But in general, 
assortative mating is still positive in these models with frictions, albeit somewhat 
weaker than in the assignment models. A particular focus of the marital search 
literature is on modelling divorce, and I shall return to this in Chapter 7.
Chadwick and Solon (2002) provide a simple exposition of the 
relationship between assortative mating and intergenerational mobility, and I 
adopt this as a starting point for my discussion of the theoretical relationship 
between assortative mating and intergenerational mobility. Abstracting from the 
nuances of assortative mating, assume that married couples are positively 
correlated on the basis of their permanent incom es/* , where subscript w 
indicates the wife’s income and subscript h indicates the husband’s income.
Permanent incomes are transmitted according to the intergenerational relationship 
that has been discussed throughout, so that for wives
Corr(\nYw*,\nYh*) = p (2.20)
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(2 .21)
The combination of these two equations leads to a link between husband’s 
permanent income and his wife’s parents’ permanent income. This will simply be
It is therefore clear that assortative mating leads directly to a correlation between 
the incomes of parents and their children’s partners.
Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler (2004) explore similar issues for the UK 
and Germany. To motivate their analysis, Ermisch et al use a Becker-Tomes style 
model to work through the implications of assortative mating for intergenerational 
investments and the links between incomes of different household members 
(putting to one side the fact that they actually measure occupational status). 
Unlike Solon and Chadwick, Ermisch et al assume that assortative mating occurs 
on the basis of human capital7 rather than permanent income, so that:
Incomes for both husbands and wives are increasing with human capital, albeit 
with different rates of return, ylw and ylh.
The parental utility function is a modified version of equation (2.2) which takes 
account of the partner’s income in the utility function as well as the son or 
daughter’s own income.
The parental budget constraint is binding; parents can neither borrow nor leave 
bequests. In this case the solution of the utility maximisation problem is 
straightforward; parents invest the proportion n f  pH of their income in the human
Hhi in a regression of Hwi, to be consistent with the Solon-Chadwick framework I adapt this
In Y = a  + Sw In Y *Z'"' +e„, where S . = Pwp(
(2.22)
Corr(Hm, H J  = <7 (2.23)
logY - Y  +Y, H +v* wi tow t \w Wl Wl (2.24)
^g Y hl=y0h+ylhHhl+vhl (2.25)
= ( ! - * )  log Q*., +n\ogE(Ywil +Yhi() (2.26)
In fact Ermisch et al model this relationship as a regression such that <7 is the coefficient on
slightly.
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capital of their children, where p H is the price of human capital. This means that 
the relationship between the income of parents and daughters is expressed in 
equation (2.27)
It is clear that the relationships are very similar to those found in the simpler 
model from Chadwick and Solon (2002). However, here, the link between 
intergenerational mobility and the return to education is explicit and there is no 
ambiguity about the role of investments versus endowments. All the 
intergenerational relationships are governed by investments and will respond to 
changes in their relative costs. Also, the relationship between intergenerational 
persistence and assortative mating is more complex, if matching occurs on full
on human capital, differences in returns to human capital between men and 
women also matter.
Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994) also provide a model of the links between 
in-laws across generations. The focus in their papers is the relationships between 
the son’s eamings and his father’s and father-in-law’s education. The motivation 
for this model is different from the Ermisch et al and Chadwick-Solon models; 
rather than being concerned with what these relationships tell us about 
intergenerational mobility, Lam and Schoeni explore the information these 
relationships can provide about sons’ characteristics. They show that the effects of 
father’s education on wages can be interpreted as representing the impact of 
inherited characteristics while the effect of father-in-law’s education is correlated 
with uninherited attributes through assortative mating.
In Lam and Schoeni’s model the relationship between parental education 
and son’s eamings is driven by the inherited components of schooling, ability and 
wealth. Consequently, when son’s own schooling is controlled for in a regression
X* = a + P J r ,m + £.n where A  = n y j p » (2.27)
And the relationship between parents and the son-in-law’s income is:
X, = «  + + £h, where Sw = cmyh / pH
(2.28)
income S  = p/3( ) as we have seen, but in the case where matching occurs
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of son’s income on father’s education, the coefficient on father’s education will 
fall. In the presence of strong assortative mating, controlling for the son’s 
education when modelling the relationship between his income and his father-in- 
law’s education will not reduce the coefficient on father-in-law’s education by 
very much. This is because father-in-law’s schooling will be correlated with all 
the uninherited components of son’s income through assortative mating; it will be 
much more orthogonal to the son’s education than father’s education will be. 
Below, in the summary of results, I shall discuss the results of this exercise for 
both the US and Brazil, and the conclusions drawn by the authors.
The models discussed so far show links between parents and their 
children’s partners as an indirect consequence of marital sorting, and this type of 
model underlies my approach in this thesis. However, Fernandez et al (2004) 
propose an interesting alternative argument in the context of a son’s mother’s 
work status and the work status of his partner. Fernandez and her co-authors find 
convincing support for a direct positive relationship between a man’s mother 
working during his childhood and the probability of his wife working. Two 
possible mechanisms are posited; either men with working mothers prefer to 
marry women who work; or women who work prefer to marry men with working 
mothers, perhaps because they are more understanding and take a greater role in 
household work.
2.6 Measuring the Contribution of Assortative Mating to Intergenerational 
Persistence
Intergenerational relationships which take account of the relationship between 
parents and their children’s partners face exactly the same measurement 
difficulties as the standard relationships between parents and sons. It is important 
to obtain good measures of parental status for the explanatory variable, and to 
ensure that the measure of the child’s partner’s income is not a biased measure of 
their permanent income. The usual methods apply when taking account of the first 
difficulty, but the second becomes increasingly problematic when married women 
are a focus of the empirical work because of women’s more complex labour 
supply decisions.
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The difficulties of measuring intergenerational persistence for daughters 
and daughters-in-law are clear. Both and 8  are based on concepts of full 
income, which are frequently missing in the data. Minicozzi (2002) attempts to 
tackle this problem head on, by making assumptions about the relationships 
between current income and full income for women. Minicozzi’s aim is to 
generate bounds on the estimated /? for daughters. However, the bounds that 
result are wide, from .12 to .53.
Both the Chadwick and Solon (2002) and Lam and Schoeni papers (1994) 
focus on the relationship between fathers-in-law’s and daughters husbands’ 
incomes. The obvious advantage of this is that husbands’ incomes will be closer 
to full income than daughters’ incomes will be. Solon and Chadwick nonetheless 
still use daughter’s current income in their empirical work, albeit indirectly. They 
show that the relationship between husband’s and wife’s combined income, and 
parental income (measured by the coefficient p ) can be decomposed, allowing us 
to get indirectly at the relationship between and 8 .
Which is equivalent \o p w= { \-  s)/3w + s8w, where s is the share of husband’s 
income in(Yiw + Yih).
The log of the couples combined incomes can be written as
ln(Kti + rm) = a + / / l n y * r ” + ^ (2.31)
7 parents 
wi__
^ p a r e n t s
(2.32)
Where // =
Equally
parents y' parentshi
^ Y  parents yy  parents 
wi
(2.33)
It is simple to show that
r parents 
wi__
y  parents 
wi
parentsparents
d y  parents ^  d Y f "  ^  (1^ + 1^ )
(2.24)
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ln(^ /,/ + ^i) = ln(l*,)-ln(5w) implying (2.35)
ln(SJ = ln(n,)-ln(r)ll + r4,)
Consequently, the coefficient from the regression of ln(5w)on parental income 
will be equal to 0 -  (1 — ^ )(<5‘>v -  Pw) • If 0 is close to zero this implies that and 
Sw have similar magnitude. As shown by equation (2.22) this occurs if p  is large 
and/or if the variance of husbands’ incomes is higher than the variance of wives’ 
incomes.
Ermisch et al (2004) estimate S  and ft  for both men and women. In their 
data they only have eamings available for Germany, so they estimate and S  on 
the basis of occupational indices for both countries and on the basis of eamings 
for Germany. The use of occupational indices may overcome some of the 
measurement problems faced when trying to estimate concepts which require 
knowledge of the full incomes of daughters. While the prestige index will not be 
available for those not in employment, occupational status will not be affected by 
current hours decisions in the way that annual eamings are.
2.7 Results from the Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Mating 
Literature
Table 2.4 summarises the results from several papers that take account of 
children’s household formation and assortative matching for intergenerational 
persistence.
I show an overview of the results for the three papers reviewed in the 
theory section; Chadwick and Solon (2002), Ermisch et al (2004), and Lam and 
Schoeni (1994) plus some estimates from Atkinson et al (1993) and Altonji and 
Dunn (1991) which offer less complete treatments of this question. The main 
feature to note from Table 2.4 is that the in-law’s relationship is strong in every 
case. In no case is the parent to son-in-law/daughter-in-law’s elasticity 
substantially below the parent to son or daughter elasticity, and all the in-law 
relationships are statistically significant. This indicates considerable assortative 
mating in all the countries shown here: the US, the UK, Brazil and Germany.
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As we have seen, the theoretical models of intergenerational mobility 
emphasise that it is possible for the in-law relationship to be stronger than the 
relationship between parents and their own child. This is the case in two of the 
studies considered here; for Brazil in Lam and Schoeni (1994) and for the UK in 
Atkinson et al. In addition, Lam and Schoeni show that father-in-law’s education 
will have more information about son’s unobserved ability if assortative mating is 
strong; it will be more orthogonal to son’s schooling. In Brazil, this is clearly the 
case, adding own schooling to the wage equation reduces the coefficient on 
father’s education by more than it does the coefficient on father-in-law’s 
education in Brazil. This is not the case in the US.
Both of these pieces of evidence indicate that assortative mating is strong 
in Brazil. The results from Atkinson et al indicate that it also likely to be strong in 
the UK, while results based on occupation from Ermisch et al (2004) indicate 
weaker assortative mating, as 8  < for both men and women. This causes us to 
speculate on how contemporary results based on income will look for the UK; a 
question explored in Chapter 6.
2.8 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter has been to highlight the main approaches taken to 
the theory and measurement of intergenerational mobility and to review the 
empirical literature most relevant to the analyses that follow.
A number of important themes have emerged, some of which will be 
returned to repeatedly in subsequent chapters. As my thesis is primarily empirical, 
the most crucial insights discussed here have been methodological. The perfect 
datasets for measuring intergenerational mobility would include the lifetime 
incomes of two generations. My discussion of measurement methodologies has 
provided a number of lessons to incorporate as I (inevitably) use second best data 
to examine intergenerational mobility.
In the theoretical sections of this chapter I provide an economic foundation 
for my interest in intergenerational transmissions. I develop arguments to show 
how economic models of investment can explain the transmission of economic 
status between generations. I have also shown, however, that it is difficult to
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distinguish models of intergenerational investment from persistence resulting 
purely from inherited characteristics. The role of human capital is important in 
whichever model is used, and I explore the extent to which differences in 
education are responsible for intergenerational inequality in several of my studies.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Literature on Intergenerational Persistence for Sons, US
Study Country Data Source Son’s Outcome Variable Father’s Income 
Variable
Approach to 
Measurement Error b
Behrman and
Taubman
(1985)
US Fathers taken from 
NAS-NRC Twin 
Sample, offspring 
followed up
Log annual eamings in 
1980.
Log annual eamings 
around age 50
No averaging or 
correction, some cases 
are excluded with low 
eamings or experience
.23 (.04)
Solon (1992) US Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics
Log annual eamings in 
1984, ages 25-33
Log annual eamings, 
1967-1972.
5 year average of 
father’s eamings
.41 (.09)
Log annual eamings in 
1984, ages 25-33
Log annual eamings, 
1967
Father’s education used 
as an instrumental 
variable
.53 (.014)
Zimmerman
(1992)
us National Longitudinal 
Survey
Log annual eamings in 
1981, ages 29-39
Log annual eamings, 
1966-1971.
4 year average of 
father’s eamings
.54 (.08)
Log annual eamings in 
1981, ages 29-39
Log annual eamings, 
1971.
Duncan Index used as 
instrumental variable.
.67 (.15)
Mazumder
(2001)
us Survey of Income and 
Program Participation 
matched to Social 
Security Record
Log of average eamings 
over 1995-1998. Sons 
bom 1963-1968.
Log annual eamings, 
1970-1985.
16 year average of 
father’s eamings
.58 (.11)
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Table 2.2: Summary of International Literature on Intergenerational Persistence for Sons
Study Country Data Source Son’s Outcome Variable Parental Income 
Variable
Approach to 
Measurement Error p
Couch and Dunn 
(1997)
Germany 
and US
German Socio- 
Economic Panel 
and PSID
Log annual eamings 
averaged 1984-1989, sons 
on average aged 23 in 
Germany, 25 in US
Log annual eamings 
averaged 1984-1989,
Five-year averages Germany:
.11 (.06)
US: .13 (.06)
Wiegand (1997) Germany German Socio- 
Economic Panel
Log monthly eamings in 
1994; sons aged 27-33
Log monthly eamings, 
1984-1989
Five year average .32 (.07)
Bjorklund and 
Jantti (1997)
Sweden 
and US
Swedish Level of 
Living Survey and 
PSID
Log annual eamings in 
1990, bom 1952-1961.
Father’s eamings 
predicted from 
observables
Two -  sample 
instrumental variables 
(TSIV)
Sweden:
.28 (.09)
US: .42 (.12)
Osterbacka
(2001)
Finland Finnish
quinquenniel
census
Log average annual 
eamings, 1985, 1995, 2000, 
sons bom 1950-1960
Log average annual 
eamings, 1970 and 1975.
Two year average, but 5 
years apart.
.13 (.005)
Corak and Heisz 
(1999)
Canada Matched income 
tax data
Log annual eamings in 
1995. Sons bom 1963-1966
Father’s log annual 
eamings, 1978-1 982.
Five year average of 
father’s eamings
.23 (.01)
Atkinson
(1981)
UK Follow up of 
Rowntree York 
Sample
Log weekly eamings at 
survey date (1975-1978)
Log weekly eamings in 
1950
None .36 (.03)
Dearden, 
Machin and 
Reed (1997)
UK National Child
Development
Survey
Weekly eamings at age 33 
for a cohort bom in 1958
Log weekly father’s 
eamings when son 16.
Instrumental variables 
using father’s ed and 
social class
.58 (.06)
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Table 2.3: Summary of Literature on Changes in Intergenerational Persistence
Study Country Data Source Approach Results
Mayer and Lopoo 
(forthcoming)
US PSID Sons bom from 1949-1965. Compare rolling three-year cohorts. 
Dependent variable is family income at 30.
Decline in elasticity after 1953- 
57 cohort. p=.47 to |3=.27.
Corcoran (2001) US PSID Sons bom 1953-1968. Split into two cohorts, bom before 1960 and 
bom after 1960.
Decline in elascities between 
the cohorts |3=.25 to (3=.2.
Fertig (2002) us PSID Five cohorts, not strictly based on birth year. In first cohort parental 
earnings observed 1968-1972, child’s earnings observed 1985-1989. 
Difference between two cohorts is dropping earliest year from the 
previous sample and adding a later one.
Decrease in persistence for 
father-son pairs, no change for 
daughters or mother-son pairs.
Lee and Solon (2004) us PSID Uses all valid observations for adult children from 1978-2000. 
Assumptions on age-eamings profiles are made to distinguish time, 
cohort and age effects.
No change
Levine and Mazumder 
(2002)
us PSID, NLS, 
General 
Social 
Survey
Measures sons in early 1980s in all three surveys and compares with 
early 1990s.
Fall in persistence in PSID, 
increase in persistence in NLS, 
no clear trend in GSS.
Ermisch and 
Francesconi (2004)
UK British
Household
Panel
Hope-Goldthorpe indices of occupational prestige are used as the 
measure of economic status. Cohorts bom from the 1940s to the 1970s 
are compared.
Persistence in occupational 
index has fallen from p=.29 to 
p=.22
Fortin and Lefebvre 
(1998)
Canada General
Social
Surveys
1986 and 1994 GSS obtain information about earnings and parental 
characteristics, parental earnings are imputed using a two stage IV 
method.
No strong evidence of changes
Bratberg et al (2004) Norway Register data Compare cohorts of sons bom in 1950 and 1960 Statistically significant decline 
in persistence, p=.16 to (3=.13
Osterbacka (2004) Finland Census Three cohorts aged 29-31 in 1985, 1990 and 1995 No noticeable trend
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Table 2.4: Summary of Literature on Intergenerational Persistence in 
Daughters9 Earnings, Family Income and Partners9 Earnings
Study Country Data Relationships Considered
Source
Atkinson, UK Rowntree Son’s earnings on father’s earnings .36 (.11)
Maynard and follow-up Son-in-law’s earnings on father’s earnings .41 (.12)
Trinder (1983) sample
Altonji and Dunn US NLS Son-in-law’s earnings and father’s earnings .26
(1991) (correlation)
Chadwick and US PSID Son’s earnings on parental income .52 (.08)
Solon (2002) Daughter’s family income on parental income .39 (.06)
Son-in-law’s earnings on parental income .36 (.08)
Log of son-in-law’s share of combined
earnings on parental income .01 (.005)
Ermisch, UK BHPS Son’s Hope-Goldthorpe index on father’s HG
Francesconi and index. .31 (.02)
Siedler (2004) Daughter-in-law’s HG index on father’s HG
index .20 (.02)
Daughter’s HG index on father’s HG index .26 (.02)
Son-in-law’s Hope-Goldthorpe index on
father’s HG index .20 (.02)
Germany German Son’s occupation on father’s occupation. .33 (.02)
Socio- Daughter-in-law’s occupation on father’s
Economic occupation .26 (.02)
Panel Daughter’s occupation on father’s occupation .25 (.02)
Son-in-law’s occupation index on father’s
occupation .20 (.02)
Son’s earnings on father’s earnings. .40 (.08)
Daughter-in-law’s earnings on father’s .33 (.07)
earnings .15 (.05)
Daughter’s earnings on father’s earnings .15 (.04)
Son-in-law’s earnings index on father’s
earnings
Lam and Schoeni Brazil PNAD, Son’s earnings on father’s education Father-in-
(1994) cross- Son’s earnings on father-in-law’s education law’s
sectional education
survey stronger
Impact on father’s schooling coeff when own Reduced by
schooling included. about 75%
Impact on father-in-law’s schooling coeff Reduced by
when own schooling included. about 70%
US PSID Son’s earnings on father’s education Father’s
Son’s earnings on father-in-law’s education education
stronger
Impact on father’s schooling coeff when own Reduced by
schooling included. about 50%
Impact on father-in-law’s schooling coeff Reduced by
when own schooling included. about 65%
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Chapter 3: International Evidence on Intergenerational Mobility8
3.1 Introduction
The early literature on intergenerational mobility suffered from interpretation 
difficulties; it was unclear the extent to which a particular estimate of the 
intergenerational elasticity (say .4) constituted an indication of a large or small 
amount of mobility. An important way in which this question has been 
illuminated has been through making comparisons of the extent of 
intergenerational mobility across countries. In addition, such comparisons can 
lead to an understanding of the economic mechanisms that lie behind variations in 
levels of mobility for different places.
Comparisons are made problematic, however, by the lack of truly 
equivalent estimates found in the literature. Different researchers take their own 
decisions about variable choice, sample selection and estimation methods, 
meaning that it is impossible to know whether variations are a consequence of 
fundamentals, or a lack of comparability. The review of the measurement of 
intergenerational mobility provided in Chapter 2 has emphasised the biases which 
result from using imperfect data to measure intergenerational mobility. It has also 
highlighted the fact that perfect data is almost impossible to come by. All 
estimates of intergenerational mobility are likely to be biased to some extent. The 
strategy with estimating internationally comparable estimates of intergenerational 
persistence is to ensure that biases are similar across countries. In this chapter I 
attempt to add to the literature with some really careful estimates of 
intergenerational mobility for males in the UK, the US, Canada and West 
Germany.
The discussion in Chapter 2 encourages us to worry about a number of 
aspects of estimation which can lead to potential biases. First and foremost there 
is the difficulty of measurement error: all measures of parental income are likely 
to be imperfect measures of parents’ permanent income, so it necessary to take 
steps to ensure that the bias is not worse in some countries than others. Second, is 
the problem of lifecycle measurement error, as highlighted by Haider and Solon 
(2004). The obvious solution to this problem is to ensure that parents’ and
8 This chapter was supported by funding from the Sutton Trust. I would like to thank Joan Wilson 
for research assistance with the GSOEP data.
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children’s incomes are observed at similar ages across datasets, but as I shall show 
below this may not suffice. In addition, it is of course important to assume that the 
variables used are measuring the same concepts across countries, and that the 
samples are similarly selected.
Chapter 2 provided a review of the international evidence on the 
intergenerational mobility of sons. The conclusion which emerges from the 
literature so far is that mobility appears to be more limited for the US, UK and 
France, with Sweden and West Germany exhibiting moderate mobility and 
Canada and the remaining Nordic countries being most mobile. What is also 
illustrated in Chapter 2 is that comparisons made on the basis of the existing 
literature may not be satisfactory. In many cases estimates are drawn from single 
country studies and take no account of the importance of common methodology. 
While Corak’s (2004) meta-analysis takes into account the way in which 
methodology will affect the estimates, we may wish to verify his results as they 
rest on strong assumptions about the extent of the biases introduced by different 
measurement approaches.
It is clear that the literature would benefit from a more systematic 
approach to comparisons across countries. The results reported here are cross- 
sectional comparisons of mobility for young men in the UK, US, Germany and 
Canada bom around 1970. The datasets used are the British Cohort Study, the 
PSID, the GSOEP and the Canadian Intergenerational Income Data respectively. 
All of these studies have been used in intergenerational analysis previously. 
Comparisons of single country studies (ie Solon 1989, 1992, Dearden et al 1997, 
Wiegand, 1997 and Corak and Heisz 1999) encourage us to expect that mobility is 
lower in the US and UK, and higher in Canada and Germany. My results 
generally confirm this picture. Income persistence is strongest in the US and UK, 
with moderate persistence in Germany and more mobility in Canada. 
Unfortunately, due to small sample sizes, the only significant result is that there is 
more mobility in Canada than in the US and UK.
As well as providing more information to evaluate levels of 
intergenerational mobility across countries “comparisons of intergenerational 
mobility across countries may yield valuable clues about how income status is 
transmitted across generations and why the strength of that intergenerational
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transmission varies across countries.” (Solon, 2002, page 59, original emphasis).
My discussion, in Chapter 2, of Solon’s (2004) model of how intergenerational 
mobility varies across time and place, showed that the relationship between 
parental income and son’s human capital and the returns to human capital both 
have crucial parts to play in the transmission of economic status between 
generations.
In order to find out how the contribution of education to intergenerational 
persistence varies across countries, I decompose my estimates of the 
intergenerational elasticity into three parts; the part due to return to education, the 
part due to educational inequality and the part unexplained by education. My 
estimations show that education is important in generating earnings persistence in 
all countries, but particularly so for the US, due to high earnings returns to 
education.
This chapter proceeds in the next section by describing my empirical 
approach followed by a description of the data in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
discusses the results for the comparison of intergenerational mobility; Section 3.5 
describes the decompositions, while Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Approach
The majority of this chapter takes a standard regression approach to measuring 
intergenerational mobility, where the parameter of interest is /? from the regression 
of sons’ earnings on parental income for individual i in country j.
In Y ~  = a, + 0 , In Y f ”m + n jA g e ^ " 1 + + ^ jA g e f+ e ,j  (31)
In my estimations I use earnings at around 30 years old and parental income at 
around age 16. The choice of comparable ages is motivated by Haider and Solon 
(2004) and Grawe’s (2003) observations about lifecycle bias, an issue to which I 
return below.
The mainstream intergenerational literature has concentrated on measuring 
the elasticity between fathers’ earnings and sons’ earnings. However the British 
dataset does not have separate measures of father’s earnings, so I use parental 
income instead. This seems to be an equally interesting measure and makes sense
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from an investment point of view, as I am able to see the impact of total resources 
in childhood. Also, I do not lose as many observations due to missing fathers. I 
supplement the analysis with measures of father-son elasticity where possible, to 
improve comparability with the existing literature. The difference between 
measures of mobility based on parental income and those based on father’s 
earnings is obviously related to the extent of lone parenthood in the countries and 
female participation in the countries under discussion; I shall return to this point 
in the results section.
To take account of variations in the income distributions between the two 
generations I also report the partial correlation between parents and sons’ 
incomes, r. In a regression which includes controls for age, the partial correlation 
will be equal to the coefficient on father’s earnings times the ratio of the residual 
standard deviations. I report this as an alternative measure of persistence.
(3.2)
rj= (C0ITitaYf*«™s^ ,to Y ^ |/ lg, ) =  P A  ^
The advantage of this measure is that it is insensitive to differences in the 
variance of sons’ and parents’ incomes within the sample. This is an issue for 
three reasons: first, as pointed out by Grawe (2003), the variance in parental 
income is likely to be larger because parents are further along in their lifecycle -
this will reduce p , this will be compounded in this case by measuring income for 
parents but earnings for sons. In terms of comparisons over countries, different 
lifecycle patterns of income and earnings variance could lead to different
estimates of P  but will not affect r. The correlation measure of mobility also 
takes into account the different levels of inequality between generations and 
changes in inequality between generations and over time. This may prove to be 
particularly important as I am considering mobility for young men growing up as 
inequality rose considerably in the US and UK, and more moderately in Canada 
and West Germany (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, Table 4).
In Chapter 2 I stressed the importance of using nationally representative 
samples and minimising measurement error, illustrating how early estimates of 
intergenerational mobility were substantially biased downwards due to these 
issues. The first of these concerns hopefully should not be relevant here, as all the
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data sources used here should be broadly representative of the population.9 
Measurement error is more of a concern, and to overcome it, I average income 
over a number of years wherever possible. My approach is discussed in detail 
below when each country is taken in turn.
In addition to the regression results, I present some estimates of transition 
matrices. These are derived by dividing the income distributions of parents and 
children into equal numbers of quantile groups (I use quartiles) and noting the 
proportion from each parental quartile which finish in each quartile of the 
children’s distribution. Complete immobility is represented by all of the children 
who begin in a particular quartile remaining in the same quartile (all cells in the 
leading diagonal equal one, the others equal zero), complete mobility would be 
where the starting quartile has no effect on the destination (all cells equal .25). An 
index of immobility is generated by adding the values found in the lead diagonal 
and adjacent cells.
To consider the role of education in underpinning intergenerational 
persistence I borrow a considerably simplified version of Solon’s (2004) model. It 
is clear that education attainment varies according to parental income, such that 
Ed*™ = a0j + y/j In YijH,rent* + etJ. This is due to both differing endowments and 
differing investments across families. Education has benefits in the labour market 
such that In Y*™* +aXj +<pjEd*°ns +u(Jwhere (f>j denotes the return to education in
country j. This means that the overall intergenerational elasticity can be 
decomposed into the return to education multiplied by the relationship between 
parental income and education, plus the unexplained persistence in income that is 
not transmitted through education.
P i = t ¥ t +
Cov(Ulv In Y ‘ (3-3)
KarOn y 1 1 )
The data available only allows education to be measured by quantity (and even 
this is done crudely, as discussed in the data section) so aspects of the quality of 
education, as well as many other unmeasured factors, will be included in the 
unexplained component.
However, the extent to which surveys are representative can be affected by attrition and this issue 
is discussed in the Appendix.
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3.3 Data
Intergenerational Mobility Data
The UK analysis is the building block for the approach taken to the rest of the data 
used in this chapter. In some respects the UK has ideal datasets for exploring 
intergenerational relationships, as it has two large cohort studies which observe 
children from birth to adulthood, also obtaining information about parents along 
the way. I use the second of these datasets, the British Cohort Study (BCS), for 
comparisons of mobility across countries. The members of this cohort are all 
those bom in a single week in 1970; gross weekly usual parental income data (but 
not father’s earnings) is available for age 10 and age 16, and gross weekly usual 
adult earnings are collected in 2000 when individuals are 30.
In both years when parental income information is collected in the BCS, 
income is reported in bands rather than continuous amounts. I generate continuous 
variables by fitting a Singh-Maddala distribution to the data using maximum 
likelihood estimation. This allows me to find the expected value within the band. 
This is particularly helpful in allocating an appropriate value for those in the top 
category10.
The dataset used for the US analysis is the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics. This is an annual survey which began with 4800 families in 1968. 
Analysis is restricted to those young men who are children of the initial sample 
members (excluding the Survey of Economic Opportunity members) who were 
bom between 1965 and 1973. Parental income and fathers’ earnings are observed 
at age 16 and the four adjacent years, and sons’ earnings are observed in 2001 
(and therefore refer to 2000).
The disadvantage of my precise approach to comparability is a very small 
sample of just 187 sons. This is to a large extent a consequence of the reduction in 
the core sample from 1997. Such a small sample unsurprisingly leads to rather 
large standard errors. In order to reduce these difficulties, I also report estimates 
for a larger sample of all sons bom between 1954 and 1970.1 once again observe
10 Singh and Madalla (1976). Many thanks to Christopher Crowe for providing his stata program 
smint.ado which fits Singh-Maddala distributions to interval data.
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parental income in the years around age 16 and observe sons’ earnings for age 
301 \  and this leads to a much improved sample of 527.
There are a variety of variables available to measure parental income, after 
experimentation I have settled on the “family money” measure less the earnings of 
those other than the “head” and “wife”- this is motivated by the fact that the 
teenager’s own earnings will be correlated with his later labour market 
performance. I also present results using father’s gross earnings as the explanatory 
variable. Both of these variables are annual amounts.
For West Germany I use the German Socio-Economic Panel, which is
based on very similar principles to the PSID. Unfortunately it began much later, in
1984. As in the PSID, I select the sample of young men bom between 1965 and
1973. The short panel means that I am unable to follow the full sample from ages
1 014 to 18, instead I use parental income information from 1984-1988 . The 
parental income variable is household net monthly income; once again the 
teenager’s own income is subtracted. The outcome measure used is gross monthly 
earnings in 2000. The GSOEP consists of a number of sub-samples; I restrict to 
the core nationally representative sample. As with the PSID, the stringent 
approach to comparability leads to a small sample of around 220, so I also use a 
supplementary sample which includes some older sons (those bom between 1960- 
1973), raising the sample to 289.
The Canadian analysis is based on information from the Canadian 
Longitudinal Tax Records held by Statistics Canada. The tax records provide 
information on all income tax returns in Canada between 1979 and 1998. 
Information on names, addresses and ages included in the data allowed Statistics 
Canada to match individuals bom between 1962 and 1970 with their parents, this 
was possible provided both generations filed a tax return while the child was 
living at home in his or her late teens.13 The matched data forms the 
Intergenerational Income Data (IID) and its basis on administrative records means
11 For sons who turn 31 in 2000 or 1998 (the years when there was no survey) data for the 
following year is used.
12 This means that the age at which family income is measured ranges from 11-15 to 19-25 and is 
collinear with sons’ age. This effect should be ameliorated by controlling for son’s age.
13 This requirement is less stringent than it would be in the UK as individuals are legally required 
to file a tax return if they worked at all in the previous year, so this will include part-time and 
holiday work of those in education.
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its size is considerable: Statistics Canada estimates that the data includes around 
70 percent of the relevant age group (Cook and Demnati, 2000). A more complete 
description of the creation of the data is given in the appendix to Corak and Heisz 
(1999) and Oreopoulos (2003).
One of the main advantages of using administrative data is that there is 
considerably less concern about attrition and measurement error, particularly as 
most earnings reports come directly from the employer. The reliance on tax 
records brings with it a worry that the data may not be fully representative of the 
Canadian population. One of the key requirements to be included in the dataset is 
that the parent and child both file for tax while living in the same household. The 
dataset will therefore exclude those with no labour market attachment in their 
teenage years, those who leave home before they start working, or those whose 
parents have no labour market attachment. Evidence from Corak and Heisz 
indicates that the selections introduced by the matching process do not change the 
results.
For comparability purposes, I focus on a young group within the sample, 
those bom between 1967 and 1970. Sons’ gross earnings are obtained from the 
most recent year available, 1998. Parental income is, as with the PSID, obtained at 
age 16 and the surrounding four years. I use total parental income as the 
explanatory variable; this is market income plus pensions, grants and employment 
insurance. Significantly, it does not include welfare payments, as these were not 
required on the tax return until 1992.
In all the countries where samples include more than one son per family, I 
include all the sons available and cluster the standard errors by family identifier, 
thus accounting for the correlation between unobservables among brothers. Other 
studies also restrict to sons who have both parents present in the household, I do 
not. Consequently, I use the average age of the parents to control for differences 
in parents’ ages. One additional restriction is necessary. The British and Canadian 
data do not include self-employment income in the earnings variables; I therefore 
exclude the self-employed from all samples.
A focus on comparability has been at the forefront of the construction of 
the data used in these studies. However, there are some differences which are
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unavoidable. The British income data for both generations is collected on a 
weekly basis, whereas for Germany the income data is monthly and for the US 
and Canada it is annual. In Chapter 2 I emphasised the downward-biasing effect 
of measurement error. It is clear that weekly income is likely to be a more 
erroneous measure of permanent income than annual income. Unfortunately, 
relatively few studies have attempted to quantify the magnitude of this impact. 
Boheim and Jenkins (2000) consider the implications of using weekly rather than 
annual income measures to compute the extent of inequality using British 
Household Panel data. The authors find that in the distribution of income does not 
vary much depending on the measure used; however, this does not mean that a 
household’s position in the income distribution does not fluctuate. In the context 
of measuring intergenerational mobility, we might expect this non-comparability 
to bias down the estimates for the UK and Germany compared to the US and 
Canada. However, it should be emphasised that the information asked for in the 
UK is ‘usual’ weekly income, hopefully meaning that not all week-by-week 
fluctuations will be reported.
Education Variables
In order to decompose the intergenerational elasticities into those parts explained 
and unexplained by son’s education level, it is necessary to have comparable 
measures of continuous education across countries. Unfortunately, the Canadian 
tax data does not offer any information about education levels; it is therefore not 
possible to include Canada in this analysis. In order to believe the decompositions 
for the other countries, it is essential that the education variables used are 
comparable.
The custom of measuring educational attainment by years of schooling is 
quite reasonable in the US system. Young people take one grade per year and 
measured schooling naturally takes the form of ‘grades completed’. This measure 
is particularly useful as not only does it measure schooling continuously but it 
also has an attainment component, as students sometimes have to repeat grades in 
order to pass them.
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The situations in the UK and West Germany are not so simple. The 
education systems in these two countries are clearly based on qualifications 
attained rather than grades completed, and students follow alternative tracks. For 
example, in West Germany students are split into qualitatively different schools at 
around age 13. In order to resolve this difficulty I convert the qualifications 
attained into years of schooling in the UK and West German data. In the UK this 
is done crudely on the basis of the usual age that individuals leave education after 
attaining the highest qualification recorded. In West Germany I use the schema 
developed by Pischke (1993) which is based on adding the years spent at school 
(which depends on the school type) to the years spent in vocational training (the 
work-experience component of apprenticeship is acknowledged by allocating half 
a years schooling to each year spent achieving one) and the years spent at 
university. The resulting coding is extremely similar to the one derived 
specifically for cross country comparisons by Lillard et al (2002).
Educational attainment can also be measured categorically, to better 
recognise the different structures of the education systems in different countries. 
Steedman, McIntosh and Green (2004) derive a categorisation of comparable 
education levels in order to conduct a cross-country comparison of skill 
attainment. This is a difficult task, as some qualifications do not match up well 
across countries. In order to overcome this difficulty Steedman et al allocate 
proportions of individuals with a particular qualification to different codes. This is 
not suitable for my micro-level analysis. Instead, I use four categories of 
attainment similar to the Steedman et al coding which are broadly comparable 
with lower secondary attainment, secondary attainment, some post-secondary 
schooling and higher education (more details are provided in the Appendix). 
While this categorical variable cannot be used to decompose the explained part of 
persistence, it can be used to check how the levels of returns compare across 
countries and to derive the unexplained part of persistence.
3.4 Comparative Measures of Mobility
Table 3.1 summarizes the samples used in my comparative estimates of 
intergenerational mobility for the UK, the US, Germany and Canada, and provides
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a survey of the information in the data section. This Table highlights my focus on 
individuals bom around 1970 and my aim to measure sons’ parental income when 
they are approximately 16 and their own earnings at around 30 years old. In 
addition, it shows clearly the difference between the comparable samples and the 
extended samples used for the US and West Germany.
In order to minimise the impact of measurement error I wish to use time- 
averaged measures of parental income wherever possible. However, the extent to 
which this is possible varies across the surveys. In particular, in the British data 
income measures are only available at ages 10 and 16. I therefore present results 
for three different income measures: single year income, averages of income over 
two years and income averaged over five years.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 describes the data used in this section of the analysis. Means and 
standard deviations are set out for the variables used, both in levels and logs. 
Direct comparisons of the measures are made difficult by changes in exchange 
rates over time, however some issues are apparent.
The first two lines of the Table show how the mean ages of sons and 
parents compare between countries. These re-emphasise the focus of the samples 
upon sons at around age 30 to 31, although the sons from the extended West 
German sample are rather older, with a mean age of almost 33. The average 
parental age is very similar across countries at around 43-45, although parents in 
the UK and US appear to be somewhat younger than those in West Germany.
Moving on to the income measures, for the UK sons’ average earnings at 
age 30 are slightly larger than their parents’ income at age 16; in all other 
countries the opposite is true. Additionally it is the case that there is greater 
inequality in the UK in the sons’ generation than for parents, which is not the case 
for the other countries. This appears to indicate that measurement problems in the 
UK data lead to an underestimate of the mean and variance of parental income. To 
a certain extent the low variance found in the data is a mechanical consequence of 
the fact that it is based on banded data. It is difficult to know what to do about 
this; however the fact that the correlation is independent of relative variances
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Germany rather lower. After the adjustment, the gap between mobility in Canada 
and in the other countries increases.
The results based on two-year averages of income in the second panel are 
slightly higher than in panel (1). This indicates that averaging over two years of 
data reduces measurement error to a certain extent. The patterns are very similar 
to those for the single year estimates with weaker mobility exhibited in the US 
and UK and more mobility shown in West Germany. Unfortunately I cannot add 
comparable estimates for Canada to this table at present, but as we shall see, 
estimates using five years of data also indicate high mobility, so it is reasonable to 
say that mobility in Canada is high by international standards.
The five year averaged results given in the lower panel are higher in all 
countries as one would expect, showing that the use of a more permanent measure 
of income reduces measurement error. The largest change when we move from 
the single-year to the averaged results is for the US, where r rises from around 
.23-.26 to around .35-.4. This large change indicates more transitory income 
mobility in the US. It also raises questions about the extent to which estimates for 
the UK would rise if more years of data were available. Comparing across 
countries, the results are similar to those presented for a single measure of 
income, although the gap between the US relative to Canada and Germany has 
widened.
These results seem to broadly confirm expectations from the literature; 
however before taking these conclusions too far, it is important to see the extent to 
which it is possible to distinguish the estimates from each other when some of the 
samples used are so small. To consider this question, I include 95 percent level 
confidence intervals for all the estimates. The small sample sizes used for the US 
and West Germany lead to very large confidence intervals, although it is clear that 
the use of the extended samples reduces them somewhat. The very large sample 
provided by the administrative data in Canada gives us much more confidence 
about the level of mobility there, and I can say that mobility in Canada is 
significantly greater than mobility in the UK and the US.
Table 3.4 provides results for the father-son elasticity of earnings for the 
US, West Germany and Canada. Once more the averaged results show a higher
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elasticity of earnings from father to son in the US than in other countries. For 
West Germany the estimates of /? for father’s averaged earnings on the extended 
sample is .303 and r is .283. This is substantially higher than obtained by Couch 
and Dunn (1997) and Grawe (2004), but much more similar to the results obtained 
by Wiegand (1999). This increase in the estimate closes part of the gap found in 
Table 3.3 between the US and Germany, although persistence in the US still 
appears to be greater by the partial correlation measure. Once again, the point- 
estimates of the correlations imply that there is more mobility in Canada than in 
the other countries under study.
A comparison of the estimates in Table 3.4 with those reviewed in Chapter 
2 generally show that the approach to the data taken here does not lead to a large 
change in the estimates of intergenerational mobility. An exception to this is the
P  for the US which is .33 based on five years of father’s earnings compared to 
.41 for a similar specification in Solon (1992). Although it appears substantial at 
first glance, this difference is not statistically significant. The difference reflects 
the rather small sample sizes used in intergenerational analyses of the PSID, and 
the sensitivity of the analyses to differences in definition and the years of data 
used. These features of the data are discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
The Inequality Adjustments
It is worth taking a moment to consider the implications of the inequality
S D \nYPam"\Age
adjustments made in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. If (--------—-----)>1 then r > f i ,  this
SD*r V*
indicates that parental inequality is greater than sons’ inequality. Under stable 
aggregate inequality, this is the result that we would expect for two reasons. First, 
because I am measuring parental income rather than earnings and the variation in 
income from other sources will magnify the dispersion. Secondly, because parents 
will be older than sons when incomes are observed and we know that the variance 
in income and earnings increases with age. If inequality is rising fast enough
S D \n Y Far™ \A g e
between the two generations to counteract these effects then (--------------- ) < 1 and
^ ^ l n Y 30nl\Age
r< P  . The evidence from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 as to which of these effects
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dominates is mixed. Despite the large rises in inequality experienced in the US 
over this period, the adjustment is more likely to result in a fall in the estimate, 
indicating that the lifecycle effect is dominating.
Parental Income Mobility versus Father’s Earnings Mobility 
In the US and Canada /? is slightly higher for family income than for father’s 
earnings. This is what might be expected if total resources during childhood are 
more important than individual parents’ earnings; this is in line with the human 
capital investment model described in Chapter 2. In West Germany the reverse is 
true when comparing averaged results, and as we have seen, this difference is 
important as it reduces the gap between estimated mobility in the US and West 
Germay.
This difference could have several causes. In the first case it could be a 
consequence of sample selection; to be included in the fathers’ earnings 
regressions there must be a working male head of household. However, imposing 
this restriction on the parental income regressions does not explain any of the 
differences. Second, in the German data income is measured net of tax with 
transfer payments included, while the US data does not subtract tax, so will 
account for less redistribution16. If the appropriate transmission mechanism within 
the family is based on endowments rather than investments, more redistribution 
will result in less persistence from family income to son’s earnings. I have 
checked this hypothesis by using gross joint parental earnings; once again there is 
substantially less persistence in Germany than when mobility is measured using 
fathers’ earnings.
This leads to the conclusion that there is a genuinely stronger transmission 
mechanism to sons’ earnings from fathers’ earnings than from parental income in 
West Germany. This is confirmed by splitting the sample into families where both 
parents’ work and where only the father works. If father’s earnings are truly more 
closely linked with sons earnings then we would expect a larger association on 
parental income when the father is the only breadwinner. There is suggestive
16 We would expect there to be less redistribution in the US even if the data was measured 
comparably.
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evidence that this is the case, for the extended sample the partial correlation is 
.169 (.089) among families were both parents work while it is .259 (.082) for 
families were only the father works.
In West Germany the sole-breadwinner model lasted rather longer than in 
any of the other countries studied: for example Fitzenberger and Wunderlich 
(2002) show that the rise in employment for females in West Germany has been 
much smaller than in the UK. In 1986 50 percent of mothers are working in my 
German sample, compared with 70 percent for a comparable sample of 16-year- 
olds in the US. This is likely to mean that the selection of mothers into work is 
different and has implications for the contribution of mother’s wages to household 
income. These contrasts between West Germany and the US provide some 
suggestive evidence in favour of the importance of endowments rather than 
human capital investments in generating intergenerational persistence. In the 
investment model it should be income as a whole which determines investment; in 
Germany this is very clearly not the case, with a stronger relationship between 
fathers’ and sons’ earnings only too apparent. If assortative mating on 
endowments is similar for parents in the US and West Germany, then we would 
imagine that higher female participation leads to parental income being more 
closely related to parental endowments in the US, accounting for the stronger 
relationship between sons earnings and parental income in this country17.
The important distinction between measuring family resources by either 
parental income or father’s earnings has been given scant attention in a research 
area which began when father’s earnings and family income were more 
legitimately interchangeable. This is clearly no longer the case, and the results 
discussed here have illustrated that comparing intergenerational estimates with 
different explanatory variables may be able to tell us more about the mechanisms 
which underlie mobility. This area is clearly ripe for further research.
Transition Matrices
17 This discussion also has implications for the intergenerational mobility of women, with the 
implication that we would expect mobility to be higher for women compared with men in West 
Germany. This deserves further investigation
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Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 and 3.8 show transition matrices between sons’ earnings 
and averaged parental income for all four countries. For the US and West 
Germany I use the extended samples. For the US, UK and West Germany I use 
two year averages of parental income and remove the age variation before 
dividing the data into quartiles. These transition matrices imply rather more 
persistence across generations for the US than for the other countries. The 
aggregate index of immobility is 3.092 for the US compared with 2.885 for the 
UK, 2.798 for West Germany and 2.771 for Canada. One of most important 
features of these transition matrices is the higher proportion of individuals with 
parents in the poorest quartile who remain in this quartile in the US; .417 
compared with .374 in the UK , .322 in Canada and .304 in West Germany. There 
is also a higher degree of persistence at the top in the US and UK compared with 
the other countries, so not only is it harder to climb up, but it is also more difficult 
to fall down the income distribution relative to one’s parents.
Life-cycle earnings profiles
Taking on board the findings of Haider and Solon (2004) about the biases 
introduced by observing sons at a young age, I have been careful to observe sons 
at the same age in all countries, apart from in Germany where the sons in the 
extended sample are somewhat older. In this section, I demonstrate the 
importance of this restriction, the implications of relaxing it, and comment upon 
whether it is sufficient to ensure that estimates are truly comparable across 
countries.
Since Mincer (1958), it has been acknowledged that workers with more 
training have steeper eamings-experience profiles, and therefore that the returns to 
education tend to increase with age. In Haider and Solon’s formulation of 
measurement error, At indicates how different age-eamings profiles by skills
result in current income underestimating permanent income for those with higher 
permanent incomes.
y*„ = 4 + “,, (3 -4 >
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I explored the way that this type of measurement error introduces bias through 
both fathers’ and sons’ incomes in Section 2.3. These biases will lead to an 
underestimate of p  if sons are observed at a young age when At<\. Ideally we
wish to compare sons at the same point in their age-experience profile, and 
differences in age-eamings profiles across countries may mean that the current 
approach does not suffice.
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 explore age-eamings profiles for men between 25 and 
38 of different education levels for all four countries; this should give an 
impression of the time path of At for sons in each country18. Mincer’s prediction
is true in all cases with steeper earnings growth for the most educated group. In 
the US and Canada there appear to be higher returns to college education than in 
the UK, but the age profiles are similar. In West Germany however, the wages of 
college graduates rise much more steeply than for other groups in their early 
thirties and the full returns do not appear to be reaped until men are around 35. 
This is around 4-5 years later than in the other countries and may indicate that 
At = 1 at a later age. It may be, then, that this effect leads to an underestimate of P
in Germany for younger sons and explains why the results for West Germany 
increase when I include older sons in my expanded sample19.
3.5 Decomposing Intergenerational Mobility
Finally, I turn my attention to the mechanisms which may underpin the variations 
I find in mobility across countries.
In order to motivate the education decompositions which follow, Table 3.9 
shows a breakdown of education levels in the intergenerational samples for the 
UK, West Germany and the US20, both by years of schooling and by my 
categorical education variable. The mean number of completed years of education
18 In order to minimize the impact of the sample selections inherent in the intergenerational data, I 
use the Labour Force Survey for the UK, the Current Population Survey for the US, the full 
GSOEP for Germany and the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics for Canada.
19 It also may explain why the estimates for young sons in Couch and Dunn (1997) are so much 
lower than my own.
20 From this section onwards I focus on results for the extended samples for the US and West 
Germany.
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is broadly similar across the three countries, at around thirteen years. In all cases 
the distributions are bi-modal with a concentration of young people completing 
between 10 and 12 years, and a further concentration at 16 years. The lower part 
of the table indicates that the implications of different years of education for the 
level of qualifications vary substantially across countries. In West Germany, many 
students leave after 11 years of education or less; but Germany does extremely 
well when education is measured by qualification level, with only 7 percent of the 
sample achieving below level 3 in my schema. This is due to the success of West 
Germany in producing well-qualified apprentices who have spent relatively little 
time in formal schooling. In all three countries more than one fifth of the sample 
are graduates, with the UK performing particularly well in this regard with almost 
30 percent achieving a degree.
Table 3.10 provides an analysis of the returns to education by country, 
using both measures of education. The return to a year of education varies 
substantially across countries. It is highest in the US at .106, .075 in the UK and 
.064 in West Germany. These results can be compared with those found by 
Denny, Harmon and O’Sullivan (2004) who use data from the International Adult 
Literacy Survey to estimate the returns to education in many countries. Their 
samples of all working individuals show returns to a year of education of .100 for 
the UK, .089 for the US and .054 for Germany. These seem broadly comparable 
with my findings, bearing in mind that my samples focus on a particular cohort of 
young men.
The second set of results in Table 3.10 present returns to qualification 
level. These present a rather different picture from the years of education results. 
Again, the returns to education in the US are higher than in the other countries; 
but the gap between the UK and West Germany has closed, with returns to 
qualifications in these two countries now appearing extremely similar. This 
indicates that the years of education variable for West Germany should be treated 
with some caution in the decompositions. This is not surprising given the 
descriptive patterns which showed many people attaining level 3 qualifications 
after a short period of schooling.
Table 3.11 shows decompositions of intergenerational mobility. These are 
based on the intergenerational coefficients, when two-year averages of parental
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income are used as the explanatory variable of interest. The estimates of P 
reported here imply that the UK is least mobile, followed by the US and then 
Germany. The partial correlations presented in Table 3.3 gave a slightly different 
pattern showing mobility to be weakest in the US, then the UK followed by West 
Germany. The difference in the ranking of the UK and US is due to the larger 
variance in parental income in the US, as discussed previously in the text. Either 
way, the large standard errors mean that the estimates are essentially 
indistinguishable.
The first aspect to note from the decompositions is the importance of 
educational levels in explaining intergenerational mobility. Differential levels of 
education explain between 35 and 50 percent of intergenerational mobility across 
countries, this is the case even when education is measured crudely by years of 
schooling. The largest contribution of education to intergenerational persistence is 
made in the US, where 50 percent of the p  coefficient can be explained by my 
simple decomposition. In particular, the strong returns to education in the US play 
an important role. The UK has the highest extent of persistence in this 
specification, this is driven both by a relatively strong relationship between 
educational attainment and parental income and also by a large unexplained 
component. Further investigation of this unexplained component is an obvious 
target for future research.
As noted above, the large variance in parental income in the US leads to 
an underestimate of p  for that country. It is clear from the parts of the 
decomposition shown in Table 3.11 that both the returns to education and the 
relationship between parental income and education (measured by the covariance) 
are stronger in the US, and that these lie behind the strong income persistence 
found in this chapter. It is possible to use these results to calculate some 
counterfactuals. To take two examples: if the UK had the same relationship
ibetween education and parental income as the US , ft would equal .340, much 
higher than its actual level. Similarly, closing the gap in returns between West 
Germany and the US would lead to closure in the gap in p  for the two countries; 
p  for West Germany would be .262.
21 In calculating this counterfactual it is important to remember that both variances and co- 
variances contribute to regression coefficients. I vary the relationship between parental income and 
education while keeping the variance of parental income constant.
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As I have already stated, these results are strongly contingent upon us 
having faith in the measures of educational attainment used. Although it is not 
possible to do a complete decomposition using the categorical measures, these 
alternative measures of educational attainment can be used to make a number of 
comments about the decomposition results presented in Table 3.11. The results 
presented in Table 3.10 strongly suggest that the use of the years of education 
variable is underestimating the role of educational returns in generating 
intergenerational persistence in West Germany. This implies either that the 
relationship between parental income and years of schooling or that the extent of 
unexplained persistence is exaggerated for West Germany in Table 3.11.
To investigate the sensitivity of the results to the education measure, I 
recalculate unexplained persistence for all countries, using the four category 
education attainment variable. The change to the unexplained component is 
remarkably small. In the UK slightly less mobility is explained by education, with 
the unexplained component estimated as .184 using the education categories, 
compared with .177 using years of education; for the US this comparison is .138 
compared with .134. In West Germany, where we might expect the strongest 
influence from changing the education variable, there is no difference; the new 
model reveals unexplained persistence to be .135 regardless of which education 
variable is used. This indicates that the West German results may overestimate the 
importance of differences in years of schooling by parental income level and 
underestimate the importance of the returns to education in generating 
intergenerational persistence.
3.6 Conclusions
This research has attempted to provide a new approach to the data sources for 
estimating intergenerational mobility across countries. By attempting to make the 
mobility estimates as comparable as possible, I illustrate some of the important 
methodological issues in the current literature on cross country estimates of 
intergenerational mobility.
This comparative study of intergenerational mobility indicates that there is 
somewhat more mobility in Canada than in the other countries under examination.
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Drawing further firm conclusions about relative mobility in the US, UK and 
Germany is prevented by small sample sizes. The small samples used for the 
GSOEP and PSID are partly a consequence of the stringent approach I take to 
ensuring comparability; implying a trade-off between precision and 
comparability. However, this is only part of the story.
One of the motivations behind this Chapter was to address the concerns 
about the comparability of methodology across countries in the estimates 
intergenerational mobility to date. It was anticipated that the results found would 
be able to shed light on the most important dimensions where comparability is 
important. In particular, I wished to evaluate surveys such as Corak (2004) that 
use assumptions about the impact of differences in methodology to overcome 
some of the non-comparability between studies of individual countries.
In general, the results from this survey have been in line with those from 
the literature to date. Throughout, I have emphasised that the size of the standard 
errors prevent me from drawing strong conclusions, this appears initally to be a 
disadvantage of the methodology adopted. However, it should be noted that many 
of the standard errors in the survey in Table 2.2 would also prevent strong 
conclusions being drawn from comparisons across studies. For example, there is 
no statistically significant difference between Solon’s (1992) .41 estimate 
(standard error .09) for the US and Wiegand’s (1997) estimate of .32 (standard 
error .07). The statistical significance of Corak’s (2004) conclusions will be 
affected not only by the precision of the estimates in the original study but also by 
uncertainty over the assumptions made to overcome methodological differences. 
In fact, Corak does not include any standard errors in his review. Consequently, 
while the point estimates found in this chapter may not be dramatically different 
from those found in across country studies, an advantage of the methodology 
adopted here is the explicit consideration of the uncertainty inherent in cross 
country comparisons of mobility.
Putting aside these caveats, point estimates of the elasticities appear to 
indicate somewhat less mobility in the US and UK, with West Germany more 
mobile. In the last Section of the Chapter measurement questions were put aside 
to address the more interesting question of why mobility varies across countries. 
Many models of intergenerational mobility stress the role of education in
71
determining the persistence of incomes across generations. My explorations for 
the US, the UK and West Germany indicate that this is important, with higher 
returns to education being particularly crucial in driving the low mobility found in 
the US, while a strong relationship between parental income and education is a 
feature for the US and the UK.
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Figure 3.1: Male Earnings Profile in the UK
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Notes:
1. The data is from the Labour Force Survey 1994-2002, all quarters pooled.
2. Males bom between 1958-1973.
3. Earnings are reported as gross weekly.
Figure 3.2: Male Earnings Profile in the US
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Notes:
1. The data is from the Current Population Survey 1990-2000.
2. Males bom between 1960 and 1973.
3. Earnings are reported as gross annual.
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Figure 3.3: Male Earnings Profile in West Germany
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Notes:
1. The data is drawn from the full GSOEP sample 1993-2001.
2. Males bom between 1960 and 1973.
3. Low education is defined as no school degree or a secondary or intermediate school 
degree only. Medium education is classed as upper secondary school or apprenticeship. 
High education is degree and technical college.
4. Earnings are reported as gross monthly.
Figure 3.4: Male Earnings Profile in Canada
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Notes:
1. Data is taken from the cross-sectional sample of the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics, 1993 to 2001.
2. Sample is all men bom between 1965 and 1970,41775 observations.
3. Earnings are annual and adjusted to 2000 prices.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Comparative Samples
Country Years of 
birth
Year of 
Earnings 
Data
Parental Income Measure
Single Two year Five year 
measure average average
United 1970 2000 Age 16 Age 10 and N/A
Kingdom age 16
United States 1965- 2000 Age 16 Age 10 and Age 14 through
1973 age 16 age 18
United States 1954- Age 30 Age 16 Age 10 and Age 14 through
Extended 1970 age 16 age 18
Sample
West Germany 1965- 2000 1986 1984 and 1984-1988
1973 1988
West Germany 1960- 2000 1986 1984 and 1984-1988
Extended 1973 1988
Sample
Canada 1967- 1998 Age 16 N/A Age 14 through
1970 age 18
Notes:
1. The two year average for the US is based on age 10 and age 16 parental income in 70 
percent of cases, for the remaining cases age 16 income is averaged with the nearest 
available income observation to age 10.
2. An explanatory variable based on age 10 and age 16 income would be perfectly possible 
using the Canadian IID, however as I cannot currently access this data I am able to add 
this analysis.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Comparative Samples
UK (£) US ($) US ($) W. Germany W. Germany Canada
Extended (DM) Extended (CDN$)
Sons’ Ages 30 31.67 (2.38) 30 31.13(2.51) 32.60 (3.46) 29.55 (2.40)
Fathers’ Ages 43.40 (5.30) 43.16(5.27) 43.47 (5.64) 45.26 (6.20) 46.55 (6.35) -
Sons’ Earnings 1929(1326) 4230(2756) 3799 (2307) 5164(2808) 5332(2692) 2970 (2575)
Ln Sons’ Earnings 7.440 (.472) 8.196 (.524) 8.108 (.505) 8.444 (.465) 8.480 (.464) 7.706 (.942)
Parental Income (One year) 1732(1037) 6019 (3674) 5806 (3772) 4782 (3888) 4730 (3565) 5153 (5314)
Ln Parental Incomes 7.283 (.613) 8.522 (.634) 8.487 (.633) 8.343 (.472) 8.331 (.490) 8.285 (.836)
(One year)
Parental Income (Average) 1571 (726) 5911 (3248) 5774 (3584) 4660(1889) 4774(2388) 5207 (4704)
Ln Parental Incomes (Average) 7.255 (.463) 8.542 (.550) 8.501 (.577) 8.374 (.383) 8.376 (.431) 8.328 (.755)
Dads’ Earnings (One year) 4289 (2588) 4760 (3489) 5494 (3891) 5417 (3630) 4175 (3540)
Ln Dads’ Earnings 8.169 8.244 (.768) 8.457 (.448) 8.485 (.438) 8.143 (.709)
(One year) (.700)
Dads’ Earnings (Average) 4257 (2359) 4738 (3202) 5357 (2635) 5319(2600) 4187 (3331)
Ln Dads’ Earnings (Average) 8.200 (.600) 8.285 (.613) 8.506 (.381) 8.500 (.377) 8.182 (.590)
Sample Size 1708 187 527 220 289 428022
Notes:
1. The table reports sample means with standard deviations reported in parentheses.
2. All incomes are in 2000 home currencies (Deutsche Marks for West Germany).
3. All earnings and incomes are converted to monthly amounts. Parental incomes are gross for all countries except Germany where it is “post-government”.
4. Fathers’ and sons’ earnings are gross in all countries.
5. Averages include missing years in the US, Canada and Germany.
6. The statistics for averaged results are based on the 10 and 16 averages for the UK and five-year averages for all other countries.
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Table 3.3: Comparisons of Intergenerational
Mobility Based on Parental Income
(1)
Single measure of parents’ income
P Confidence Partial Confidence Number of
Interval Correlation Interval Observations
UK .209 (.020) .169-.250 .267 (.026) .216 - .318 1708
US .262 (.071) .121 - .403 .307 (.084) .412-.472 187
US .236 (.042) .153-.319 .292 (.052) .097 - .470 527
Extended
W. Germany .146 (.056) .036 - .256 .154 (.059) .038 - .270 220
W. Germany .203 (.070) .102-.304 .223 (.056) .113-.330 289
Extended
Canada .165 (.002) .160-.169 .143 (.002) .139-.146 428022
(2)
Two year averages of parents’ income
UK .281 (.028) .226 - .336 .271 (.027) .218-.324 1708
US .289 (.082) .127-.450 .289 (.082) .128-.450 187
US .259 (.032) .195-.322 .321 (.040) .243 - .399 527
Extended
W. Germany .153 (.071) .014 - .292 .136 (.062) .014 - .258 215
W. Germany .175 (.073) .033 -.318 .171 (.071) .032-.310 273
Extended
(3)
Five year averages of parents’ income
US .379 (.073) .236 - .522 .385 (.074) .240 - .530 187
US .308 (.039) .232 - .384 .349 (.040) .263 - .435 527
Extended
W. Germany .171 (.070) .033 - .309 .146 (.060) .028 - .264 220
W. Germany .210 (.057) .096 - .324 .197 (.054) .091 - .303 289
Extended
Canada .205 (.002) .200-.210 .178 (.002) .173-.182 428022
Notes:
1. Regressions are of sons’ earnings on parent’s incomes, with controls for sons’ and
parents’ ages.
2. The variables used are detailed in the text and Table 3.1.
3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are corrected for correlations between
brothers.
4. When weights are used in the Canadian analysis the coefficients are depressed by around
.005.
5. Two year averages for the US are based on ages 10 to 16 where information at age 10 is
available or using the closest information to age 10 where it is not.
6. For Germany income from 1984 and 1988 is used for the two year average.
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Table 3.4: Comparisons of Intergenerational Mobility
Based on Fathers’ Earnings
(1)
Single measure of father’s earnings
P Confidence Partial Confidence Number of
Interval Correlation Interval Observations
US .201
(.072)
.059 - .343 .256 (.091) .078 - .434 172
us .168 .081 -.256 .255 (.067) .124-.386 492
Extended (.044)
W. Germany .204
(.066)
.072 - .336 .213 (.069) .078 - .348 174
W. Germany .225 .108-.342 .242 (.064) .117-.367 227
Extended (.059)
Canada .135
(.003)
.130-. 140 .113 (.002) .109-.117 303953
(2)
Five year average of father’s earnings
US .330
(.065)
.201 - .458 .355 (.070) .218-.492 185
US .286 .211 -.360 .343 (.045) .254 - .432 472
Extended (.038)
W. Germany .284
(.082)
.122-.446 .254 (.073) .111 - .397 174
W. Germany .303 .162-.443 .283 (.067) .152-.369 227
Extended (.071)
Canada .189
(.003)
.183-.196 .159 (.003) .154-.164 303953
Notes:
1. Regressions are of sons’ earnings on parent’s incomes, with controls for sons’ and 
parents’ ages.
2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are corrected for correlations between 
brothers.
Table 3.5: Transition Matrix for the UK
Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental average Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
income quartile
Bottom .374 .222 .247 .157
2nd .293 .310 .242 .155
3rd .217 .248 .264 .271
Top .119 .220 .252 .409
Notes
1. Immobility Index: 2.885
2. Sample size: 1707
3. Data drawn from the British Cohort Study as described in the text.
4. Variation due to age is removed before the data is split into quartiles.
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Table 3.6: Transition Matrix for the US
Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental average Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
income quartile
Bottom .424 .296 .189 .091
2nd .267 .282 .290 .160
3rd .189 .250 .242 .318
Top .130 .160 .282 .428
Notes
1. Immobility index: 3.079
2. Sample size: 526
3. Data drawn from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics as described in the text.
4. Variation due to age is removed before the data is split into quartiles.
Table 3.7: Transition Matrix for West Germany
Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental average Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
income quartile
Bottom .355 .329 .197 .118
2nd .275 .362 .194 .1883rd .219 .137 .370 .274
Top .155 .225 .211 .409
Notes
1. Immobility index: 2.916
2. Sample size: 289
3. Data drawn from the GSOEP as described in the text.
4. Variation due to age is removed before the data is split into quartiles.
Table 3.8: Transition Matrix for Canada
Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental average Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
income quartile
Bottom .332 .289 .218 .160
2nd .245 .269 .262 .223
3rd .211 .238 .272 .279
Top .211 .203 .248 .337
Notes
1. Immobility index: 2.771
2. Sample size: 428022
3. Data drawn from the IID as described in the text.
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics for Education
United Kingdom United States West Germany
Mean Years of 
Education 
% with:
13.08 (2.21) 13.77 (1.88) 12.55 (2.27)
<11 years 7.34 2.28 29.29
11 years 34.60 3.61 26.18
12 years 10.80 33.84 3.91
13 years 7.34 7.98 8.59
14 years 0 12.74 7.03
15 years 12.98 5.70 1.17
16 + years 26.91 33.84 21.48
Level 1 23.89 5.89 6.25
Level 2 32.56 33.84 1.04
Level 3 14.88 26.42 69.10
Level 4 28.67 33.84 23.61
Notes
1. The standard deviation for years of education is in parentheses.
2. For qualifications codings see the appendix.
Table 3.10: Returns to Education
United Kingdom United States West Germany
Regression (1)
Years .075 (.005) .106 (.011) .064 (.011)
Regression (2)
Level 2 .126 (.035) .231 (.064) .165 (.163)
Level 3 .209 (.039) .364 (.070) .266 (.125)
Level 4 .423 (.035) .656 (.070) .595 (.139)
Sample 1702 526 288
Note:
The omitted category in the second regression is Level 1.
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Table 3.11: Educational Decompositions
Country P Return to 
Education
Cov(Edson M Y paren,s) Cov{EdM Yparen,s) Var(\nYparen,s) Explained
Component
Unexplained
Component
Cov(uso\ \ n Y paren,s)
Var(\nYparen,s)
Var(\nYparenls)
UK .281 .075 (.005) 1.329 (.113) .275 .207 .099 .182 (.027)
US
(.028)
.259 .107 (.011) 1.169 (.134) .423 .362 .125 .134 (.032)
West
(.032)
.211 .064 (.012) 1.187 (.293) .216 .182 .076 .135 (.054)
Germany (.058)
Note:
I include the variance of parental income in this Table as it is necessary to calculate the counterfactuals -  for example, the extent to which intergenerational 
mobility would change if countries had an equal relationship between parental income and educational attainment.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A.3.1: Qualifications Categories
Education
Category
United Kingdom United States West Germany
1 No qualifications, High school drop out Secondary school
CSEs grades 2-5 leaving certificate or
no leaving certificate
2 0  levels, High school graduate Intermediate school
Apprenticeship leaving certificate
3 A level, Some college Upper school leaving
Advanced Vocational certificate,
(Advanced City and apprenticeship
Guilds etc)
4 Professional College degree University degree
qualification, (grade 16 and above)
Degree
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Chapter 4: Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in the UK and
u s 22
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 I have highlighted how comparisons of intergenerational mobility 
across countries can help us to understand more about the mechanisms which lead 
to limited mobility. Extending these comparisons to changes over time in mobility 
can help even more, as between country differences are fixed and we can begin to 
speculate about how policy and institutional changes affect mobility. In this 
chapter I compare changes in intergenerational earnings mobility for the US and 
the UK. Once again, methodological considerations are vital, and some time is 
spent in considering the robustness of the results given the limited nature of the 
data available.
In the UK I compare the extent of mobility for sons in the 1970 cohort 
(used in Chapter 3) with mobility in an earlier cohort of those bom in 1958.1 find 
strong evidence of a fall in mobility for the UK. I compare this with changes in 
mobility for the US using the PSID over similar cohorts of young men. Owing to 
the small samples available in the PSID I approach this question in several ways 
and find no significant change over the period of interest, although there is some 
evidence of an up-tum in intergenerational persistence for the most recent cohort.
The case of the UK and US is particularly interesting as these countries 
have both experienced large rises in income inequality since the late 1970s 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Cross country comparisons tend to suggest 
strong income persistence in the UK and US compared with more mobility in the 
Nordic countries. This leads us to imagine a positive link between cross sectional 
inequality and income persistence. This hypothesis has often been alluded to in 
the literature, but has not been formalised or conclusively explored (e.g. Hout, 
2003, 2004). In particular, there is no evidence concerning the relationship 
between changing inequality and mobility.
Dickens and Ellwood (2003) show how wage inequality has combined 
with changes in work and demographics to lead to increases in relative child 
poverty in the two countries over the same period. Increasing relative poverty may
22 The work on the UK in this Chapter builds upon the research reported in Blanden, Goodman, 
Gregg and Machin (2004).
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be one route by which increases in inequality lead to changes in mobility. If more 
relative poverty leads to more families being affected by credit constraints, or 
severer constraints for some families, then we might expect that increased 
inequality will lead to a reduction in mobility.
Some of the rise in income inequality since the late 1970s has been a 
consequence of increased returns to education (as illustrated by Machin, 1999 for 
the UK and Katz and Autor, 1999, for the US). Solon’s (2004) model of changes 
in mobility is very clear on the effect of rising returns to education (as, indeed, is 
the decomposition shown in the previous chapter). Expected returns will influence 
parental investment. If parents anticipate higher returns to human capital 
investment they will make more investments if they can afford to, leading to a 
larger gap between the human capital of those from richer and poorer 
backgrounds. Higher realised returns will lead to a stronger relationship between 
human capital investments and children’s income, generating another positive link 
between rising inequality and increasing intergenerational persistence.
Solon’s model also has several other predictions. The first is that the 
increased heritability of endowments across generations will lead to increased 
income persistence. As discussed in Chapter 2, endowments include everything 
that is transmitted between generations without investment decisions being made. 
The inherited component of immobility is inevitably somewhat of a black box. 
The advantage of considering changes in intergenerational mobility in the same 
countries is that, hopefully, some of the factors in this black box will remain 
constant over time.
The other mechanisms mentioned by Solon are more explicitly policy 
relevant, in that they consider the balance between public and private investment 
in children’s human capital. Solon shows that parental investments (and, 
consequently, intergenerational persistence) will increase with the productivity of 
parental human capital investment, and will fall with the progressivity of 
government investment. Conceptually, it is somewhat difficult to separate these 
two components. We can imagine that parental investment will be more 
productive when the investment provided by the government is low, investments 
in teaching a child to read will be very productive whereas additional cello lessons 
may be less so. It is harder to imagine what else may influence the efficiency of
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parental investments. Nonetheless, it is clear that increased government 
investment is likely to lessen the difference between the human capital of those 
from richer and poorer families and thereby increase intergenerational mobility.
Solon’s emphasis on government investments illustrates the possible 
importance of changes in education policy in the two countries. As the direct costs 
and foregone eamings associated with education increase substantially at the end 
of the compulsory stage it is common for credit constraints to be discussed 
primarily in the context of further and higher education. In Chapter 5 I focus on 
how changes in education policy have influenced the relationship between 
parental income and educational attainment in the UK, so I provide only a short 
summary for both countries here.
The overall story is that there has been a large expansion in post- 
compulsory education in the UK since the 1970s, at both the further and higher 
education level. This has been coupled with a cut-back in means-tested support 
for university students. Both of these points shall be discussed in considerable 
detail in Chapter 5.
In the US, the increase in enrolment rates has been more muted. Card and 
Lemieux (2000) show an analysis of enrolment by age, sex and year and 
demonstrate that while college enrolment rates rose slowly for women from the 
1970 onwards enrolment for men dipped somewhat in the 1970s before 
rebounding. Enrolment rates for men at age 19 increased from around 40 percent 
in 1980 to 55 percent in 1996. The direct costs of attending university are 
substantially higher than in the UK, and there have been much less dramatic 
changes in the educational attainments of young people. The assistance available 
for young people in the US takes several forms, including means-tested (Pell) 
grants, subsidised loans and state-subsidised colleges and universities. Over the 
1980s and 1990s fiscal stringency meant that fees at public colleges rose and loan 
limits were frozen. For more on the financing of higher education in the US, see 
Kane (1999) and Dynarski (2004).
In this chapter I focus on students who would have attended university 
between the 1970s and late 1980s. In the UK, the younger students would have 
been at the beginning of the large expansion of higher education, while later
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cohorts in the US would have been feeling the start of cut-backs in Government 
subsides.
In the next section I review the previous literature on changes in 
intergenerational mobility in the US, UK and other countries. In section 4.3 I 
discuss the data, while in Section 4.4 I consider the estimation approaches taken. 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide a review of the results, with an emphasis on the 
robustness of my findings. Section 4.7 discusses the implications of this chapter, 
and Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Current Evidence
Measuring changes in intergenerational mobility over time has become a growing 
area of research, especially for the US. Several papers have now addressed 
changes in intergenerational mobility in the US, although none seem to 
satisfactorily address the issue in a way that is comparable with the data we have 
available for the UK. In addition, the studies have produced mixed evidence, so 
there is value in considering the question once more.
The main difficulty in considering changes in mobility in the US is that the 
main dataset available, the PSED, yields rather small sample sizes. This has been 
illustrated clearly in Chapter 3, and the problem worsens when the objective is to 
measure persistence across several time periods. Corcoran (2001), Fertig (2002) 
and Mayer and Lopoo (forthcoming) (known as henceforth as M-L) split the 
available data by cohort, choosing one value to represent the earnings (or family 
income in the M-L case) of the individual (Corcoran and Fertig both use an 
average measure, but there is still just one observation per individual).
Corcoran uses those bom between 1953 and 1968 and splits the data at 
1960 to create two samples to compare. Parental income is observed over as many 
years as possible between age 8 and 17 and son’s earnings are the average taken 
over ages 25 to 27. Fertig’s method is less clear as the five cohorts she uses are 
based on the years in which parental income is observed, but not the child’s age 
specifically. M-L measures parental income when the child is aged 19-25 while 
adult family income is observed at age 30 for cohorts bom from 1949 through 
1965. The number of individuals observed for each birth cohort at age 30 is very
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small. This difficulty is partly overcome by comparing rolling cohorts which 
include three birth-years of observations. All three of these studies find that the 
intergenerational elasticities have decreased over time in the US, but the changes 
observed are often on the margins of statistical significance.
Levine and Mazumder (2002) supplement these studies by using the 
National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) and the General Social Survey (GSS) in 
addition to the PSID to explore US trends. They also find evidence of an increase 
in mobility using the PSID but a fall in mobility is found in the NLS surveys. 
Evidence from the GSS does not paint a consistent story. Unfortunately, both the 
GSS and NLS have their own problems as sources of data for intergenerational 
mobility. In the GSS there is no parental income measure, so income must be 
imputed either on the basis of the child’s five category retrospective report of 
relative income, or on the basis of father’s occupation and industry. There is also a 
problem with the parental income data in the NLS: in the first survey this is 
reported by sons and in the second by parents. This means that additional 
measurement error alone may be responsible for the lower estimates observed for 
the first survey.
The purpose of a new paper by Lee and Solon (2004) is to obtain estimates 
on changes in intergenerational mobility over time for the US which use the PSID 
but are based on much larger samples and are therefore more reliable. Lee and 
Solon use all the earnings observations available for children aged 25 and over in 
the PSID between 1978 and 2000 and regress these on parental earnings averaged 
over ages 15 to 17. This method means that the number of observations used and 
the ages at which earnings observations are taken is related to the birth cohort. 
The intergenerational coefficient obtained for each year of earnings data will 
result from time, age and cohort effects. For my purposes cohort effects are the 
main interest as we wish to compare the life chances of children bom at different 
points in time. The authors admit that cohort effects can only be separately 
identified if the age-eamings profiles of the different cohorts are identical over 
time, a nontrivial restriction. The conclusion of Lee and Solon’s work is that 
intergenerational mobility is constant across time for the US.
This review has illustrated that there is no ideal solution for measuring 
changes in intergenerational mobility in the US; all the available data has
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limitations. However, the PSID appears to be the most suitable data available. In 
this chapter, I focus on methods similar to both Corcoran and M-L to discuss 
changes over time in ways which are comparable with the data available for the 
UK. However, the clear limitations with these approaches mean that I take 
particular care to focus on the robustness of my results.
For the UK, research on changes over time is much more limited and the 
research presented here is the first to consider changes in intergenerational income 
mobility. Goldthorpe and Mills (2004) and Ermisch and Francesconi (2004) have 
measured changes in social mobility using occupation based social class measures 
and indices. Both studies find that the intergenerational connection between 
occupational status has declined over time. The interpretation of these results is 
complicated by changes in the underlying structure of social class and occupation 
over time. While the meaning of income may also change somewhat due to 
changes in the services provided by the non-market sector, my preferred measures 
of mobility use income, not least because income provides more variation and is 
easy to break down into equal-sized groups for ranking.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are a number of papers which study 
changes in intergenerational mobility in other countries. The evidence from these 
suggests either no change or a decrease in intergenerational persistence over time. 
Taken as a whole, the current literature tends to point towards an increase in 
mobility. In this context, the evidence I find for a sharp fall in mobility in the UK 
is particularly striking, and leads us to question which factors have led to such a 
unique result for the UK, compared with other countries.
4.3 Data
UK Data
The two cohorts used in the UK comparison are the National Child Development 
Survey (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study (BCS). The BCS is used in the 
cross-country comparison in Chapter 3, and, as discussed there, includes all 
individuals bom in a single week in April 1970. The National Child Development 
Survey features the cohort bom in a week in March 1958, twelve years earlier. 
While the BCS has information on the cohort members at age 5, 10, 16 and 30,
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the NCDS has data collected at ages 7, 11, 16, 33, and 42. The important sweeps 
of data for my purposes are the age 16 sweep for both cohorts and the age 30 
sweep for the BCS and age 33 sweep in the NCDS. At age 16, income 
information is provided by parents in both cohorts, while in the early 30s, 
information is obtained on earnings.
The parental income data is not provided in an ideal form in either cohort. 
The information on NCDS income is presented by source “father’s earnings”, 
“mother’s earnings” and “other income”. In each case parents are asked to provide 
information by selecting the band into which their net weekly or monthly income 
from each source falls. There is some ambiguity in terms of what missing reports 
for each component mean: does it mean that families have no income from this 
source or simply that the information is missing? If it is the case that a component 
is missing then there is an argument for dropping the observation. This issue is 
considered in some detail in a data note by Micklewright (1986) and I have 
followed his advice in excluding families where a parent’s earnings are missing 
but they are reported to be working in another part of the questionnaire. The BCS 
parental income data is not reported by component. Instead, parents are asked to 
indicate which band (from 11) their gross total weekly income falls into.
In order to use banded data as an explanatory variable in the usual 
intergenerational model I must convert it into a continuous form. For the NCDS I 
assign each component a single value which is the midpoint for this component 
for similar families in this band in the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) in 1974. 
Family income is generated by summing these variables. Combining information 
on three components means that the final income distribution has 77 different 
values. For the BCS, where there is only one banded variable, I use maximum 
likelihood estimation to model a Singh-Maddala distribution for the data, as in 
Chapter 3. In principle, it should also be possible to estimate the distribution 
based on the 77 unique categories in the NCDS, but the fact that the upper and 
lower bounds for the categories are not exclusive means that this is 
computationally impractical.
The methods of data collection indicate some clear problems with the 
comparability of the parental income data across the cohorts. First, there are 
clearly many more unique values possible for the NCDS than the BCS. Second,
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the NCDS income components are reported as net of tax while the BCS asks for 
gross income. To account for this, I refer across to the FES data for the 
appropriate year (in this case 1986) where incomes are reported both net and 
gross. I can then calculate the proportion paid in tax by families in each band. I 
subtract the median of this from the expected value obtained in the Singh- 
Maddala distribution23. The final difficulty is that the NCDS income question 
clearly asks parents to include child benefit, whereas the BCS data asks that it be 
excluded. I therefore impute a value for child benefit based on the number of 
children in the household (and lone parent status for the BCS). My initial 
estimates use data where this amount is added to the BCS income, but I also 
experiment with subtracting it from the NCDS instead.24
There is one final concern with the parental income data, which relates to 
the NCDS only. In 1974, when the age 16 data was being collected for this cohort, 
Britain was in the midst of a three-day working week due to a power shortage 
brought about by unrest in the coal industry. The worry is that parents would 
report their incomes from a three-day week rather than their usual incomes. Grawe 
(2004c) considers this difficulty by comparing reported father’s earnings across 
the period when the three-day week was in effect with information gathered after 
it had ended. The study seems to find convincingly that few income reports have 
additional measurement error due to the exceptional circumstances and Grawe 
states that his best estimate of the fraction of misreports is zero.
Compared to these difficulties, the cohort members’ earnings data 
available for the two cohorts are more straightforward to use. For both cohorts 
individuals are asked to provide information on their gross and net pay and state 
the period which each covered. I use gross pay in my analysis to be comparable 
with the information available in the US data, and convert this to monthly figures. 
Unfortunately, there appear to be a number of cases in which the pay period has 
been incorrectly coded; consequently this data has been carefully cleaned. 
Inevitably, an element of judgment is in play, but the cases which need attention 
are generally obvious due to either extremely high or low weekly earnings or
23 The proportion subtracted in tax is zero for the first two income bands (up to £100 a week in 
1986 prices) and rises up to 26% in the top income band (those with incomes of £500 or more).
24 Child benefit rates for 1974 and 1986 were obtained from the Institute for Fiscal Studies web 
site http://www.ifs.org.uk/taxsystem/contentsben.shtml.
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hourly wages, or great inconsistency between the net and gross weekly earnings 
(different pay periods are asked for each measure). Both sets of earnings data used 
here have been cleaned independently by colleagues at the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies and the changes made generally match up well between the two versions, 
(for example, the correlation between the two versions of the BCS earnings data is 
.82). As discussed in Chapter 3, a limitation of the BCS data is that information on 
self-employment income is poor, this is also a problem in the NCDS. 
Consequently, the self-employed are dropped from both datasets, as are those not 
in employment at the time of the survey.
In summary, the comparisons made over time for the UK rely on a 
comparing the relationship between parental income at age 16 and individual 
earnings at age 33 for a cohort bom in 1958, with the relationship between 
parental income at age 16 and earnings at age 30 for a cohort bom in 1970. The 
comparison is necessarily based on two snap-shot measures, and this limitation 
must be borne in mind when we extrapolate to draw conclusions about the trends 
in intergenerational mobility in the UK.
The discussion in the preceding chapters has made the point, time and 
again, that measurement error in the parental income measure can lead to serious 
biases in the estimation of intergenerational mobility. The fact that the UK 
estimates rely on single week (not even single year) measures of parental income 
is therefore of some concern. The instrumental variables solutions proposed in 
Chapter 2 are unsuitable here, experimentation has shown that using education 
and social class as instrumental variables in the cross-cohort context is dubious. 
Sargan tests indicate that the extent of upward bias introduced by these variables 
varies substantially across the cohorts and that estimates seem to be very sensitive 
to the choice of instruments. The difficulty posed by measurement error in the 
explanatory variables is therefore of great concern, the most important dimension 
of this is the extent to which the extent of measurement error varies across the 
cohorts. The robustness of the results to measurement error will be considered in 
detail.
A further concern about these data is the extent of attrition and item non­
response in the two cohorts, the combination of these two data problems means 
that only one fifth of the original cohorts can be used in the intergenerational
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analysis. Once again, the concern is that these difficulties may lead to different 
biases in the two datasets, meaning that the results are not legitimately 
comparable. This issue is addressed in some detail in the appendix; however, I 
flag up the key implications of my analysis in the results section.
US Data
The PSID data used to estimate changes in intergenerational mobility over time in 
the US has been discussed in some detail in Chapter 3. To recap, this survey 
follows a national sample of households from 1968 to the present, following all 
members as they split from sample households to form new households. In many 
ways this data is highly suitable for considering the trend in intergenerational 
mobility as it is collected every year and available for all birth cohorts. The 
difficulty is that the numbers of observations available for a particular birth cohort 
are limited, as has already been discussed.
I measure parental income in the same way as in Chapter 3. Parental 
income is taken as the total family money measure less the earnings of members 
other than the “head” and “wife”. In the analysis which is comparable with the 
UK, I average parental income over ages 14 to 18. Sons are matched to parents on 
the basis of the head of the household in which the son lives at age 16 (provided 
he is classified as a “child” in the household); this is in contrast with the approach 
of M-L, who use the parental identifier file to match children on parents, as 
commented upon further below. These two decisions are taken to ensure 
comparability with the information in the UK data where family income is the 
income of the “parents” who live with the child at age 16.
The sons’ earnings used as the earnings for the year the son turns 30, 
obtained when he is 31. For the sons who turn 31 in 2000 or 1998 (the years when 
there was no survey) data for the following years is used. Those who report 
themselves to be self-employed at the time of the survey are excluded.
The PSID is composed of two sub-samples: the nationally representative 
Survey Research Centre sample (SRC), and the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
(SEO) which focuses on the disadvantaged. Lee and Solon (2004) and Fertig 
(2002) discard the SEO (as do I in Chapter 3), while M-L include the additional
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observations and use the weights provided to account for the over-sample. The 
benefit of this is that the effective sample size increases. I show results which both 
include and exclude the SEO in order to discover whether this decision has 
important implications.
I take two broad approaches to the data. First, I split the data by birth 
cohort into three exclusive samples, those bom 1954-1957, 1958-1962 and 1963- 
1970; this is similar to the approach chosen by Corcoran. Second, I use the rolling 
birth cohort approach use by M-L. I begin the rolling cohort analysis by 
replicating M-L’s analysis as far as possible for cohorts bom from 1949 to 1965.1 
then modify this approach to be as comparable as possible to the UK cohorts and 
consider sons bom up to 1970.
Replication of M-L’s estimates is important. The criticisms of the small- 
sample approach to measuring changes in intergenerational mobility are in part 
due to the fear that the results found are due to specific decisions concerning 
sample selections and variable use. If results from this approach are to be taken 
seriously, it is necessary to show they are robust to different approaches. In 
particular, M-L use parental income measured between ages 19 and 25 and use 
family income, rather than earnings, as the dependent variable. It is important to 
know what impact these decisions have on the results. In addition, it is necessary 
to show how results for later cohorts (not considered in the M-L analysis) are 
related to those for earlier groups. The main finding of the M-L paper is that the 
intergenerational elasticity declined for sons bom between 1953 and 1965. The 
two questions I address are: is this trend still present when data is used which is 
more comparable to what I have in the UK, and does it continue for cohorts bom 
from 1965 to 1970?
4.4 Estimation Approaches
As in Chapter 3, I focus on two measures of intergenerational persistence; the 
intergenerational elasticity ( Pcj) and the intergenerational partial correlation ( rcj),
the parameters and variable are subscripted by cohort c in country j  as these are 
the two dimensions which are varied in this analysis.
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As before, /? is obtained from a regression of son’s earnings on parental income, 
as in equation (4.1).
In Y”  = « ,+ /? „  In YZ™  + K A g e r ‘‘ + rir> A g< r'2 + K A g e f + e kj ( 4I )
The partial correlation is obtained by adjusting /3 by the ratio of the parents to 
child’s standard deviations of income/earnings.
S D  taY PARENTSM , ,
rci=(CorrcjtoYP^ KIS|Age =  P c,(  ^  >
As in Chapter 3, the virtue of the correlation measure is that it will be invariant to 
differences between the variances of sons’ earnings and parental incomes. This 
will adjust for changes in inequality between the two generations, and the fact that 
the change in inequality between parents and children may vary by birth cohort as 
aggregate inequality increases in both countries.
4.5 Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in the UK
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the data used to investigate 
intergenerational mobility in the UK. This table confirms that we are considering 
two cohorts facing an era of increasing inequality. There is more earnings 
inequality for sons in the BCS than the NCDS, and parental incomes are more 
unequal among the second cohort than the first25.
Table 4.3 reports the first estimates of changes in intergenerational 
mobility in the UK. For sons bom in 1958 the elasticity of own earnings with 
respect to parental income was .205; for sons bom in 1970 the elasticity was .291. 
This is a clear and statistically significant growth in the relationship between 
economic status across generations. For the correlation estimates, the fall in 
mobility is even more pronounced. The correlation for the 1958 cohort is .166 
compared with .286 for the 1970 cohort. The correlation is lower than the 
elasticity for the 1958 cohort because of the particularly strong growth in
25 The parental incomes reported here for the BCS are different from those reported in Table 3.2 as 
parental incomes have been adjusted for tax and child benefit as explained in the data section. The 
sample is also larger as in Chapter 3 I imposed the restriction that income data should be available 
at ages 10 and 16.
(4.2)
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inequality between parental income and son’s earnings (in other 
words, s d 58'”'!°'W > y This is no surprise when we remember that 
parental income was collected in 1974 whereas sons’ earnings were measured in 
199326.
Initial results suggest that the intergenerational mobility of sons has 
decreased between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in the UK. However, given the 
complications and difficulties noted in the data section, it is important to give the 
robustness of this result thorough consideration. I now produce a number of 
pieces of evidence in support of my initial result.
As explained in the data section, the form of the two datasets is far from 
ideal, and some adjustments have been made to get the data in the form shown in 
Table 4.1. First, I experiment with the adjustment for child benefit. To recap, the 
NCDS data comes in bands for three components of net income, an expected 
income is assumed for each band and component and the resulting values are 
added. In the BCS, gross income (less child benefit) is measured on an 11 
category scale and appropriate expected values for each band are computed by 
fitting a Singh-Maddala distribution.
In order to make the BCS data more comparable with what is available in 
the NCDS, a proportion is removed for tax and imputed child benefit is added. It 
would be unreasonable to completely ignore these difficulties. An alternative 
would be to calculate the child benefit which is received by the NCDS families 
and subtract this from the NCDS income instead. When this is done, the change in 
the elasticities falls slightly to .063 (.033) compared to .085 (.036) moving it on to 
the margins of statistical significance. However, the change in the correlations 
remains strongly significant at .110 (.033).
Ultimately, the refutation of the results presented in Table 4.2 depends 
upon the NCDS estimates suffering from greater downward bias than the BCS 
estimates. As discussed in previous chapters, Haider and Solon (2004) have 
shown that downward bias can come from measuring sons’ earnings at an early
26 Differences between the results for the BCS in Table 4.2 and those in Table 3.3 are due to 
differences in the measure of parental income, as described above. The difference is larger for the 
unadjusted results (betas) because accounting for tax and child benefit equalise parental income, 
leading to higher estimates of beta.
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age. However, since the NCDS data is observed at 33 compared with age 30 in the 
BCS, this is unlikely to be responsible for the differences between the cohorts 
Any differential downward bias is likely, therefore, to result from poorer 
measurement of parental income data in the NCDS.
Table 4.3 shows a calibration exercise on how much larger the 
measurement error would be required to be in the NCDS for us to conclude there 
is no statistically significant rise in the partial correlation for sons across the 
cohorts, for various assumptions on measurement error in the BCS. For example, 
the first row of the Table shows that if we assume complete accuracy in the BCS 
one would require measurement error in the NCDS to be 26 percent for sons. As I 
relax the assumptions on the accuracy of the BCS data, it is clear that the 
measurement error required in the NCDS to get rid of the rise also increases and is 
often substantial. For example, if measurement error in the BCS is as high as 
Mazumder’s (2000) recent paper suggests, the NCDS measurement error would 
need to be 73 percent for the rise we observe to be rendered statistically 
insignificant. Table 4.3 shows under various assumptions that there would need to 
be substantially higher measurement error in the NCDS data to eliminate the 
pattern of rising intergenerational immobility across the two cohorts.
Transitory income variations are the main form of measurement error in 
parental earnings or income mentioned in the literature. The problem is especially 
acute here as parental income is just a single weekly measure. In order to get a 
handle on the effect this may have on my estimates, I have investigated changes in 
the permanent versus transitory component of labour income in a large British 
data source, the New Earnings Survey panel. The New Earnings Survey is a one 
percent employer reported database covering all British employees carried out in 
April of each year. It contains very accurate wages data from employer records 
and enables one to follow people through time. This data can be used to work out 
the permanent and transitory components of earnings and compare them with the 
NCDS and BCS data.27
27 Dickens (2000) undertakes a detailed study of how much of the rise in earnings inequality seen 
in Britain is due to a rise in the permanent versus the transitory components of earnings. He finds 
about half of the rise in the variance of hourly earnings between 1975 and 1995 to be permanent, 
and half transitory.
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If the relative importance of the transitory component of income has 
decreased over time, then this provides some independent evidence from another 
data source for the possibility of higher attenuation bias in the NCDS. It seems 
that the data is partly in line with this. Estimating a fixed effect earnings equation 
over five years of data for a cohort equivalent to the BCS fathers shows that 
transitory fluctuations in income account for 21 percent of the total variance. A 
comparable figure for NCDS fathers is slightly higher at 32 percent. However the 
last row of Table 4.3 shows the variance contribution of transitory income would 
need to be higher than this, at 44 percent, to result in no statistically significant 
fall in mobility. In summary then, Table 4.3 shows that measurement error in the 
NCDS would need to be quite substantial to even reduce the observed rise to 
statistically insignificant levels, let alone to account for it entirely.
In the appendix I consider the implications of attrition and non-response 
for these results. While it is very difficult to be entirely confident about how 
results will be driven by selections into the sample on unobservable 
characteristics, the evidence available suggests that the finding that 
intergenerational mobility has declined reflects a real change rather than being 
driven by data weaknesses. Therefore, all the evidence presented so far 
encourages us to believe that there has been a genuine rise in the link between the 
incomes of parents and their sons in the UK. The next step is to find out whether 
similar trends are observed in the US.
4.6 Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in the US
The PSID data is much more flexible than the data used for the UK. I exploit this 
flexibility, and take a number of approaches to measuring changes in 
intergenerational mobility.
Three Cohort Analysis
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for three cohorts: those bom 1954-1957, 
1958-1962 and 1963-1970. After 1996 the sample was reduced quite substantially 
(dropping many of the SEO families) which is why I include more birth years in 
the final cohort than in the first two. One of the decisions which must be made
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when using the PSID is whether to include the SEO sample and weight the data. I 
have therefore shown the descriptive statistics for both the weighted and 
unweighted data, where the unweighted data excludes the SEO. The unweighted 
data generally seems to have very slightly higher means. This is likely to be 
because the weights take account of differential attrition as well as initial sample 
differences. In general, the patterns for the weighted and unweighted data are very 
similar. There is clear evidence of growth in both parental income and sons’ 
earnings across the three cohorts. Inequality in parental income appears to fall 
between the first and second cohorts and then rise between the second and third 
cohorts. This makes sense, as parental incomes for the cohorts were obtained in 
the early 1970s, the mid to late 1970s and the late 1970s and onwards.
Table 4.5 uses these three cohorts to produce my first estimates of the 
changes in intergenerational mobility in the US. Once again, I present weighted 
estimates in the upper panel and unweighted estimates in the lower panel. What is 
immediately clear is that none of the changes in elasticities or correlations are 
statistically significant. Putting aside the issue of significance, the point estimates 
suggest an overall rise in intergenerational persistence between these three 
cohorts; the opposite trend to the one reported by most of the current papers on 
intergenerational mobility using the PSID. This trend is most apparent between 
the second and third cohorts. These more recent cohorts are not generally used in 
current studies, so there is a possibility that by extending the samples I am picking 
up a trend which has not been examined before. Reassuringly, results do not differ 
substantially between the panels, for either the level or the change. This adds to 
my confidence about the results reported in Chapter 3, which are based on 
excluding the over-sample, this decision will not have made much difference.
Owing to the small samples used, Table 4.6 does not allow strong 
conclusions to be drawn about changes in intergenerational mobility. It is also 
clear that the insignificant rise which is observed could be a consequence of the 
way that the data is split into periods; the effect of moving one birth year between 
cohorts is unclear. Consequently the remainder of the analysis compares results 
based on rolling cohorts, which show how robust the results are to changing the 
definitions of the cohorts.
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Rolling Cohort Analysis
The starting point for this analysis is Mayer and Lopoo’s forthcoming paper, (M- 
L). This paper explores the relationship between family incomes across 
generations, my approach is to move in a step-by-step way from M-L’s analysis of 
family income mobility for cohorts from 1949 to 1965 to my UK-comparable 
analysis of sons’ earnings mobility for cohorts from 1954 to 1970. The first step is 
to replicate M-L’s analysis. I have not been able to be completely precise in this 
replication and Table 4.6 shows how my sample sizes differ from those reported 
in M-L. In every case, my samples are slightly larger than those used by Mayer 
and Lopoo, by around 5 percent. It appears that the authors are placing some 
restrictions on the data which are not obvious by their descriptions in the text.
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.7 show how the results from my replication differ 
from those in M-L’s paper. In the initial cohorts the elasticities I present are quite 
a lot higher than M-L’s results, however from 1953-1956 to 1960-1963 the results 
are extremely similar. Figure 4.3 demonstrates clearly that my replication shows 
the same overall pattern as the M-L results, particularly with regard to the fall in 
the elasticity from 1953 onwards. Mayer and Lopoo do not report the correlation 
coefficients in their paper. However I show the appropriate correlation 
coefficients for my replication. These suggest a flatter trend in intergenerational 
persistence than the elasticities. This is because the difference in inequalities 
across generations reduces for later time periods, as parental incomes begin to be 
affected by rising inequality. For the final cohort parental incomes are observed 
during the 1980s. Changes in inequality may, therefore, lead to an over-statement 
of the fall in intergenerational mobility over this period. Consequently I report 
both correlations and elasticities from now on.
The first step to move from M-L’s approach to one more comparable with 
my UK analysis, is to use earnings rather than family income as the dependent 
variable. The connection between family incomes across generations is 
undoubtedly very interesting, and is considered in great detail in Chapter 6. 
However, this compounds many influences, including the age of family 
formation, wives’ labour market participation and child-bearing decisions. The 
impacts of these in the US are discussed in more detail in Mayer and Lopoo 
(2004). In this chapter I wish to focus on sons’ individual earnings. Figure 4.4
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shows the results from my replication of the M-L approach for both family 
income and earnings as dependent variables. Again, the trends are similar, but 
with earnings mobility somewhat flatter over time than family income mobility. In 
fact, when we look at the partial correlation for earnings, the trend appears to be 
almost flat across the whole time period.
So far my results indicate that the evidence for an increase in 
intergenerational mobility does not seem to be as strong as an initial glance at the 
literature may suggest. I now make a few final modifications to ensure that the 
analysis is as comparable as possible with what I have for the UK. The parental 
income data used in the M-L replication is obtained from parents at age 19-25, 
this seems rather late. The one advantage of using this data is that it enables the 
use of older cohorts who would have been teenagers before 1968 when the survey 
started. However it seems more natural to want to know about the connection 
between sons’ earnings and their parental income in the teenage years, when 
investments are actually being made. Also, the information on British parental 
income is taken at age 16; I therefore use parental income data at age 14-18. In 
addition, I change the way that parents and children are matched. Mayer and 
Lopoo use information from the parental identification file, instead, I use 
information about who the child is living with at 16. Both of these changes mean 
the income measured is more likely to be relevant to the investments made in the 
child.
In Table 4.8 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4 I show the difference that these 
modifications make, and provide results for later cohorts up to 1970. I show 
results for ft coefficients and partial correlations separately. In both cases I report 
three sets of estimates: the first is for my replication of the M-L approach 
(parental income measured from 19 to 25) with earnings as the dependent 
variable; the second shows the same sample but using parental income between 
ages 14 and 18; and the final results show estimates for cohorts up to 1970, using 
parental income from ages 14 to 18 and matching parents on the basis of who the 
child lived with at age 1628. It is clear that for the cohorts where the three 
estimates overlap, the different estimation methods have a limited impact; there
28 The other slight change is that M-L use 1995 weights, for my final estimates I use age 30 
weights. This has very little impact on the estimates.
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are certainly no differences which approach statistical significance. However, 
extending my preferred estimates into later cohorts shows a very sharp increase in 
the point estimates of the intergenerational elasticities and partial correlations.
The picture from point estimates of the /? coefficients is one of increasing 
mobility up until the 1957-1960 cohort, followed by a flat period and then a 
strong fall in mobility (rise in J3) for the 1964-1970 cohorts. For the partial 
correlation results the initial upward trend in mobility is less clear. However, the 
kick up in the estimate for the last cohorts is still very much in evidence; and it is 
also found when the Survey of Economic Opportunity is excluded from the 
sample and weights are not used . I have experimented with a variety of 
functional forms to capture these patterns in the data, but have been unable to find 
any statistically significant trends.
It is unfortunate that there are no datasets which could provide more 
sizable samples of data over this period. A strong finding of increasing mobility 
followed by a fall shortly afterwards would be extremely interesting and may 
make us wonder about the connection between intergenerational mobility and the 
business cycle, for example. However, given the sample sizes that are available 
the only solid conclusion I can draw is that there are no significant changes in the 
US over the period of the British data, nor going back to cohorts dating from 
1949.
4.7 Discussion
To reiterate, the main story which has emerged from this chapter is one of falling 
intergenerational mobility in the UK. The picture for the US is of fairly stable 
intergenerational mobility but with a possible fall in mobility for the most recent 
cohorts.
As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, both of these countries 
experienced a sharp increase in cross-sectional household inequality over the 
period under consideration. One of the motivations behind this chapter is to assess
29 A possible explanation for the very recent change in the estimates o f would be the reduction in 
the sample from 1997 onward. I have repeated the analysis in Table 4.10 on only those individuals 
who are still in the sample from 1997, and there is no evidence to suggest that this explanation is 
correct.
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if the rise in cross-sectional inequality is matched by an increase in 
intergenerational inequality. The evidence for the US suggests that it is not. At 
least, if there is a close link between inequality and intergenerational mobility, 
then there must be countervailing factors in the US which have worked in the 
opposite direction, at least for cohorts bom up to the late 1960s. One explanation 
is that relative child poverty is more important than inequality per se. Dickens and 
Ellwood (2003) show that increases in child poverty were much stronger in the 
UK than the US as inequality rose from the late 1970s onwards.
An alternative candidate explanation for the changes observed is the role 
of education, both through returns and through the relationship between parental 
income and education. In the next chapter I provide a full consideration of the 
relationship between changes in intergenerational mobility and educational 
attainment in the UK. I show that changes in education participation have helped 
to increase intergenerational mobility in the UK, with educational changes (driven 
by an increase in the relationship between parental income and education) 
explaining at least 30 percent of the overall change.
The evidence for the US suggests that the rise in returns to education did 
not have the correct timing to account for the rise in persistence observed at the 
end of my data, while there is little evidence on recent changes in the education -  
parental income relationship.
Angrist, Chemzhukov and Femandez-Val (2004) show a rise in the 
schooling coefficient in an earnings regression from .07 in the 1980 census to .11 
in the 1990 census. The return to education is then constant between 1990 and 
2000. The implication, therefore, is that increases in the returns to education in the 
US could not explain an increase in intergenerational persistence among very 
recent cohorts.
Evidence on changes in the relationship between parental income and 
educational attainment in the US suggests that parental income has had an 
increased impact on children’s attainment. By comparing the High School and 
Beyond Survey of the class of 1982 with the National Educational Longitudinal 
Survey of 1988 Kane (1999, pl26) finds that increases in participation at four year 
college over the 1980s were disproportionately focused on young people with
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higher household incomes. Similarly Manski (1992) finds an increase in the 
relationship between education and parental income in Current Population Survey 
from 1970 to 1988. More recent evidence on the relationship between education 
and parental income is limited.
The findings in the literature on returns to education and the education- 
parental income relationship would encourage us to expect a rise in 
intergenerational income persistence in the US throughout the data, but as I have 
noted, this is only observed in the very last periods of data, if at all. It is hard to 
think of an explanation for a dramatic increase in persistence in recent periods; 
there is no obvious policy change which would produce them. In order to get 
some sense of the forces operating I have repeated the decomposition from the 
previous chapter on each period. The evidence from this suggests that the large 
rises in the elasticity are largely unexplained by education.
As noted above, education does a better job at explaining the change in 
intergenerational mobility in the UK, explaining 30 percent of the change 
observed, and this will be returned to in the next chapter. However, a natural 
question is to ask what explains the remaining 70 percent of the increase in 
persistence. These explanations could also help to shed some light on why 
intergenerational persistence does not appear to increase in the US.
One initial candidate is the composition of families. We know that larger 
families tend to have more income, and also that larger families tend to have 
poorer outcomes per child (see Becker and Lewis, 1973). So far, this has not been 
accounted for in any of the estimates. To investigate this I devise rough 
equivalence scales30 and repeat the intergenerational estimation using equivalised 
parental incomes. The results from this exercise show that the family size can 
explain a small part of the change. Using equivalised income the partial 
correlation rises by .081 (an increase which is still statistically significant) 
compared to .119 in the non-equivalised results. The smaller change is explained 
by the rise in the intergenerational correlation when equivalised income is used in 
the NCDS; this is generated by the strong negative relationship between the
30 The equivalence scales used are based on McClements’ (1977) methodology, but missing 
information on the ages of the cohort members’ brothers and sisters prevent these from being as 
precise as they might be. Equivalised income is obtained by using these scales to derive income 
per adult equivalent.
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family size and earnings at age 33 in this cohort, which is not apparent in the BCS 
sample.
Another aspect of family composition which may have implications for 
estimates of intergenerational persistence is growing up with a single mother. 
This could help to explain the aggregate changes observed if either the proportion 
of children with lone-mothers or the impact of this for intergenerational estimates 
has changed,. The data does not reveal any evidence that this can explain the 
increase in persistence. For both cohorts, the partial correlation estimate is slightly 
larger (by about .01) when children growing up with no father in the household at 
age 16 are excluded. As the proportion of these children with no father in the 
household has risen slightly between the two cohorts, the difference in 
intergenerational persistence along this dimension would contribute towards a fall 
in intergenerational persistence rather than the rise which is observed.
The intergenerational literature rarely assesses the impact of structural 
economic changes for mobility. One example of this would be changes in 
regional inequalities. As shown in Jackman and Savouri (1999) and Gregg, 
Machin and Manning (2004) the regional disparity in unemployment and 
employment rates grew extremely fast between 1979 and 1986, and while gaps in 
unemployment rates have closed through the 1990s, regional inequality in male 
employment rates remained wide through to 1999. The impact of this on 
intergenerational mobility can be expressed in a similar way to the impact of 
education on intergenerational mobility.
Regional disparities mean that sons’ income is a function of the region he 
lives in, gc represents the extent of regional inequality.
In Y™ = «,, + ^ Region™  +u,c (4-3)
The region the son lives in as an adult can be thought of as a consequence of 
parental income. Here parental income represents two aspects of the influence of 
parental background on region of residence; the parents’ own region (the 
importance of which will depend on the migration rate, and the regional 
inequalities that effect parents), and the fact that those with high parental income 
tend to attain university education more move away from home (see Gregg,
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Machin and Manning, 2004, for more on the UK’s national graduate labour 
market). These relationships are captured by 07r , and (abstracting somewhat) more
regional mobility for sons would lead to a reduction in mc between the cohorts.
Region,T = a0, + G7f  In + e,r (4.4)
The impact of regional differences on changes in intergenerational mobility 
therefore depends on the changes in regional inequalities and residential mobility 
between generations. To explain the fall in intergenerational mobility regional 
inequalities would need to have grown, while mobility declined among sons. 
Regional inequalities appear to have remained constant or fallen slightly between 
1991 and 2000. The trend in the extent of regional mobility is less clear and 
appears to depend upon which data source is used; however there is no firm 
evidence pointing towards a fall in residential mobility across regions.
Although far from comprehensive, this discussion has served to illustrate 
how regional inequalities may impact upon intergenerational mobility, and 
demonstrate that in a simple model recent changes in regional inequality cannot 
explain the rise in intergenerational income persistence observed. A similar 
argument could be made in terms of changes in the industrial structure and would 
consider the returns to being in different industries and the influence of parental 
background on the sector of employment.
Esping-Andersen (2004) emphasises the importance of parent-child 
transmissions in early life for generating intergenerational inequalities. He 
particularly stresses the development of cognitive abilities (which are not as 
closely related to educational attainment as we might imagine) and the role of 
cultural capital and the family environment in generating these. He argues that 
the high quality childcare available in Nordic countries reduces the relationship 
between cognitive functioning and parental background that leads to 
intergenerational income persistence. The argument emphasising the importance 
of the early years in encouraging mobility is becoming increasingly common in 
the policy debate in the UK (see Alakeson, 2005).
For the mechanisms discussed by Esping-Andersen to explain the rise in 
persistence there would need to be either an increase in the association between 
family background and cognitive skills, or a rise in the return to cognitive skills in
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the labour market. The importance of these mechanisms are explored to a limited 
extent in Blanden et al (2004) where it is found that adding early test scores 
(proxies for cognitive skills) to the intergenerational model is unable to explain 
the change in mobility. Evidence on the role of other traits which are generated 
within the family and rewarded in the labour market is currently more limited, 
although an analysis of the role of non-cognitive traits in explaining 
intergenerational persistence is on the agenda for future research.
4.8 Conclusion
Comparisons of the 1958 and 1970 cohorts of sons in the UK indicate a large 
change in intergenerational mobility, such that the earnings of sons in the second 
cohort are much more closely linked to parental income than is the case for those 
bom twelve years earlier. This occurred over a period when income inequality 
was increasing for both parents and children.
Despite the growing number of papers which have examined the change in 
intergenerational mobility over time in the US, my findings indicate that the small 
sample sizes available for the US mean that the data is not well suited to 
measuring changes in mobility. The conclusion of much of the literature to date 
(Lee and Solon, 2004, excepted) appears to be that mobility in the US has 
increased in recent years. However, this conclusion appears to be fragile to 
changes in the dependent variable or to using the correlation rather than the 
elasticity as the measure of association. In addition, adding data for cohorts up to 
1970 indicates that intergenerational persistence has rebounded in recent years, 
albeit not to a statistically significant extent. The overall conclusion must be that 
there has been no change in intergenerational mobility which is large enough to 
detect in the PSID.
It is natural to seek an explanation for the differences in the trends 
between the UK and US. Aside from the data issues, why is it the case that 
changes in intergenerational mobility in the UK are so much more dramatic? I 
have discussed a number of possibilities. The direct connection between cross- 
sectional inequality and mobility does not appear to be directly responsible for the 
rise in intergenerational persistence in the UK, as the rise in inequality in the early 
periods for the US was stronger (although child poverty increased more quickly in
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the UK). Changes in education policy are the next likely contender, and changes 
in education policy and participation rates were greater in the UK than in the US 
over this period. As we shall see in the following chapter, education does explain 
some of change in the UK. Nonetheless, this is only responsible for part of the 
difference between the trends in the two countries and while I have discussed 
some likely candidates, the rest remains unexplained.
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Figure 4.1: Mayer and Lopoo Results Compared with my Replication
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Note:
These results are for three-year rolling cohorts. Son’s family incomes are measured at age 
30 while average parental income is measured between ages 19 and 25.
Figure 4.2: Earnings and Family Income Mobility Compared using 
Mayer-Lopoo Approach
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Figure 4.3: Intergenerational Earnings Coefficients: 
Replication and New Results
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Figure 4.4: Intergenerational Earnings Correlations: 
Replication and New Results
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for UK Samples
1958 Cohort (NCDS) 1970 Cohort (BCS)
Son’s Earnings 1867(1130) 1932(1362)
Log Son’s Earnings 7.420 (.464) 7.439 (.475)
Parent Income (age 16) 1390(488) 1480 (730)
Log Parents Incomes 7.171 (.379) 7.188 (.479)
(age 16)
Sample 2161 1976
Notes:
1. The table reports sample means with standard deviations reported in parentheses.
2. Earnings and incomes are in 2000 pounds and are converted to equivalent monthly 
amounts.
3. Parental incomes are now reported net of tax and including child benefit. Sons’ earnings 
are gross.
Table 4.2: Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in the UK
NCDS BCS Change
P .205 (.026) .291 (.025) .085 (.036)
Partial .166 (.021) .286 (.025) .119 (.033)
Correlation (r) 
Sample Size 2163 1976
Note:
Regressions are of sons’ earnings on parents’ incomes, with controls for parents’ ages.
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Table 4.3: Measurement Error Calibrations for the UK
Assumptio Regression f t BCS/0 Implied Implied Implied
ns on From Adjusted for adjusted f i  for NCDS NCDS
British British Changes in NCDS if Regression Error
Cohort Cohort Inequality no statistically
Survey Survey significant
Error change
No error .291 .286 .221 .273 26%
10% .323 .318 .254 .314 35%
Solon .340 .335 .271 .334 38%
14.52%
Mazumder
58%
.693 .684 .619 .764 73%
New 
Earnings 
Survey - 
21%
.368 .363 .299 .369 44%
Notes:
1. No significant rise would require a difference in the adjusted coefficients of .063 or less.
2. The Solon figure is the difference between the average of the single-year estimates 
compared with the five year average.
3. Empirical estimates of the permanent component of earnings in the New Earnings Survey 
panel indicate that in our worst case the transitory component of labour income can have 
only risen to 32% in the NCDS, well within the bounds in the Table (see text of main body 
of chapter).
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Three Cohort Approach to the PSID
1954-1957 1958-1962 1963-1970
Cohort Cohort Cohort
Weighted data
Son’s Earnings Age 30 3140(1510) 3147(1720) 3712(2187)
Log Son’s Earnings Age 30 7.877 (.703) 7.851 (.738) 8.035 (.678)
Parent Income (14-18 average) 5351 (4070) 5415 (3076) 5822(3448)
Log Parents Incomes 8.382 (.633) 8.446 (.574) 8.493 (.622)
(14-18 average)
Sample Size 341 358 288
Unweighted data with SEO sample excluded
Son’s Earnings Age 30 3137(1533) 3322 (1938) 3859(2256)
Log Son’s Earnings Age 30 7.879 (.684) 7.916 (.679) 8.092 (.609)
Parent Income (14-18 average) 5601 (4183) 5595 (3045) 5899 (3415)
Log Parents Incomes 8.439 (.606) 8.485 (.572) 8.527 (.571)
(14-18 average)
Sample Size 169 181 210
Notes:
1. All figures are in 2000 US Dollars per month.
2. The top and bottom one percent of the sons’ earnings distribution are dropped from the 
weighted and unweighted samples.
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Table 4.5: Three Cohort Approach to Measuring
Changing Mobility in the US
Weighted data
p  Partial Sample
________________________________________ Correlation (r)____ Size
1954-1957 .281 (.081) .241 (.069) 341
1958-1962 .367 (.094) .285 (.054) 358
1963-1970 .347 (.080) .317 (.073) 288
Change cohort 1 to cohort 2 .086 (.124) .044 (.088)
Change cohort 2 to cohort 3 -.020 (.123) .032 (.090)
Change cohort 1 to cohort 3 .066 (.114) .076 (.100)
Unweighted data with SEO sample excluded
P Partial Sample
Correlation (r) Size
Cohort
1954-1957 .284 (.107) .237 (.090) 169
1958-1962 .328 (.085) .273 (.070) 181
1963-1970 .342 (.076) .323 (.072) 210
Change cohort 1 to cohort 2 .044 (.137) .036 0114)
Change cohort 2 to cohort 3 .014 (.114) .050 (.100)
Change cohort 1 to cohort 3 .058 (.131) .086 (.115)
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is earnings at age 30; explanatory variable is averaged parental 
income between age 14 and 18.
2. Quadratic age controls are included for both generations.
3. The top and bottom one percent of the sons’ earnings distribution are dropped from the 
weighted and unweighted samples.
Table 4.6 Sample Sizes for Mayer-Lopoo Replication
Sample sizes shown in 
M-L Table 2
Sample Sizes for my 
Replication
1949-1951 245 261
1952-1954 317 332
1955-1957 317 332
1958-1961 375 385
1962-1965 313 330
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Table 4.7: Variations on Replicating the Mayer-Lopoo Approach to
Changing Mobility in the US
Family Income as the Dependent Variable
Cohort
(1)
Results from M-L
(2)
Replication of 
M-L
(3)
Correlation Coeff. for 
Replication of M-L (r)
1949-1952 .346 (.062) .424 (.071) [337] .365 (.061) [337]
1950-1953 .421 (.061) .520 (.064) [382] .414 (.050) [382]
1951-1954 .432 (.061) .522 (.064) [414] .397 (.049) [414]
1952-1955 .429 (.068) .483 (.070) [434] .378 (.055) [434]
1953-1956 .473 (.073) .497 (.069) [429] .419 (.058) [429]
1954-1957 .441 (.068) .440 (.075) [421] .380 (.065) [421]
1955-1958 .400 (.068) .392 (.068) [407] .361 (.063) [407]
1956-1959 .367 (.056) .362 (.058) [389] .332 (.052) [389]
1957-1960 .327 (.054) .297 (.055) [408] .270 (.050) [408]
1958-1961 .301 (.060) .274 (.055) [382] .241 (.048) [382]
1959-1962 .302 (.060) .304 (.074) [392] .233 (.056) [392]
1960-1963 .263 (.064) .269 (.076) [383] .219 (.061) [383]
1961-1964 .270 (.070) .360 (.095) [344] .260 (.069) [344]
1962-1965 .279 (.066) .349 (.093) [330] .248 (.066) [330]
Family Income and Earnings as the Dependent Variable
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Cohort Family Income Family Income Earnings p Earnings
p  (2) above Correlation (3) 
above
coefficient Correlation (r)
1949-1952 .424 (.071) [337] .365 (.061) [337] .392 (.083) [321] .293 (.062) [321]
1950-1953 .520 (.064) [382] .414 (.050) [382] .482 (.057) [361] .342 (.057) [361]
1951-1954 .522 (.064) [414] .397 (.049) [414] .434 (.087) [385] .295 (.059) [385]
1952-1955 .483 (.070) [434] .378 (.055) [434] .396 (.089) [402] .275 (.062) [402]
1953-1956 .497 (.069) [429] .419 (.058) [429] .405 (.080) [396] .316 (.063) [396]
1954-1957 .440 (.075) [421] .380 (.065) [421] .293 (.080) [389] .232 (.080) [389]
1955-1958 .392 (.068) [407] .361 (.063) [407] .305 (.079) [380] .254 (.066) [380]
1956-1959 .362 (.058) [389] .332 (.052) [389] .274 (.064) [360] .235 (.055) [360]
1957-1960 .297 (.055) [408] .270 (.050) [408] .223 (.066) [378] .193 (.057) [378]
1958-1961 .274 (.055) [382] .241 (.048) [382] .254 (.067) [358] .211 (.056) [358]
1959-1962 .304 (.074) [392] .233 (.056) [392] .295 (.064) [368] .242 (.052) [368]
1960-1963 .269 (.076) [383] .219 (.061) [383] .265 (.065) [360] .237 (.058) [360]
1961-1964 .360 (.095) [344] .260 (.069) [344] .336 (.066) [320] .300 (.059) [320]
1962-1965 .349 (.093) [330] .248 (.066) [330] .312 (.069) [302] .301 (.066) [302]
Notes:
1. The top panel contains the figures graphed in Figure 4.3, while the bottom panel records 
the estimates graphed in Figure 4.4.
2. Standard errors are listed in parentheses while sample sizes are presented in square 
brackets.
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Table 4.8: Changing Earnings Mobility in the US: 
Replication and New Results
Earnings P coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Cohort Mayer Approach Mayer Approach Age 16 Merge
19-25 Income 14-18 Income 14-18 Income
1949-1952 .392 (.083) [321]
1950-1953 .482 (.057) [361]
1951-1954 .434 (.087) [385]
1952-1955 .396 (.089) [402] .361 (.085) [306]
1953-1956 .405 (.080) [396] .396 (.074) [396]
1954-1957 .293 (.080) [389] .275 (.078) [390] .281 (.081) [341]
1955-1958 .305 (.079) [380] .289 (.079) [380] .266 (.074) [326]
1956-1959 .274 (.064) [360] .252 (.080) [361] .269 (.081) [306]
1957-1960 .223 (.066) [378] .195 (.074) [379] .255 (.081) [313]
1958-1961 .254 (.067) [358] .248 (.074) [359] .284 (.075) [293]
1959-1962 .295 (.064) [368] .266 (.069) [370] .385 (.080) [293]
1960-1963 .265 (.065) [360] .233 (.064) [363] .321 (.087) [272]
1961-1964 .336 (.066) [320] .250 (.069) [324] 251 (.084) [232]
1962-1965 .312 (.069) [302] .251 (.071) [306] .250 (.087) [210]
1963-1966 .226 (.107) [171]
1964-1967 .358 (.102) [152]
1965-1968 .468 (.107) [129]
1966-1969 .608 (.102) [119]
1967-1970 .515 (.114) [117]
Earnings Correlations (r)
(4) (5) (6)
Cohort Mayer Approach Mayer Approach Age 16 Merge
19-25 Income 14-18 Income 14-18 Income
1949-1952 .293 (.062) [321]
1950-1953 .342 (.057) [361]
1951-1954 .295 (.059) [385]
1952-1955 .275 (.062) [402] .286 (.068) [306]
1953-1956 .316 (.063) [396] .314 (.059) [396]
1954-1957 .232 (.080) [389] .226 (.064) [390] .241 (.069) [341]
1955-1958 .254 (.066) [380] .242 (.066) [380] .227 (.064) [326]
1956-1959 .235 (.055) [360] .210 (.067) [361] .239 (.072) [306]
1957-1960 .193 (.057) [378] .160 (.061) [379] .208 (.066) [313]
1958-1961 .211 (.056) [358] .191 (.057) [359] .226 (.060) [293]
1959-1962 .242 (.052) [368] .209 (.055) [370] .291 (.061) [293]
1960-1963 .237 (.058) [360] .205 (.056) [363] .242 (.065) [272]
1961-1964 .300 (.059) [320] .230 (.063) [324] .203 (.068) [232]
1962-1965 .301 (.066) [302] .240 (.067) [304] .209 (.073) [210]
1963-1966 .210 (.100) [171]
1964-1967 .311 (.089) [152]
1965-1968 .422 (.096) [129]
1966-1969 .562 (.094) [119]
1967-1970 .451 (.100) [117]
Notes:
1. These results are shown graphically in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
2. Standard errors are listed in parentheses while sample sizes are presented in square 
brackets.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Education in Generating Increased 
Intergenerational Income Persistence in the UK31
5.1 Introduction
There is a clear connection between the persistence of income inequality across 
generations and the unequal distribution of educational attainment. Young people 
from richer families have higher educational attainment than those from more 
deprived backgrounds, and this is one of the reasons that they go on to earn more. 
As a consequence, the equalization of educational attainment for children from 
different backgrounds is seen as an important policy tool to promote social 
mobility. This goal can be clearly seen in the rash of recent policies designed to 
improve the education prospects of those from poorer backgrounds in the UK (e.g. 
Excellence in Cities, Education Maintenance Allowance, see McNally, 
forthcoming, for details).
This chapter looks in detail at the relationship between parental income 
and educational attainment in the UK, demonstrating how this has changed over 
time. I then go on to investigate the extent to which the relationship between 
parental income and educational attainment can be regarded as causal, rather than 
simply reflecting inherited ability and other family characteristics which are 
correlated with income. This is important as without an understanding of what 
underlies educational inequality is it impossible to know how policy can be used 
to reduce inequalities and promote intergenerational mobility.
A strong motivation for the focus on changes over time is the evidence 
from Chapter 4 that intergenerational mobility for sons has fallen in the UK. I find 
that an increase in the relationship between educational attainment and parental 
income explains part of this trend. Specifically, I show results for educational 
inequality, measured as the gap in attainment between those from rich and poor 
backgrounds. Comparing the 1958 and 1970 cohorts once more, I find that 
educational inequality increased both in terms of staying on at school beyond age 
16 and for access to higher education.
The relationship between parental income and education can also be 
considered for later cohorts, who are not yet old enough to have reliable earnings
31 The research described in this chapter has been carried out jointly with Stephen Machin and 
Paul Gregg. Published outputs are Blanden and Machin (2004), Blanden and Gregg (2004) and 
Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2005).
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information (so cannot be used in a full intergenerational analysis). I extend my 
findings by incorporating information from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) on cohorts going through schooling in the 1990s. Evidence from these 
more recent cohorts (up to those bom in the late 1970s) is mixed, but the most 
telling measure (the relationship between higher education graduation and 
parental income) illustrates that there has been no reversal in the growth of 
educational inequality. This is potentially bad news for the mobility of these 
cohorts.
My analysis is presented for a period which saw sharp increases in 
educational attainment and post-compulsory participation in the UK. The key 
message is that despite the expansion of the number of students undertaking 
higher qualifications, the distribution of these opportunities was skewed towards 
students from higher income backgrounds. The importance of this evidence from 
a policy perspective cannot be overstated, especially as higher education policy is 
likely to be a key battleground in the 2005 general election campaign. Labour has 
nailed its colours to the mast by putting forward a 50 percent target for higher 
education participation (current participation is 1 in 3) and introducing top-up fees 
while the Conservative policy amounts to restricting the numbers in higher 
education and reducing the direct cost of study (Goodman and Kaplan, 2003). 
While the research reported here is unable to determine the precise impacts of 
these policies, it is clear that in the past (from the 1976 up until around 2000) 
expanding the number of places has not substantially improved access for those 
from poorer backgrounds.
My main findings on changes over time receive support from other 
studies. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (forthcoming) consider the interaction of 
income and ability in determining educational attainment. They find that while 
ability had a declining impact on educational attainment, the impact of parental 
background increased. Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles (2004) 
consider more recent changes in access to higher education. As information 
connecting participation with parental income is unavailable, two alternative 
approaches are used. By matching student postcode information with local income 
data, the authors find that the gap in participation between those from rich and 
poor neighbourhoods widened over the 1990s. In addition, they find that gaps in
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participation by social class widen from 1994/1995 onwards. The evidence on 
widening gaps in participation is further confirmed by very recent statistics from 
the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) covering 1994-2000, who report 
that “most of the new places in HE have gone to those from already advantaged 
areas” (HEFCE 2005, p. 11)
My discussion of theoretical models in Chapter 2 showed intergenerational 
persistence to be a consequence of both the inheritance of endowments between 
generations and the investments made by parents in their children. I also noted 
how difficult it is to distinguish these two mechanisms in the data. The same 
argument applies to the relationship between parental income and educational 
attainment. Those with higher parental income have more education, but it is hard 
to discern whether this is because these children are brighter and more motivated, 
or if parental income actually makes a direct difference to the educational 
opportunities available to children. An understanding of this question is essential 
from a policy viewpoint as it will help us to appreciate if there will be a direct 
impact of policies to reduce child poverty on the education of children, or if 
alternative interventions are necessary.
The second part of this chapter addresses the identification of causality in 
the relationship between educational attainment and parental income. I provide a 
summary of the possible approaches which can be taken to this problem and show 
some results which attempt to identify the impact of parental income on education 
in the UK. The evidence shows that the causal impact of parental income on 
education is small in comparison with the overall association between these 
variables. This implies that redistribution will have a limited impact on closing the 
gaps in attainment between children from different family income backgrounds 
and indicates the more direct interventions to support poorer children’s learning 
may be necessary.
This analysis pertains to a time period when the educational landscape was 
shifting rapidly in the UK. In the following Section, I detail the most important 
changes which occurred. In Section 5.3 I outline the data used in this chapter. 
Section 5.4 presents the results for changes in educational inequality, the 
robustness of which are tested in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 I discuss possible 
methodologies for identifying the causal effect of parental income and educational
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attainment before presenting results on this for the UK in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 
concludes.
5.2 Education Policy in the UK
Figure 5.1 shows the rapid expansion in education participation in the UK. It 
reports the higher education participation rate, the proportion staying on after the 
compulsory school leaving age and the proportion of students attaining five or 
more good O level/GCSE passes. The Figure shows higher education (HE) 
participation was at low levels at the start of the 1960s, with around 6 percent of 
the 18 to 19 year old age cohort then participating in higher education. This rose 
to around 14 percent by the mid 1970s, before dropping back a little in the late 
1970s. Most of the 1980s saw small increases in higher education participation 
but the expansion from the late 1980s thereafter was very rapid indeed. By the 
year 2000 HE participation reached one in three.
There was an even stronger increase in the extent of proportion of young 
people staying on past the compulsory school leaving age (15 until 1973 and 16 
thereafter), this rose steadily from 20 percent of each cohort in 1961 to 50 percent 
in the late 1980s. After 1987 the increase was even more rapid, with a further 20 
percent increase until the mid-1990s, after this point it has remained fairly steady.
The rapid rise in staying on rates is in line with the reform of the age 16 
examinations which occurred in 1988. In that year the General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSE) became the public examination taken by pupils on 
leaving secondary school (at age 16), and it marked a departure from the previous 
O (Ordinary) levels system (see Gipps and Stobart, 1997).
The O level system was based on relative performance within the 
examination cohort and tended to impose a ceiling on how many people could 
achieve each grade and pass the exam (i.e. achieve grade A to C). Under the 
GCSE system the use of criterion-referenced assessment means everyone (at least 
in theory) could achieve the top grade and a higher proportion of the age group 
takes GCSEs than took O levels. Furthermore GCSEs moved away from a pure 
examination assessment to introduce (an often substantial) coursework 
assessment. The third series on Figure 5.1 indicates that the reform did have an
118
feffect, in the year of GCSE introduction there was a structural break in the series; 
secondary school attainment began to increase much more rapidly, an increase 
which has continued to the present.
While the beginning of the rise in staying on and the GCSE reform are not 
precisely aligned, Figure 5.1 certainly suggests that the two are linked. It is 
possible that this reform could have different impacts by parental income; an idea 
that I explore in the empirical work below.
The rise in HE participation was accompanied by changes in the system of 
student financial support. The 1962 Robbins Report put in place the principle of 
means-tested student support for fees and living expenses. From 1977, this was 
expanded so that local education authorities paid all students’ full university fees, 
alongside a means-tested maintenance grant. The level of maintenance students 
should receive was fixed depending on whether they studied away from London 
and/or lived at home. The contribution to this made by the local authority (the 
grant) was calculated on the basis of the maintenance level less an assessed 
parental contribution which depended on parental residual income (income less 
allowances for mortgage payments, pensions and other dependent children). Until 
1985 students who were not eligible for the means tested grant received a 
minimum award.
In order to be more precise about the way that changes in the student 
finance system would have affected students in my data Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
way that maintenance grants varied by parental residual income in 1976/1977. 
This is the academic year when the NCDS cohort turned 19, and would be 
expected to enter higher education. At this time the maximum grant (outside of 
London) was £87532, this was available to those with residual parental incomes of 
up to £2,700. After this point the grant declined, by £1 per £5 up to £4,200 and 
then £1 for each additional £10 of residual income after this point.
This can be compared with Figure 5.3 which shows the situation in 
1988/1989, the year when the BCS cohort turned 19. For students in this year, a 
grant of £2,810 was available to those with parental residual income of up to 
£9,900. After this point the grant declined by £1 for every £7 of parental residual
32 Information on the grant systems in 1976/1977 and 1988/1989 was obtained by personal 
correspondence with DfES officials.
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income until £12,600. Between residual incomes of £12,600 and £18,400 the 
grant was withdrawn by £1 for every £5, and beyond £18,400 £1 was lost for each 
£4 of residual parental income.
Two features of the grant system are relevant for our appraisal of its 
possible impact on participation. The first is the extent of support available. The 
second is how progressively this support is distributed. On the first point, it is 
clear that the value of the maximum grant reduced over this period in real terms. 
In 1976/1977 the maximum grant payable to students living away from home 
outside London was £3,808 in 2001 prices, by the time the BCS cohort entered 
HE in 1988/1989 the level of maximum maintenance had been reduced in real 
terms to £3286. On the second point, a benefit system is defined as progressive 
when the average rate of benefit (measured here by the grant divided by residual 
income) decreases with income33. This condition is met in both years. Also 
relevant is the rate at which the benefit is withdrawn as income increases. The 
figures show that the marginal rate at which the grant is lost decreases with 
income in 1976/1977 (i.e. it falls from 1 in 5 to 1 in 10), while it increases with 
income in 1988/1989 (rising from 1 in 7, to 1 in 5, to 1 in 4). In this sense, the 
grant system faced by the BCS students is more progressive. However, we may 
believe that what matters most is the amount received by the poorest. In this case 
we might be more concerned with the reduction in the generosity of the level of 
the maximum grant.
Figure 5.4 shows the decline in the real value of the maximum grant 
throughout the 1980s, which was coupled with the loss of eligibility to housing 
benefit and unemployment benefit in vacations between 1985 and 1990. Also 
illustrated in Figure 5.4 is the sea-change in student funding from 1990, when 
maintenance grants were frozen and began to be phased out in favour of 
subsidised loans available to all students. The aim was that maintenance should be 
funded half from grants/parental contributions and half from student loans. As 
Callender (2003a) points out, the shift away from grants to subsidised loans meant 
that the public subsidy of student living costs purely from benefiting lower 
income students to benefiting all students (the majority of which are from more
33 Brown and Jackson (1990) p. 313.
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affluent families, as we shall see)34. The third ‘cohort’ of data used in this Chapter 
is formed from the BHPS. As I show below, this cohort would have been entering 
HE between 1992/1993 and 1997/1998. The phasing out of maintenance grants 
meant a decline in support for all students who would have previously received a 
grant, and those from poorer backgrounds bom in later years would have lost out 
relatively more.
Despite the expansion of HE student numbers leading to increased fee 
income, universities remained starved of resources. The Dearing Report of 1998 
allowed universities to charge students £1000 a year towards the cost of studying, 
and increased the maximum loan available, but this still did not resolve the 
funding crisis. Greenaway and Haynes (2003) demonstrate that, as participation 
doubled from 1980 to 2000, funding per student halved.
The most recent policy, due to be implemented in autumn 2006, will allow 
universities to raise fees up to a maximum of £3000 a year. This, and the cost of 
maintenance, will be met by even larger loans, to be paid back as a proportion of 
income after the graduate’s earnings exceed £15,000. This will be accompanied 
by a reintroduction of maintenance grants of £2,700 a year for students with 
household incomes of below £17,500, with some support available for those with 
household incomes up to £37,425. In addition a new Access Regulator has been 
set up to ensure that universities who raise fees use a proportion of this income to 
provide additional funds for scholarships and bursaries to support low income 
students.
Proponents of the policy argue that it will have no adverse effects on the 
participation of those from less-well off backgrounds as education will not be 
related to ability to pay at the point of entry, indeed the new grant and bursary 
arrangements are a return to higher means-tested support. However, one may 
worry that students from lower income backgrounds will be less likely to 
participate as the cost of study rises both because their parents are unable to 
contribute and because they are more averse to taking on debt than young people 
from richer backgrounds (see Callender, 2003b, for evidence on the latter).
34 Callender (2003a) demonstrates the impact of student finance from 1989 to 1998, and shows 
that state subsidy reduced by 2.5 per cent for the richest group of students while those who would 
have received a full grant in 1989 lost out to the tune of 35 per cent in 1998.
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This section has reviewed several substantive policy changes that have 
affected students and prospective students over time. These are likely to have 
impacted not only upon the overall increases in education participation and 
attainment already documented, but also may have differentially affected young 
people from different family backgrounds. In the first part of this chapter I 
examine empirically how the relationships between parental income and 
educational attainment have changed alongside these policy developments.
5.3 Data
In order to explore the relationships between parental income and education it is 
essential to use data with good measures of both of these concepts. The NCDS 
and BCS cohorts, used previously, provide data on parental income at age 16 and 
information on the educational attainment of the cohort member at several points 
in time. The parental income variables were discussed in detail in the data 
description of Chapter 4. As I use the same variables here I restrict this discussion 
to describing the education variables.
In this analysis, I consider two measures of educational attainment, staying 
on at school past the compulsory leaving age and degree attainment by age 23 (the 
rationale behind the age 23 cut-off will be returned to below). The education 
information for the earlier NCDS cohort is obtained from the age 23 sweep of the 
data. I use the ‘Age in months when left full-time education’ variable and define 
staying on as leaving school after September 1974.35
For the BCS, educational information is available from the limited follow- 
up at age 16, a postal questionnaire at age 26 and a full survey at age 30. The age 
26 information is very unsatisfactory so it is not used. For the staying on variable, 
I use the direct measure of whether the cohort member stayed on from the age 16 
follow up. Where this is unavailable I supplement it with information on whether 
the individual left school at 17 or above from the age 30 questionnaire.
35 In earlier versions of this research (Blanden, Gregg and Machin, 2005) the staying on variable 
was based upon a derived variable on age left school and all those who left school at 17 and older 
were defined as staying on. This means that those who left school between 16 and a half and 17 
are now counted as staying on, whereas before they were not counted as staying on. As a result the 
staying on rate rises from around 30 to 40 percent, but the results for the income-staying on 
relationship are largely unaffected.
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rInformation on degree attainment is also obtained from the age 30 questionnaire, 
it is possible to restrict to those who had completed their degrees by age 23 as 
cohort members are asked to give the year each qualification was awarded.
The two British cohorts also include the results of tests taken at various 
points during childhood. In the second part of my analysis I use the results of 
maths and reading tests at age 11 in the NCDS and 10 in the BCS to attempt to 
condition out some of the factors which may be correlated with both educational 
attainment and parental income.
While the cohort data provide a very good starting point for considering 
the relationship between education and parental income, they suffer from a couple 
of limitations. The first is that they are increasingly out of date. The NCDS cohort 
reached age 16 in 1974 while the BCS attained this age in 1986. Even the later 
cohort went through the school system before the GCSE examination reform took 
place. The second limitation of these data is that results may be specific to 
individuals bom in the relevant weeks. These difficulties are unavoidable when 
investigating intergenerational mobility, as the cohorts are the only datasets 
currently available with the necessary information (although the BHPS and the 
Millennium cohort have possibilities for the future). While the data available for 
investigating parental income and educational attainment is far from perfect, there 
are more datasets available. I therefore bring two additional datasets into my 
empirical analyses, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES).
The BHPS began in 1991 with a sample of 5500 households. All 
individuals over 15 years old were asked to provide extensive information 
including details of income and education. Individuals were then contacted in 
subsequent years and followed through the panel (adding new respondents from 
the household as they reached 16). There is data so far for eleven waves up to 
2002. As the data is at the household level, income information is obtained from 
parents themselves while young people report their own educational achievements 
and participation.
36 Household income information is a gross measure for the whole household. I subtract the child’s 
own earnings from this figure and adjust it to a net measure using information on gross and net 
income from relevant years of the FES.
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The structure of this data is not as good for observing educational 
transitions as the cohorts, primarily because the number of individuals observed in 
their late teenage years is not large. To be comparable with the cohort data I wish 
to observe family income at age 16. However, to observe individuals from age 16 
to 23, they must be present for eight years of the panel, which, given the number 
of waves of data currently available, means looking at only four waves worth of 
16 year-olds. I therefore try to maximise the sample via a number of methods. In 
case of missing income measures at age 16, I also allow family income to be 
observed at 15 or 17, and allow the graduation outcome to be observed at 22 if the 
individual is not retained through the sample until 23.37
The nature of the BHPS as a general household panel means that more 
information is available on the individual’s family than in the cohort studies. I 
exploit this in two ways in my causal analysis. First, I use the fact that all 
household members are surveyed to generate sibling difference estimates. In 
addition, information on parental incomes continues to be observed when the 
child has left home. As I shall explain in Section 5.6, this can be used as a proxy 
for the impact of permanent income which is not correlated directly with 
educational outcomes.
The cohorts and the BHPS data are both longitudinal, meaning that 
parental income at age 16 can be matched with degree attainment at a later date. 
In order to find out about the relationship between staying on and parental income 
this form of data is less crucial. To check the patterns found in the longitudinal 
data I use the FES, a cross sectional household survey. The FES has been 
collecting information on education since 1978, as well as detailed income and 
expenditure data. This data can be used to look at associations between family 
income and school leaving age and how they have evolved over time, checking 
the findings from the longitudinal data and filling in the gaps between these 
surveys. I use this data to relate the staying on decisions of 17/18 year olds in each 
FES year to information on family income in the same year.38
37 23 is a better age to observe whether individuals have obtained a degree as many individuals 
who do not begin their studies at 18 and have taken longer courses will be missed if the data is 
taken any earlier.
38 Once again the child’s own earnings are subtracted from family income as they will be 
correlated with his/her labour market status and educational participation.
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5.4 Changes in Intergenerational Mobility and Educational Inequality
Measurement o f Educational Inequality
In Chapter 3 I expressed intergenerational mobility in terms of differences in 
education by parental income and the returns to that education. Equation (5.1) 
shows the intergenerational mobility regression, for individual i in cohort c.
In Y ?u =ac + Pc In + e,r (5.1)
In this chapter my main focus is on the relationship between parental income and 
educational attainment, as shown below.
Ed™* = a0c + y/c In Y*™* + (5-2)
where y/c represents the link between parental income and education in cohort c.
Children’s education has a return in terms of their own earnings, which is 
modelled as <j>c in the following equation.
In I';'"" = a u + t 'E d f*  + uK (5.3)
Combining these equations makes it clear that the overall intergenerational 
elasticity J3C can be decomposed into the return to education multiplied by the
relationship between parental income and education plus the unexplained 
persistence in income that is not transmitted through education.
P  =4>v + CovOy,ln C )  (5-4)
c '  '  V ar( \nY 'm m )
The first results I show in this section compare the estimates of changes in 
intergenerational mobility from the previous chapter with those which control for 
education. When controls for education are added to the intergenerational model
„ Cov(uir, In YJT*1) . . . . , r . ,pr = -------------- ------- , which is the extent of intergenerational persistence
r Var(\nY^r )
taking into account the impact of educational differences, this was referred to as 
‘unexplained persistence ’ in Chapter 3. If unexplained persistence changes by 
less than overall persistence this indicates that education must be responsible for 
part of the increase in the relationship between incomes across generations.
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In the context of the decomposition, y/c can be interpreted as a measure of 
educational inequality. This implies a linear relationship between education and 
parental income, but if one thinks more generally about the distribution of 
educational outcomes for people from different income backgrounds there are 
many definitions of educational inequality which could be used. Suppose we split 
the income distribution into q quantiles then we could compare education gaps 
across quantiles and look at how they evolve through time. I follow this approach 
in the empirical work in this chapter, and begin by looking at income quintiles 
(setting q = 5), and defining educational inequality as the gap in educational 
outcomes of those with parental incomes in the top relative to the bottom income 
quintile. To check robustness, I experiment with alternative measures of 
educational inequality in Section 5.5.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 shows the patterns of education and family income for the main datasets 
used in this analysis, the NCDS, the BCS and the BHPS. The first line gives 
information about the precise cohorts which are being compared in my analysis; 
obviously the NCDS and BCS are the 1958 and 1970 cohorts respectively. These 
cohorts were taking staying on decisions in 1974 and 1986 and would have 
potentially joined the higher education system in 1976/1977 and 1988/1989. The 
samples drawn from the BHPS are more complex as they are based on a number 
of birth cohorts and samples differ for the staying on and degree models. The 
sample used to find out about staying on was bom on average in 1979, and spans 
those bom between 1975 and 1984. This sample was aged 16 i.e. taking decisions 
about staying on between 1990 and 2001. The degree sample is older, including 
only those bom between 1974 and 1979 (the average year of birth is 1976.5), the 
sample potentially entered higher education between 1992/1993 and 1997/1998. 
The BHPS data therefore gives a picture of what is happening for those making 
decisions about post-compulsory schooling in the 1990s.
The education information displayed in Table 5.1 re-confirms the patterns 
shown in Figure 5.1. There is a strong rise in staying on and degree graduation by 
23. Staying on rates increased from 40 percent to over 70 percent between 1974 
and the late 1990s, while the proportion with a degree increased from 10 percent
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to 25 percent. The standard deviations of family income (given in parentheses) 
confirm the rise in income inequality which occurred for families with children 
over this time period.
Intergenerational Mobility and Education
To motivate the discussion of educational inequality I first show the contribution 
made by education to the changes in intergenerational mobility found in the 
previous chapter. This can be shown by comparing the change in unconditional 
measures of intergenerational mobility for sons39 with measures of the change 
which control for the fact that individuals differ in their educational attainments. 
To keep this investigation in line with the rest of the chapter the education 
controls added are whether the son stayed on at school past the compulsory age 
and if he attained a degree by age 23.
Table 5.2 shows the results of this exercise. Education does play a role in 
explaining the change in intergenerational mobility for sons as adding education 
variables to the model has a larger impact on the results for the BCS. The 
increase in the unconditional /? is .085 compared with .060 for the results 
conditional on education. The effect of adding education is similar for the partial 
correlation, the change reduces from .119 to .083. In both cases adding education 
to the model explains 30 percent of the rise in intergenerational persistence 
observed between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts. This suggests that a closer 
examination of the relationship between parental income and educational 
attainment is warranted.
The discussion of equation 5.4 above made it clear that education can 
explain intergenerational mobility through two routes: the relationship between 
parental income and education and the returns to education. The finding that 
education can explain the rise in intergenerational mobility could reflect either of 
these dimensions. In keeping with the results in the remainder of this chapter the 
education variables added are ‘stayed on beyond age 16’ and ‘degree attained’.
391 report results only for sons here to be consistent with the results from Chapter 4 and to avoid 
the difficulties in measuring intergenerational mobility for daughters; this will be returned to in 
Chapter 6. Results in Blanden, Goodman, Gregg and Machin (2004), which ignore these 
complications, find that education is responsible for even more of the change in mobility for 
daughters than sons.
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There is evidence of a rise in the conditional return to degrees but a fall in the 
return to staying on. The strength of the positive relationship with parental 
income has increased for both these outcomes; this implies that a large part of 
increasing role of education in intergenerational persistence comes through the 
rising association between parental income and sons’ educational attainment. This 
suggests that a closer examination of the relationship between parental income 
and educational attainment is warranted40.
Educational Inequality
I begin my investigation of the changing distribution of educational opportunities 
by considering the evolution of staying on beyond the minimum school leaving 
age by parental income group. As discussed in the data section, I am able to 
examine this using longitudinal data from the cohort studies and the BHPS and 
using cross-section household data from the FES.
Table 5.3 looks at staying on rates broken down by parental income group 
over the three longitudinal data sources I use. Since the staying on decision occurs 
at age 16, the three periods in the spotlight are 1974 (for the 1958 cohort), 1986 
(for the 1970 cohort) and 1990-2001 (for the BHPS individuals). The Table shows 
the proportion staying on beyond age 16 for people from the highest quintile, 
middle three quintiles and bottom quintile of the parental income distribution for 
these three data sources. Educational inequality is the gap in the proportion 
staying on between the highest and lowest quintiles. This is reported in the final 
column.
In all cases the gap between the staying on rates of those from the richest 
and poorest backgrounds are large, between 25 and 40 percentage points. Also, as 
has already been demonstrated in the aggregate figures, the Table shows there to 
have been a rise in the staying on rate for people from all parental income groups. 
What is interesting is the way that the distribution of this rise varies between 
income groups. Between 1974 and 1986 the largest rise occurs for young people 
from higher income groups (rising from .57 to .70) whereas between 1986 and the
40 When continuous ‘years o f education’ variables are used in the decomposition, this result is 
even clearer, there is a slight downward shift in the return to schooling and a strong rise in the 
association between parental income and years of schooling.
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1990s, the largest rise occurs for those from lower income groups (from .32 to 
.62). Consequently educational inequality rises by .11 between the first and 
second cohorts, and falls by .14 between the second and third cohorts.
Using the Family Expenditure Survey to match 17/18 year olds with their 
family income enables us to consider these changes in more year-on-year detail. 
The results obtained are given in Table 5.4. Again educational inequality is large 
at a given point-in-time with there being sizable differences in staying on rates 
between young people from high and low income backgrounds. The change over 
time is very similar to that found in the cohort data. Educational inequality was 
.28 for cohorts leaving school between 1977 and 1979. This rose to .40 in 1986- 
1988, before subsequently falling back to .26 for those leaving school between 
1998 and 2000. The pattern of changes is therefore very similar for both the 
longitudinal and cross-section data.
The time series pattern of these changes ties in very closely to the policy 
changes discussed earlier. As already mentioned, 1988 was the first year in which 
16 year olds took the GCSE qualification; this also coincided with the beginning 
of the strongest period of growth in post-compulsory participation the UK has 
ever seen. It seems that the exam reform resulted in a weaker association between 
income and education under the GCSE system, where in most subjects all 
individuals are entered to take exams and more meet the standard acceptable to 
continue on in the schooling system41.
My results for post-16 participation indicate increased educational 
inequality up to 1988 and then a narrowing in educational inequality in the period 
after GCSEs were introduced. A key question is whether this continued through to 
higher education. One can make arguments either way here. Perhaps the school 
system matters most so that the increased staying on rates for people from poorer 
families ought to manifest itself in less inequality at HE level. On the other hand, 
the opportunity and direct costs of study are higher at older ages, and policy 
changes appear to have led to Government-funded student support being less
41 An alternative explanation is that young people were influenced by labour market conditions. I 
have investigated this, and mapping regional youth unemployment rates into the data does little to 
explain the changes.
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ftargeted towards poor students. If this matters, one may not see inequality at HE 
level falling, even if it does at earlier stages of the education sequence.
Due to the data requirements, I am only able to explore these changes 
using the longitudinal sources: the cohort studies and the BHPS. Table 5.5 
presents results for obtaining a degree by age 23 that are analogous to those 
presented for staying on in Table 5.3. The Table shows a large rise in higher 
educational inequality (from .15 to .30) between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts. This 
is consistent with increased educational inequality being in part responsible for 
the fall in intergenerational mobility observed earlier. However, in contrast to the 
results for staying on, educational inequality continues to increase through to the 
BHPS young people around 1999. As such, higher educational inequality has 
persistently risen in Britain since the late 1970s. Put alternatively, the expansion 
of higher education has more strongly benefited children from richer families.
The initial analysis of educational inequality presented above indicates 
that up until the change in the secondary examination system in 1988, increased 
opportunities to carry on studying at age 16 and 18 were being mostly taken up by 
those from richer backgrounds. After the GCSE was introduced, this trend 
reversed at age 16, with the staying on rates of the poorest youngsters beginning 
to catch up with their peers. This change was not seen for higher education 
attainment, where the gap between rich and poor continued to widen42.
There are a number of interpretations which can be placed on the growing 
educational inequality in higher education participation. One possibility is that it 
could be a consequence of the policies outlined in Section 5.2 which reduced 
students’ access to means-tested support. Earlier I described the policy 
environments faced by students in the different cohorts. What was very clear 
from this discussion is that the real value of means-tested grants declined over the 
period. This could therefore provide an explanation for the increase in educational 
inequality in higher education participation observed. However, my analysis 
suggests that larger changes in financial arrangements occurred over the 1990s 
than between 1976/1977 and 1988/1989, it is therefore surprising that the largest
42 It should be noted that the earliest years of data used from the BHPS refers to years during the 
large increases in staying on and HE participation shown in Figure 5.1, so the data will not fully 
represent the situation after these increases occurred. More work is needed to look at the most 
recent years of data as they become available.
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increases in educational inequality in HE occurred between the first and second 
cohorts, rather than between the second and third. One hypothesis is that the 
changes over the 1990s affected the younger individuals in the BHPS most, and 
this impact is understated by the large range of birth years included in the BHPS 
data. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to enable an analysis of differences 
through the 1990s, so this must be flagged up for future work.
An alternative explanation is that the disproportionate participation of 
those from higher income groups is a direct effect of the expansion in higher 
education. In particular, if young people with higher income are on average of 
higher ability then it would be expected that these would be more likely to take 
advantage of an increase in the number of places. Willen, Hendel and Shapiro 
(2004) construct a similar argument about the cost of college in the US, they 
argue that if education serves a signalling function then reductions in the cost of 
college will lead to a tighter link between ability and education; resulting in a rise 
in the college wage premium.
As mentioned above, Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (forthcoming) consider 
the connection between ability and educational attainment in the British Cohort 
data. They find a declining relationship between attainment and ability, with those 
with lower ability and high parental income the group to improve their 
educational attainment by the most over time. The authors point to the end of 
selective education as one of the main drivers behind this change. The changes 
between the second and third cohorts would not have been influenced by the end 
of the selective system; and it is unfortunate that it is not possible to assess how 
interactions with ability influence the more recent results.
5.5 Robustness Checks on Educational Inequality
In this section I subject my findings on educational inequality to a number of 
tests. In many ways the analysis presented so far has been quite specific in terms 
of the sample used and the approach taken, here I experiment with the results in a 
number of ways to check that my conclusions do not change.
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Results by Gender
To maximise sample size the results displayed so far are for pooled samples of 
males and females. We may wonder if the trends in educational inequality 
observed are consistent across genders, especially as the results I have shown for 
the impact of education on intergenerational mobility are for sons only. This 
concern can be dismissed as separate analyses reveal that while participation rates 
vary by gender (girls are more likely to stay on at school) there are very similar 
overall trends in educational inequality for males and females. For example, over 
all three cohorts educational inequality in higher education completion rose by 
.22 for men from .16 to .38 while for women it rises by .23 from .14 to .37.
Measurement Error
Throughout this thesis I have stressed the difficulties caused by imperfect 
measures of parental income and the same argument applies here. Theoretical 
models of parental investments encourage us to think that permanent income 
through childhood is what matters for educational attainment. In the models 
presented I am limited to using one-shot measures of parental income, which will 
be poor estimates of permanent income, and will lead to a downward bias on 
educational inequality. As the focus of this research is to look at changes over 
time, this attenuation bias will only matter if it is not constant.
The FES provides one way to check the effect of attenuation which is not 
available in the other data sets, as it has information on family expenditure as well 
as income. I treat consumption as a proxy for permanent income, this follows 
Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (1957), which states that individuals 
will make consumption decisions on the basis of permanent rather than current 
income. Consumption has also been exploited as a proxy for permanent income in 
Blundell and Preston (1998).
Table 5.6 compares results for staying on inequality based on family 
consumption quintile with those based on income quintile shown previously. It is 
clear that using consumption data does reduce the downward bias on the results. 
In every case the estimates of educational inequality are larger when consumption 
quintiles are used rather than income quintiles. The overall trend from the income
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data is that educational inequality is widening significantly up to 1986-88 and 
then narrows significantly in the remaining periods up to 2000. The consumption 
data reveals the same trend, but more muted, as neither the rise or fall in 
inequality is statistically significant. This seems primarily to be driven by the 
result for 1986-1988 which appears to be less affected than other periods by 
whether income or consumption is used to generate the quintiles.
Alternative Specifications
For the results discussed up to this point educational inequality has been defined 
as the difference between the participation or attainment of the richest quintile 
compared with the poorest quintile. As already noted, this is just one possible way 
of finding out how the relationship between education and parental income has 
changed over time. In this section I check if similar changes are observed for 
alternative measures, using quartiles, deciles and finally a linear relationship 
between education and parental income (the relationship implied by the 
decomposition).
To ease computation these measures are derived using Probit models 
rather than by comparing the proportions in each income group. The results from 
the Probit models which show educational inequality by quintile are precisely 
comparable to those obtained from the descriptive methodology, as we shall see. 
The additional advantage of using econometric models is that it is straight­
forward to add controls. This will be exploited when I try to identify the causal 
relationship, but in this section no controls are added.
To reiterate, the educational outcomes of interest can be represented as a 
0-1 dependent variable in a Probit model, where the explanatory variable is some 
function of parental income.
A quintile specification, such as has been used so far, amounts to estimating
paren ts (5.5)
5 (5.6)E4=a*+2X,.e,) Parents■qic ic
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Where the Q ic variables are dummy variables for parental income quintile q in 
cohort c, leaving out the lowest quintile, q= 1.
Measures of educational inequality equivalent to those shown earlier can be 
derived from this model as the marginal effect on the probability of the outcome 
of having parents in the richest quintile rather than the poorest quintile.
Pr[Ed,r = l | e ,  =0 ,Q, =0,<24 =0,<25 = 1]- (5.7)
Pr [Edlc = 11Q2 = 0,Q, = 0 ,&  = 0,QS = 0]
= 0 ( « f +vf5c)-<t>(ac)
where 3>(.) is the standard normal cdf. Standard errors for this measure are 
obtained by bootstrapping.
This model is easily transferred to the quartile and decile specifications by 
changing the number of quantiles to q=4 and 4= 10. The measure of educational 
inequality in these cases will be comparing the education of those in the top and 
bottom quartile of parental income and in the top and bottom decile of parental 
income. I also present models which use log income as the explanatory variable. 
The interpretation of the linear models is that a marginal effect of income on 
staying on of .2 implies that a 10 percent increase in parental income is associated 
with a 2 percent rise in the probability of staying on.
Table 5.7 reports results on changes over time in educational inequality 
based on alternative income specifications. The upper panel does this for staying 
on beyond the minimum school leaving age, while the lower panel shows results 
for degree attainment at age 23. These results show clearly that when educational 
inequality is calculated on a finer gradation, observed educational inequality rises. 
Measured inequalities based on deciles are larger than those based on quintiles, 
which in turn, are larger than those based on quartiles. This is expected, as a 
positive correlation between income and attainment implies that the top decile 
will have more education than the top quintile and the bottom decile will have less 
than the bottom quintile.
Reassuringly, patterns over time are similar across all the specifications; 
there is evidence of a rise in the relationship between income and staying on in the 
first period from the NCDS to BCS, followed by a fall between the BCS and 
BHPS. While there is some evidence that the initial rise in inequality in the first
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period may be weaker under alternative specifications the fall in inequality after 
1986 is clear whatever specification is used. In all cases the result that inequality 
in HE completion has increased over the three periods stands.
5.6 Methods to Establish Causality in the Relationship between Parental 
Income and Education43
The results from the preceding sections confirm that educational participation and 
attainment is strongly related to parental background. Those from richer families 
have a much greater chance of success than their poorer peers. If a goal of 
Government policy is to narrow these gaps then it is essential to understand the 
mechanisms behind them. In this section I move away from the descriptive 
analysis undertaken so far to attempt to identify the causal relationship between 
parental income and education.
The fundamental question is whether it is money itself which is generating 
the differences in attainment between those from different family backgrounds. 
This is particularly crucial for understanding if redistribution or reductions in 
child poverty can lead to a narrowing in educational inequality. If the drivers of 
educational inequality are ability, parental education, parental motivation etc. then 
changes in the distribution of income will have no effect on the extent of 
educational inequality. However, if parents use income to make investments in 
child care quality, the home environment and educational activities then we would 
anticipate that increases in parental income would have a real benefit for 
children’s educational outcomes. Gregg, Waldfogel and Washbrook (2005) 
support this interpretation by showing that income gains for poor parents are spent 
disproportionately on children’s goods such as children’s clothing, books and 
toys.
Taking the earlier model of educational attainment, and expressing it in a 
linear form, enables a more formal explanation of the identification problem. 
However, the parameter of interest is no longer \f/, but is 0,  the causal impact of 
parental income on educational attainment. As I am no longer interested in 
changes between cohorts the subscript c has been dropped, however education and
43 This section and the one that follows it are a shortened and revised version of the work 
presented in Blanden and Gregg (2004).
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parental income now vary with time for individuals so a subscript t has been 
added, this becomes important later in this section.
Ed„ = a  + G\nYfmm +ea (5.8)
Educational attainment is a function of many variables ( A,t ), both observed and 
unobservable, which influence child attainment. The difficulty arises because the 
cov(Ait,Y*H,ren's) > 0 , consequently estimating 9 from equation (5.8) will lead to 
an upward biased estimate of the effect of parental income on education.
A typical starting point to solving this identification problem is to control 
directly for the factors which lead to differences in educational attainments, and 
are positively correlated with income. These include parental education, 
unemployment, family status and child ability. Gregg and Machin (2000) present 
an analysis along these lines and find that significant parental income effects 
remain when many controls are added. The difficulty is that \  will consist of
both observable characteristics, X it and unobservables Z(. When controls for X it
are added an upward bias will persist if there is a positive correlation between Z.
and Y^ arents.
The most convincing way to disentangle the impact of unobserved 
heterogeneity is to use data from experiments. In the simplest form this would 
involve giving some families additional income while the income of other 
families remained unchanged, and then measuring the impact this had on 
children’s attainment. With a proper design, the income change will be unrelated 
to differences between children and their families (Zf).
It may be difficult to imagine a setting where such an experiment could 
take place, however two programmes in the US have come close. States 
administering welfare to work programs in the late 1990s were entitled to add an 
evaluation aspect which involved randomising treatment, while the Moving to 
Opportunity44 projects all had a randomised approach. Fortunately child outcomes
44 The Moving to Opportunity Projects selected families in poor neighbourhoods into three groups: 
the first group has help with rents provided they move to a more affluent neighbourhood, the 
second group has help with rents to move to any neighbourhood while the third group receives no 
assistance.
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were part of the evaluations of both programmes. However, in both programmes 
the intervention is not simply giving families more income. For the welfare to 
work programme, cash only comes when mothers move into work (although this 
can be accounted for by comparing with mothers who are also helped to move 
into work but receive no income supplement). The Moving to Opportunity 
programme can be used to discover how income may work through just one 
channel; neighbourhood quality.
Clark-Kauffman et al (2003) summarise what can be learned from the 
welfare to work evaluations while Goering and Feins (2003) do the same for 
Moving to Opportunity. Welfare to work programmes are shown to have 
significant positive effects on the test scores of pre-schoolers while Moving to 
Opportunity is shown to have a number of positive benefits for children in terms 
of test scores, behaviour and reducing criminal behaviour. These studies, 
therefore, provide powerful evidence for income effects on child outcomes; 
however the specific samples involved and the enforced link between income 
increases and other changes may mean that the results do not generalize to the 
population at large.
A more feasible alternative is to use instrumental variables (IV) to identify 
income effects. This requires a variable which influences parental income without 
having a direct effect on children’s education; a tall order. Shea (2000) and 
Chevalier et al (2005) use parental union status as their instrumental variable, on 
the grounds that this leads to higher parental earnings through additional rents, but 
that this is uncorrelated with other characteristics. Chevalier et al’s results for the 
UK indicate that parental income effects are much larger using this IV approach; a 
counter-intuitive result.
Instrumental variable approaches appear to be more successful in 
discovering the causal impact of parental education on children’s outcomes. 
Chevalier (2004), Chevalier et al (2005), Oreopoulos et al (2003) and Black et al 
(2005a) have all used changes in compulsory schooling laws to identify the effect 
of an increase in parental education on children’s attainment. The results for the 
UK from Chevalier and from Oreopoulos et al for the US, imply that the causal 
impact of parental education is strong while results for Norway in Black et al 
reveal only weak effects of parental education. The limitation of all these analyses
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is that they are local average treatment effects, which will only apply to those 
parents who take more education as a result of the change in the law.
In cases where experiments are not available and convincing instruments 
cannot be found, approaches can be used which rely on variations in income 
within the household.
The model of attainment and income with controls added is
Ed„ = a  + 6 I n ) + yX„ + v„ wherev„ = Z, + u„. (5.9)
It is therefore the correlation between Z, and which generates the upward
bias. The principle behind sibling fixed effects models is to assume that Z( is 
equal across siblings, or put alternatively, that the sibling specific part of the error 
(uit) is uncorrelated with parental income. The sibling fixed-effects model is
estimated on deviations of Edit and Yit from the family mean; this eliminates the 
impact of Z( and generates unbiased estimates of 6 .
The variation in family incomes experienced by the siblings comes from 
the age gap between them. This means that siblings will be affected by income in 
different periods because other children have either not been bom yet or have 
already left home. This approach uses income variations within a family rather 
than differences across families. Sibling studies require an income history for the 
family including some periods of differing income experience.
The central problems for sibling studies is that siblings will often be close 
in age and experience very similar income patterns for most of their childhood. 
Further, taking differences increases the attenuation bias due to measurement error 
in data reporting. An additional problem emerges from new findings in Black et al 
(2005b). This paper discusses how educational outcomes may vary by family size 
and birth order. Differences by family size may mean that results are not 
generalizable across different family sizes as only families with two or more 
children can be used in sibling-difference estimations. Differences in attainment 
by birth order lead to even greater difficulties for this estimation methodology as 
sibling-specific errors will not be random across birth-order. If families grow
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richer over time and (as Black et al suggest) older children tend to be more 
successful, this will lead to a downward bias on the measured income effect.
An advantage of the sibling-difference approach is that income shocks in 
the family will be experienced by siblings at different ages; this can provide 
evidence on when in childhood income matters most. Levy and Duncan (2000) 
describe a recent sibling study using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They 
find that parental income matters most for young children but that the magnitudes 
of the effects are small with a 2.7 fold increase in family income through 
childhood adding three quarters of a year to completed years of schooling by age 
20. These are extremely small impacts compared with others found in the 
literature.
Mayer (1997) adopts an alternative route to control forZ,. Leaving aside
the question of measurement error, income at a point in time can be thought of as 
composed of transitory and permanent components.
Y _ y  Perm + Y,rans (5.10)it i it
Therefore in a regression of the relationship between income and education the 
income parameter will be a weighted-average of the coefficients that would be 
obtained if measures of permanent and transitory income could be entered into the 
model separately. The key assumption here is that the bias is generated by the 
correlation between Z. and the permanent component of income. The transient 
income component is assumed to be uncorrelated with fixed family characteristics 
so thatcov(l'"wu ,Z ,) = 0 , and therefore the coefficient on Yilrans would be the true
relationship between parental income and education. The strategy is to use a 
measure of family income after the child has completed the normal education 
process as a control for the permanent component of income. The estimation 
equation thus looks like
Edit= e\n Y ^ X ^ Y u^ u u (5.11)
Any correlation between the later income measure and attainment is not causal 
and its inclusion can be seen as an attempt to condition out the permanent income
component. If Yu+i was perfectly correlated with Y?erm then 6 would be the
relationship between education and transitory income at age 16. However,
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Yit+l also contains a transitory component, meaning some residual bias will remain 
in this approach. This can be reduced by averaging over several years of later 
income.
Mayer uses a range of child outcomes and test scores as dependent 
variables. The addition of post-childhood family income reduces the estimated 
impact of a 10 percent increase in income on years of schooling from 1.86 to 1.68 
(after conditioning on observed family fixed characteristics). The conditioning on 
later income makes only a minor difference to the years of schooling results but is 
more important for other outcomes such as teenage motherhood and dropping out 
of school.
There are several concerns with this approach. The first is that income 
changes between the two periods considered may reflect family shocks that 
influence child attainment independently. In addition, lifecycle models predict 
that anticipated income changes will affect behaviour in all periods if families can 
smooth consumption. The final, and most damning, problem is that the investment 
model which underlies these estimations is firmly couched in terms of permanent 
income not transitory income. By conditioning for permanent income, all the 
variation of interest may be lost. Indeed, this difficulty also applies to the sibling 
model, as mean family income is differenced out. This means that the estimates of 
the effect of parental will be downward biased, giving more confidence in any 
significant results which are found.
5.7 The Causal Impact of Parental Income on Education in the UK
The evidence from US data implies that there are significant, although possibly 
small, impacts of parental income on educational attainment. In the final empirical 
contribution made in this chapter I use some of the techniques described above to 
investigate the extent of the causal relationship between parental income and 
educational attainment in the UK.
Adding Controls
I begin by assessing how the patterns of change over time are modified by taking 
the most straightforward approach to reducing bias; adding controls to the models. 
To be consistent with what has gone before, I show the impact of adding controls
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to models of educational inequality based on quintiles. In the upper panel of Table
5.8 I show models for the NCDS, BCS and BHPS for staying on while the lower 
half of the table reports the same models for degree attainment.
The first specifications (A) in each table show the results with no controls 
for comparison purposes45. The remainder of the specifications add additional 
controls for family background and the individual characteristics of the child. 
Specification B focuses on accounting for the impact of family structure by 
controlling for the child’s sex, the number of children in the household, parents’ 
age and the absence of a father figure. Specification C focuses on controlling for 
parental education, one of the main aspects which might be related to child 
attainment and correlated with family income. In the final models I am able to use 
information on test scores to take out the relationship between child ability and 
parental income; although this is only possible for the first two time periods as test 
scores are not available in the BHPS.
The results for the three cohorts show that the relationship between 
parental income and educational attainment can be somewhat explained by the 
controls I add, but that significant income effects remain. The controls for parental 
education are particularly important in reducing the estimates. Observed 
educational inequality is 40 to 50 percent lower when controls for mothers’ and 
fathers’ education levels are added. Adding controls for child’s ability at ages 
11/10 further reduces the estimates. For the NCDS, the estimate of educational 
inequality for degree attainment falls from .146 with no controls to .036 with 
controls for family structure, parental education and ability.
For the first two time periods adding controls to these models has very 
little effect on the patterns of changes over time, for both dependent variables the 
rise in educational inequality is robust and remains significant under the most 
stringent models. The same is not true for the later change, which compares the 
results from the BCS with those from the BHPS. The first two models in the lower 
panel of Table 5.8 show that there is a strong (although insignificant due to the 
sample size), rise in educational inequality at degree level for those entering 
university around 1988/1989 and those entering from 1992/1993 through to
45 For the BHPS these results differ slightly from those in descriptive statistics as I have added 
controls for birth year and wave observed.
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1997/1998. When parental education is added to this model educational inequality 
appears flat over this period. This implies that the change over the 1990s can be 
explained by the children of higher educated parents doing better, rather than a 
change in the causal effect of income.
The discussion of identification methods highlighted that adding controls 
to models of the education and income relationship will not suffice if there 
remains unobserved heterogeneity correlated with parental income. To provide 
more convincing evidence, I now experiment with sibling fixed effects estimators 
and adding controls for permanent income. Due to the data requirements of these 
approaches I am only able to use the BHPS; fortunately this is the most up to date 
of the data sources used here.
Sibling Fixed Effects Estimators
The results of the sibling models for the BHPS are given in Table 5.9. Due to the 
shortness of the panel we do not observe family incomes and full education 
histories for all siblings so the results for different qualification levels use slightly 
different samples of individuals.
The upper panel of the Table shows marginal effects for a linear 
probability model of staying on and income at age 16. In all cases I control for 
family structure as described in the notes to Table 5.8 (sex of the cohort member, 
number of siblings, parents’ age) as well as controlling for both parents’ work 
status when income is observed, as this may be correlated with both income and 
performance. First, I show the impact for this model of only focusing on a sample 
of siblings (column 2) rather than including single child families (column 1) 
where both models include basic controls for family structure. Limiting the 
sample to siblings makes very little difference. In the third column I show 
equivalent models to those in the previous section by adding controls, including 
parental education. As before, this brings down the estimate; from .107 to .069. 
The final column reports estimates from the sibling fixed effect models. This does 
not reduce the marginal effect by as much as simply controlling for parental 
education, the coefficient for this model is .079. The disadvantage of the fixed 
effect approach is that the fall in the signal to noise ratio leads to a rise in the
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standard errors leaving the income coefficient significant at only the 10 percent 
level.
The lower panel uses degree attainment as the dependent variable. In this 
case the explanatory variable used is parental income at age 18. This seems 
appropriate as this is the age when university enrolment choices are made for 
most young people. In addition, choosing a measure of income obtained closer to 
the outcome increases the available sample size. For this model the income effect 
changes more between the full sample and sibling sample, it is higher for those 
with siblings in the sample46. The marginal effect of income on the probability of 
degree attainment is .162 with basic controls, and .090 in both of the models 
which attempt to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The difference is that the 
standard error is inflated for the sibling fixed effects models.
The results of these modes indicate that sibling fixed effects estimates of 
the impact of parental income on education are the same or slightly larger than 
those which simply control for parental education. The implication of this is that 
there is no additional upward bias to remove once parental education is controlled 
for. However, this is a strong conclusion to draw given the size of the estimated 
standard errors. The large standard errors are due to the main limitation of sibling 
estimation; relying on differences in income within families for identification 
enhances the effect of measurement error and reduces the variation in income and 
outcomes that can be used to identify effects.
Controlling for Permanent Income
Table 5.10 explores Mayer’s approach of adding post-education income to the 
model, using data from the BHPS. This is an attempt to control for permanent 
income, thus removing the correlation between parental income and unobserved 
heterogeneity. In choosing the age at which post-childhood income is observed I 
must balance two factors. First, income must be taken at an age sufficiently 
removed from the educational process to satisfy the assumption that it will not be
46 To be included here siblings need to be fairly close together in age as income and outcome 
variables are further apart in time. This may explain the stronger results for the sibling sample as it 
seems plausible that income constraints on university attendance are more important for parents 
who are contemplating sending two or more children to university in quick succession.
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correlated directly with educational outcomes. However, sample size 
considerations also play a role; the further away the income is from the outcome 
of interest the smaller the sample size will be. I show results conditioning on just 
income at age 20 and on an average of income between 18 and 21. Ideally I would 
wish to use income at later ages but sample sizes become prohibitively small if 
this is attempted.
I show Probit models for the two outcomes of interest, staying on and 
degree attainment by age 23. All models control for parental education. For both 
dependent variables the impact of adding controlling for age 20 incomes is limited 
while adding average income from age 18-21 reduces the impact of income rather 
more. This is anticipated as the three year average will be a rather better estimate 
of permanent income. In the model with controls for parental income the marginal 
effect of income is .112 for staying on and .175 on degree attainment. These 
effects reduce to .080 and .146 when average income between 18 and 21 is 
controlled for.
For both models this approach indicates that upward bias is further 
reduced by controlling for a proxy of permanent income. The marginal effects fall 
by 20 to 30 percent using this method, compared to controlling simply for 
observed characteristics.
Summary
Discovering the causal relationship between parental income and educational 
attainment is a difficult identification problem. I would not claim that the methods 
proposed here are perfect, but nonetheless some lessons can be learned from my 
investigation. The main conclusion is that adding controls makes a big difference 
to the levels of educational inequality recorded. Adding controls for parental 
education, in particular, reduce the observed educational inequality by around 50 
percent; it is clear that parental education confers a strong advantage, which could 
not be overcome by redistribution. In addition, some of the impact of parental 
education is mediated by early ability, this supports the Government’s policy 
programme of concentrating on early years’ education to help children get a good 
start in the education system. The methods which rely on removing the permanent
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effects of unobserved heterogeneity do not reduce the estimates much further. 
Therefore, as far as we can tell, there is strong evidence to suggest that there is, at 
least, a small causal impact from parental income to educational attainment47.
5.8 Conclusion
Reducing the link between parental background and educational attainment is 
seen as one of the main ways in which Government policy can help to reduce 
intergenerational inequalities. The empirical results set out in this chapter have a 
number of important contributions to make to the academic and policy debate 
about the contribution of made by educational inequalities to intergenerational 
persistence.
Thirty percent of the fall in intergenerational mobility for sons can be 
explained by changes in access to education, in spite of the fact that educational 
opportunities for young people as a whole were improving over this time period, 
with increases in participation at both post-compulsory and higher education. A 
more detailed examination of patterns of participation by parental income group 
reveals that the children of higher income parents benefited disproportionately 
from the expansion in higher education. Their participation rose much faster than 
that of poorer young people. The most recent evidence does not suggest that this 
situation has reversed up to the end of the 1990s.
These findings do not present a very reassuring picture for future social 
mobility in Britain. The current Government policy is to encourage further 
expansion in the proportion of young people attending University, but previous 
expansions appear to have only exacerbated the gap in access by family 
background. In addition, we may worry that the introduction of student fees will 
only worsen this trend, although the expansion in the level of mean-tested 
assistance and discretionary assistance from Universities may suffice to counter
47 In order to keep this section of a reasonable length I have shied away from fully interpreting the 
magnitudes of the effects I find. However, evidence from Blanden and Gregg (2004) suggests that 
a £140 increase in income per week (in 2000 prices) raises the probability of obtaining a degree by 
4 percentage points using the best estimates from causal models while non-causal models suggest 
that a £140 difference in weekly income is associated with a 9 percentage point difference in the 
probability of obtaining a degree.
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the impact of fees. It will be important to repeat the analysis carried out in this 
chapter to evaluate the impact of the forthcoming changes.
The current direction of Government policy is to address educational 
inequalities at early ages, mostly through specific educational programmes but 
also by raising the living standards of poor families. My efforts to identify the 
causal effect of parental income on educational attainment are an attempt to 
evaluate the relative impact of these types of policy. While there are significant 
causal effects of parental income on educational attainment, it seems that 
redistribution alone will only be able to close a small part of the large education 
gap, for the rest we must turn to more direct interventions.
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Figure 5.1: Changes in Educational Attainment and Participation in the UK
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Notes:
1. Staying on rates from DfES series. I thank Damon Clark for providing these numbers.
2. The higher education age participation index is the number of young (under 21) home 
initial entrants expressed as a proportion of the averaged 18 to 19 year old population. 
Source: DfES.
3. Examination performance information is from the DfES Statistical Bulletin.
Figure 5.2: Student Maintenance Grants in 1976/1977
o - 
00
o -
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Residual parental incom e
Notes:
1. Incomes and grants are expressed in current prices.
2. Information was obtained by personal communication with DfES officials.
3. Calculations are for the simplest case of only children studying outside London and 
living away from home.
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Figure 5.5: Student Maintenance Grants in 1988/1989
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Notes:
1. Incomes and grants are expressed in current prices.
2. Information was obtained by personal communication with DfES officials.
3. Calculations are for the simplest case of only children studying outside London and 
living away from home.
Figure 5.4: Student Maintenance Grants and Loans 1980/1981 to 2001/2002
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1. The combined grant and full year loan data relate to those living away from 
home, studying outside London and normally domiciled in England and 
Wales.
2. Adjusted to 2001/02 prices.
3. Source: Department for Education and Skills; Office for National Statistics. 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D6455.xls
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics on Education and Parental Income
NCDS BCS BHPS 
(Staying on 
sample)
BHPS
(Degree
sample)
Mean year of birth 1958 1970 1979.52 1976.57
(range 1974- (range 1974-
1985) 1979)
Proportion Female .499 .526 .482 .510
Proportion stayed on .394 .463 .719 .729
Proportion with degree .094 .177 .248 .248
by 23
Monthly Gross Parental 1381.75 1439.45 2127.43 2082.25
Income (512.89) (713.02) (1167.92) (1072.78)
Sample Size 6262 4707 1613 580
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Table 5.2: Education and the Intergenerational Mobility of Sons
Intergenerational Elasticities p
NCDS BCS Change
Sons: Table 4.2 .205 (.026) .291 (.025) .085 (.036)
Plus son’s education .141 (.025) .202 (.025) .060 (.035)
Partial Correlations r
NCDS BCS Change
Sons: Table 4.2 .166 (.021) .286 (.025) .119 (.085)
Plus son’s education .115 (.020) .198 (.025) .083 (.032)
Sample Size 2163 1976
Note:
1. The education variables which are added for sons are staying on and degree 
attainment by age 23.
2. Standard Errors are in parenthesises.
Table 5.3: Staying on at School and Parental Income, Cohort Data
Stayed in Education Beyond Compulsory Education
Lowest 20 Middle 60 Highest 20 Educational
percent percent percent Inequality
NCDS 1974 .294 .369 .566 .272 (.019)
BCS 1986 .320 .434 .704 .383 (.023)
BHPS 1995 .619 .703 .866 .247 (.036)
Change 1974-1986 .026 .065 .138 .111 (.030)
Change 1986-1995 .299 .269 .162 -.136 (.043)
Change 1974-1995 .325 .334 .300 -.025 (.041)
Notes:
1. Educational inequality is defined as the staying on rate of those with parents in the richest
quintile minus the staying on rate of those with parents in the poorest quintile.
2. Sample sizes are NCDS: 6362, BCS: 4706, BHPS: 1613.
3. The year we establish degree attainment is 1999 on average for the BHPS. For the NCDS
and BCS all individuals need to have graduated by 1981 and 1993 respectively.
4. Standard errors in parentheses.
5. Rows and columns may not add up precisely due to rounding.
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Table 5.4: Staying On at School and Parental Income, FES Data
Staying on in Education Beyond Compulsory Schooling
Lowest 20 
percent
Middle 60 
percent
Highest 20 Educational 
percent Inequality
Sample
Size
1977-1979 .262 .367 .541 .279 (.037) 1519
1980-1982 .334 .402 .574 .240 (.040) 1683
1983-1985 .314 .430 .621 .306 (.043) 1429
1986-1988 .300 .447 .696 .395 (.039) 1358
1989-1991 .449 .547 .737 .287 (.046) 1127
1992-1994 .599 .661 .830 .231 (.047) 978
1995-1997 .607 .717 .871 .264 (.043) 972
1998-2000 .642 .722 .902 .260 (.040) 874
Change 
1977-1979 to 
1986-1988
.038 .080 .155 .116 (.054)
Change 
1986-1988 to 
1998-2000
.342 .275 .206 -.135 (.056)
Change 
1977-1979 to 
1998-2000
.380 .355 .361 -.019 (.054)
Notes:
1. Educational inequality is defined as the staying on rate of those with parents in the richest 
quintile minus the staying on rate of those with parents in the poorest quintile.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Rows and columns may not add up precisely due to rounding.
Table 5.5: Degree Acquisition by Age 23 and Parental Income
Degree Acquisition by Age 23
Lowest 20 Middle 60 Highest 20 Educational
percent percent percent Inequality
NCDS 1981 .051 .080 .197 .146 (.013)
BCS 1993 .074 .148 .373 .299 (.018)
BHPS 1999 .086 .233 .457 .371 (.053)
Change 1981-1993 .023 .068 .176 .153 (.022)
Change 1993-1999 .012 .085 .084 .072 (.056)
Change 1981-1999 .035 .153 .260 .225 (.055)
Notes:
1. Educational inequality is defined as the proportion attaining degrees of those with parents 
in the richest quintile minus the proportion attaining degrees of those with parents in the 
poorest quintile.
2. Sample sizes are NCDS: 6362, BCS: 4706, BHPS: 580.
3. The year we establish degree attainment is 1999 on average for the BHPS. For the NCDS 
and BCS all individuals need to have graduated by 1981 and 1993 respectively.
4. Standard errors in parentheses.
5. Rows and columns may not add up precisely due to rounding.
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Table 5.6: Using Consumption Data to Test Staying On and 
Parental Income Relationships
Staying on Beyond Age 16
(1)
Consumption
Educational
Inequality
(2)
Income
Educational
Inequality Sample Size
1977-1979 .338 (.036) .279 (.037) 1519
1980-1982 .292 (.037) .219 (.036) 1683
1983-1985 .365 (.042) .306 (.043) 1429
1986-1988 .418 (.043) .395 (.039) 1358
1989-1991 .357 (.045) .287 (.046) 1127
1992-1994 .328 (.044) .231 (.047) 978
1995-1997 .315 (.047) .264 (.043) 972
1998-2000 .333 (.046) .260 (.040) 874
Change 1977-1979 to 
1986-1988
.080 (.056) .116 (.054)
Change 1986-1988 to 
1998-2000
-.085 (.063) -.135 (.056)
Change 1977-1979 to 
1998-2000
-.005 (.058) -.019 (.054)
Notes:
1. Educational Inequality is defines as the difference between the staying on rate of the
top quintile less the staying on rate of the bottom quintile. Quintiles are defined on
the basis of parental consumption in column (1) and income in column (2)
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
i
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Table 5.7: Testing Alternative Income Specifications
Staying On After Beyond Compulsory Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NCDS
1974
BCS
1986
BHPS
1996
Changes Over Time 
(2)- (3)-(2) (3) -  (1) 
(1)
Basic Controls
Top Quintile .272 .383 .247 .111 -.136 -.025
(.020) (.021) (.031) (.029) (.037) (.037)
Top Quartile .243 .357 .225 .114 -.132 -.018
(.017) (.018) (.028) (.025) (.033) (.033)
Top Decile .354 .414 .283 .060 -.131 -.071
(.027) (.032) (-045) (.042) (.055) (.052)
Log(Income) .232 .298 .155 .066 -.143 -.077
(.016) (.016) (-021) (.023) (.026) (.026)
Degree Acquisition by Age 23
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
NCDS BCS70 BHPS Changes Over Time
1981 1993 1999 (8) - (9 )- (8) (9)-(7)
(7)
Basic Controls
Top Quintile .146 .298 .371 .153 .072 .225
(.014) (.018) (.052) (.022) (.055) (.054)
Top Quartile .123 .266 .359 .143 .092 .235
(.011) (.017) (.050) (.020) (.053) (.080)
Top Decile .198 .376 .448 .178 .072 .250
(019) (.030) (.078) (.035) (.084) (.084)
Log(Income) .116 .216 .258 .100 .042 .142
(.010) (.012) (.038) (.016) (.040) (.039)
Notes:
1. The data used in the top panel is discussed in the Notes to Table 5.3.
2. The data used in the lower panel is discussed in the Notes to Table 5.5.
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Table 5.8: Adding Controls to Models of Educational Inequality
Staying On Beyond Age 16 -  Quintile Measures of Educational Inequal
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NCDS BHPS Change Change Change 
1974 BCSiyso 19% (2) -  (1) (3)-(2) (3)-(l)
Educational
Inequality
A. No Controls
272(020) 3 ^  '2^2K } (.021) (.030) (.029) (.037)
-.030
(.036)
Educational
Inequality
B. Controls for family size, sex, no dad and parents’ age
-386 .216 .100 -.170 
0 1 '  (.021) (030) (Q31) (Q37)
-.070
(.038)
Educational
Inequality
C. Specification B plus controls for parental education
.243 .149 .111 -.094 
U }  (.024) (.033) (.034) (.041)
.015
(.040)
Educational
Inequality
D. Specification C plus controls for test scores
072(020) '^91 K } (.024) (.031)
Sample
Size 6362 4707 1613
Degree at Age 23/22 Quintile Measures of Educational Inequality
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
NCDS, BCS70, BHPS, Change Change Change 
1981 1993 1999 (8)-(7 )  (9)-(8) (9)-(7)
Educational
Inequality
A. No Controls
146 ( fiM'l 298 311  152 079 
. (. ) (.018) (.053) (.022) (.056)
.231
(.055)
Educational
Inequality
B. Controls for family size, sex, no dad and parents’ age
148 ( 014^ 294 364  146 070 
. (. ) (.019) (.054) (.024) (.057)
.216
(.056)
Educational
Inequality
C. Specification B plus controls for parental education
.170 .179 .103 .009 .uo/ (Q21) (Q61) (Q25) ( Q65) .112(-024)
Educational
Inequality
D. Specification C plus controls for test scores
r ni n  -^ 4 ^78 .036 (.011) ( Q20) ( Q23)
Sample
Size 6362 4707 580
Notes:
1. Marginal effects are derived from Probit models of staying on beyond 16 on dummy 
variables for quintiles of family income. Educational inequality is defined as Pr[Stay On | 
Top Income Quintile] -  Pr[Stay On | Bottom Income Quintile].
2. Specification A for the BHPS differs from those in Table 5.7 as controls for year of birth 
and wave observed are added.
3. In Specification B family size is modelled by including dummies for one other child in 
the household and two or more other children in the household (cohort member as only 
child is the omitted variable). Parental age is modelled by dummies for the age group of 
the mother and father.
4. Parental education for parents is measured in a three category coding, 1 if parents left 
school at the minimum age, 2 if they left school between the minimum age and 18, and 3 
if they left education at age 18 or later. Dummies are included for both parents, and a 
dummy is added for missing information so all observations can be used.
5. Test scores measure the child’s quintile in the distribution of maths and reading scores at 
age 11 for the NCDS and 10 for die BCS.
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6. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
7. Quintiles are derived from the net family income of the cohort member less their own 
earnings.
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Table 5.9: Relationships between Educational Attainment and Income at 16:
Controlling for Sibling Fixed Effects using the BHPS
Linear Probability Model of Staying On in Post-Compulsory Education
(1)
No Fixed Effects 
-  Full Sample
(2)
No Fixed Effects 
- Sibling Sample
(3)
(2) Plus Controls 
for Parent’s 
Education
(4)
Sibling Fixed 
Effects
Coefficient for .104 .107 .069 .079
Income on (.022) (.029) (.030) (.048)
Staying On 
Sample Size 1613 984 984 984
Linear Probability Model of Obtaining a Degree by Age 23/22 on Family Income at age 18
(5) (6) (7) (8)
No Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects (6) Plus Controls Sibling Fixed 
-  Full Sample - Sibling Sample for Parent’s Effects
___________________________________________________ Education
Coefficient for .088 .162 .090
Income on (.029) (.051) (.050)
Degree 
Attainment
Sample Size___________ 726_____________ 309_____________ 309
Notes:
1. Controls for family composition are once again added to these models as these are child 
specific at age 16. These controls are those included in Specification B in Table 5.8.
2. Additional controls are added for parents work status in the year that income is observed 
as this may be correlated with differential income and performance between siblings.
3. The definition of a sibling is an individual in the sample who shares the same parental 
identifier. This is defined as the mother and father’s combined identifiers when both these 
are listed or the lone parent’s identifier where only one is listed. A wider sibling sample 
can be generated by matching just one parent; however this raises complications about 
how long children have been co-resident.
.090
(•095)
309
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Table 5.10: Relationships between Educational Attainment and Income at 16:
Controlling for Permanent Income using the BHPS
Staying On Beyond Age 16 - Linear Probit Models
(1) (2) (3)
Log Income at age 16 (1) Plus control for Log (1) Plus control
(Controls for parental Income at 20 for Log average
education included) income 18-21
Probit marginal .112 (.031) .101 (.035) .080 (.038)
effect
Sample Size 856 856 540
Degree at Age 23/22 - Linear Probit Models
(4) (5) (6)
Log Income at age 18 (4) Plus control for Log (4) Plus control
(Controls for parental Income at 20 for Log average
education included) income 18-21
Probit marginal .175 (.043) .172 (.048) .145 (.052)
effect
Sample Size 540 540 540
Note:
All models include controls for family composition and parents’ education as discussed in the 
notes to Table 5.8.
157
Chapter 6: Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Mating in 
the UK
6.1. Introduction
This thesis considers the links between economic status across generations. So far, 
I have considered this question solely in terms of the relationship between 
parental income and individual earnings and education levels. It seems natural to 
think that household income is a better measure of economic welfare than 
individual earnings when households pool income and benefit from economies of 
scale and household public goods. Indeed, poverty is usually measured at the 
household, rather than at the individual level. Economic status for those in couples 
is therefore substantially influenced by their partners’ earnings. In this chapter, I 
broaden my focus to consider the role of partners’ earnings in contributing to the 
intergenerational links within families. If assortative mating is strong, the 
persistence of family incomes across generations might be stronger than is 
observed based on individual earnings.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, previous economic research on the interaction 
between intergenerational mobility and assortative mating is limited. All the 
studies that have been carried out suggest that partners contribute substantially to 
intergenerational persistence (Solon and Chadwick, 2002, Ermisch et al 2004, 
Lam and Schoeni, 1994). The only previous estimates of income mobility and 
assortative mating in the UK are found in Atkinson (1983), which suggests that 
assortative mating is very strong. Indeed, the relationship between the earnings of 
fathers and sons-in-law’s earnings is stronger than that found between fathers and 
sons. More recent estimates from Ermisch et al (2004) are based on occupational 
indices; in this respect, the relationship between fathers and sons-in-law are lower 
than between fathers and sons, but still substantial.
In Chapter 4 I have demonstrated, based on individual measures, that 
intergenerational mobility in the UK has fallen when comparing sons bom in 1958 
with those bom in 1970. Here I examine whether these changes are replicated for 
daughters’ earnings and once the partners of both sons and daughters are added to 
the picture. The consideration of sons and their partners and daughters and their 
partners symmetrically is an innovation in this chapter.
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The previous literature has focused either on the persistence between sons 
and their parents or sons and their parents-in-law, largely playing down the role of 
women’s earnings. This is because the intergenerational mobility of women’s 
earnings is difficult to measure, as women participate in the labour market less 
often than men, and when they do, they often work part-time. In some ways this 
problem can be ignored, if we want to know about intergenerational earnings 
persistence at a point in time it is reasonable to simply measure this without taking 
account of selection issues. In fact, measuring the way in which intergenerational 
mobility changes as patterns of female participation alters is an important focus of 
this chapter. However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the theoretical background 
to these models is firmly couched in terms of permanent income. Therefore, I 
investigate how the results are being affected, and possibly distorted, by 
participation decisions.
I begin this chapter by reviewing the theoretical background to 
intergenerational mobility and assortative mating first discussed in Section 2.5. 
This demonstrates why persistence between an individual’s parental income and 
his or her partner’s earnings may vary. The conclusions of this simple approach 
are clear; the link between parental income and partner’s earnings is increasing 
with the strength of assortative mating. If assortative mating is strong, the 
elasticity of partner’s earnings with respect parental income will be similar to that 
for the child’s own earnings.
In my results, I estimate the relationships described in the model to build 
up a picture of how assortative mating and intergenerational transmissions are 
related. I first develop a picture of how individuals match by education level. I 
find some evidence that assortative mating has increased. I also consider the 
relationship between parental income and the education of partners; these 
relationships are strong in all cases, pointing to substantial assortative mating. 
However, I find less evidence of change for these estimates.
The most important set of results show the regression coefficients and 
correlations between the earnings of sons, daughters-in-law, daughters and sons- 
in-law and their parents’ (or parents-in-law’s) income. I find, as expected, that the 
correlation between partners’ earnings and parental incomes are strong. The most 
interesting results show that these relationships have changed quite substantially,
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especially for the earnings of daughters-in-law. In the earlier cohort, there was 
only a very weak relationship between daughters-in-law’s earnings and parental 
income, whereas in the later cohort this is as almost as strong as the relationship 
between sons and their parents. There is a smaller, but still significant, increase in 
the relationship between daughters’ parental incomes and their partners’ earnings.
The challenge is to interpret these results. As emphasised above, we want 
to understand both the importance of changes in the underlying relationships and 
changes in the selection into employment. I therefore compare my uncorrected 
estimates for the employed sample with those which correct for the selection into 
employment. I find that in the second cohort, women’s participation decisions are 
more strongly correlated to their potential wages. This introduces an upward bias 
on the change in intergenerational elasticities when women’s eamings are the 
dependent variable. Indeed, this change in the selection into employment is in part 
responsible for the rise in the relationship between the eamings of daughters-in- 
law and the parental income of sons.
In the next section, I present the theoretical background and measurement 
approach used in this chapter. Section 6.3 describes the data, particularly focusing 
on the changes in household formation and employment between the two cohorts. 
In Section 6 .4 ,1 discuss how the cohorts match by education level while Section 
6.5 considers the relationship between parental income and the education levels of 
the next generation. In Section 6.6, 1 present my main results on intergenerational 
mobility, and show how they are influenced by changes in participation. In 
Section 6.7, I discuss the interpretation of my findings while Section 6.8 
concludes.
6.2 Theoretical Background and Measurement Issues
Theory
The theoretical framework behind the relationship between intergenerational 
mobility and assortative mating has been discussed in Section 2.5. Here I take the 
model used in Ermisch at al (2004), where assortative mating occurs on the basis 
of human capital. In Lam and Schoeni (1994) and Chadwick and Solon (2002) 
mating occurs on the basis of full income. Simplifying the matching process to
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r
operating only on human capital serves to reduce the number of parameters 
relevant to the model and seems a reasonable summary of the literature on 
assortative mating.
Assortative mating is modelled as a , the positive correlation between the 
human capital of wives ( H wi) and husbands ( Hhi).
Corr(Hwi,H hi) = 0  (6.1)
For both husbands and wives income is positively related to human capital, 
although the return to human capital may vary across gender as in equations (6.2) 
and (6.3) below.
iny», =Tw+r„n«+v« <6-2>
In + (6-3)
In this formulation the intergenerational relationship is driven by the optimising 
behaviour of parents. The parental utility function includes parental consumption 
and the child’s household income, so that the child’s partner’s income is also 
included. However, this does not affect the general conclusions of the model 
which are similar to Lam and Schoeni (1994) where the mechanism behind the 
correlation of education across generations is left ambiguous.
Parental utility is described in equation (6.4) where n  indicates the extent 
to which parents are altruistic and care about their child’s income. From now on I 
shall express the model in terms of the wife’s parents’ income, so that parameters 
and variables relating to the parents are subscripted w . However, the model is 
fully symmetric for husbands and wives. I am assuming that all children marry.
u r ™  = (1 -  n)  In c r* " “ + ^ ln  E(Yml + Yu,) (6.4)
Parents solve this model subject to their budget constraint. In this model, 
debt and bequests are not permitted, so that parents must spend all their available 
income on their own consumption and on the education of their children. Each 
unit of human capital has a price pH. Solving the model gives the following 
solution for the intergenerational parameter,/?, the coefficient from a log-log 
regression of child’s income on parental income.
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In Ywi = a  + P„ In Y ^ r‘"'s + ew, where &  = —  f t  (6'5)
P h
Intergenerational persistence for daughters is therefore positively related to 
parental altruism and the returns to education for women, but negatively related to 
the cost of investment.
Similar factors are important for the relationship between the husband’s 
income and his wife’s parental income. In this case, the male return to education 
is important and the relationship is moderated by assortative mating and the 
difference in the distribution of education between husbands and wives.
SDHk n  (6.6)
In Yu = a  + Sw In Y ^ '“" + ft, where Sw = cr— j ^ —  ft or
S D  P h
SD ’ ft
Putting /?and 8  together enables us to understand more about the expected 
relationship between these two parameters. If the model is worked through in 
terms of son’s parental income, the relationship is symmetric so that:
s w SD"' ft . Sh SD"- ft (6.7)—  = a — - r - —  and —  = <x— — -r-^  
fiw SDh- ft Pb SD"' ft
As shown, if the returns to education and the distributions of human capital are 
equal for men and women, the ratio of Sw and J3W, will enable the identification
of a ; the elasticity between the income of the daughter’s partner and her parents’ 
income over the elasticity of her own income with respect to her parents’ income 
will be equal to the extent of assortative mating. In this chapter, the focus is on 
how these relationships change across cohorts. The implication of equation (6.7) 
is that increases in /? for sons (as observed in Chapter 4) are likely to lead to 
increases in S  for daughters-in-law, ceteris paribus. In addition, increases in cr 
will lead to a rise in 8  relative to /?.
It is also clear that changes in the returns to human capital for men and 
women have a part to play in this model. If we think of the incomes in this model 
as permanent, participation will influence the return to human capital over the 
lifetime. The implication is that if daughters participate more, yw will increase and
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will rise relative to Sw, and ^ w ill rise relative to flh. This provides an
illustration of how changing patterns of participation can influence 
intergenerational mobility. Of course, it is difficult to observe the implications of 
these lifetime factors when incomes for the children’s generation are observed at 
only one point in time.
A further implication of the model is that in order to understand changes in 
the relationship between parental income and partners’ eamings, it will be 
necessary to try to unpick changes in assortative mating ( a )  and changes in 
returns, which, as noted, may come through changes in participation. To express 
this in another way, if the association between daughters-in-law’s eamings and 
parental incomes increases we want to know if this is because individuals have 
changed the way they match or if the match has remained the same but wives’ 
working patterns have changed.
Measurement Issues
In the empirical work in this chapter, I estimate four p a r a m e t e r s , j3h 
and Sh, based on regressions of eamings on parental income. I report partial
correlations alongside these coefficients, as previously. Obtaining good estimates 
of these parameters has all the usual problems associated with measuring 
intergenerational mobility, which have been discussed throughout this thesis. 
However, lower participation and part-time work among women creates 
additional problems in estimating /3w and Sh, and I shall focus on these here.
The classic analysis of the problems caused by selection bias is presented 
in Heckman (1979). There are two equations governing the processes, an eamings 
equation for all women (where, in this case, the explanatory variable would be 
parental income) and a latent variable relationship governing the decision to 
participate.
Yl = a  + j3Xi +ui (6.8)
z , = £ + 5 a + * ,  (6.9)
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The woman participates only if Z, >0. Therefore the regression of the observed Yi 
on X, will be biased by an additional error term, similar to an omitted variable 
bias. If those with higher eamings are more likely to work, and X(is positively 
correlated with eamings, /? will be upward biased.
Y' = a  + /3Xi + E(ui | ei > -£ 0 -  Qi) for the employed sample. (6.10)
As always, it is the change in the selection bias which will be important 
when making comparisons across cohorts. In recent papers, Mulligan and 
Rubinstein (2004, 2005) discuss the implications of the changing selection of 
women into work for the gender wage gap. They argue that as the returns to skill 
have increased, potential wages have become increasingly important in 
determining the selection into work, leading to an increasing positive selection 
bias and an observed reduction in the gender wage gap. It is clear that selection 
bias may have changed for the daughters and daughters-in-law I observe in my 
data, particularly given the changes in characteristics across cohorts which I 
highlight in the data section. It is therefore necessary to attempt to model the 
influence of endogenous selection.
Heckman’s framework provides an obvious route to exploring the 
implications of the changing selection into work. The bias in equation (6.10) can 
be shown to equal
1' = a  + ^ X ( + 5sL ^  where A, = ^ ^ a n d  v, = - £ ( 2, (611)
F(v,)
The bias will be larger the stronger is the correlation between the unobserved 
determinants of wages and participation. Inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio ( ) ,
demonstrates that the selection bias will be stronger when participation is low. 
While the extent of the bias can be estimated by making distributional 
assumptions it is more convincing to estimate the parameters of the correction 
using a Probit model of employment. In order to do this, it is necessary to have an 
exclusion restriction (i.e. a variable which determines employment but not 
eamings), so that the employment equation can be identified separately from the 
eamings model.
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In their model of intergenerational occupational mobility, Ermisch et al 
(2004) account for the selection of women into work by incorporating a Heckman 
selection correction in their estimates. Ermisch et al use a number of variables to 
predict employment and then use the cubic of the predicted probability of 
employment index generated to identify the selection. I follow their approach, 
although acknowledge its limitations in my discussion of the results.
Heckman’s correction is very powerful as it provides a point estimate of 
the parameter of interest in the context of missing information. However Manski 
(forthcoming inter alia) believes that the distributional and exclusion restrictions 
invoked by this approach are too strong. In Manski’s formation each woman in 
the sample is characterised by(y ,x ,z), where yis the dependent variable (the 
woman’s permanent income), x  is the explanatory variable (either her own or her 
husband’s parents’ incomes), z is a binary variable which takes the form of 1 if 
the woman is employed and 0 if she is not working. The regressions that are being 
estimated aim to reveal the relationship between y and jc , (E[y | jc] )  for the full 
sample of women. The law of total probability implies that
E[y | x] = E[y | jc, z = 1 ]P(z = 11 x) + E[y \x,z = 0]P(z = 0 1 x) (6.12)
In other words, the true parameter will be a weighted average of E[y \ x, z = 1] and 
E[y | x, z = 0], where the weights depend on the proportion of women who are not 
working. There is no information which can identify E[y | jc, z  = 0] and therefore 
one cannot identify a point estimate of E[y | x ] . Again, it is clear that the problem 
is exacerbated if a large proportion of the sample is not working.
Manski has developed a method to partially identify E[y | jc] by using the 
information that is available to derive bounds for the expected value. Minicozzi 
(2002) considers the intergenerational mobility of women using this approach. 
Initally she calculates the ‘worst case’ bounds, assuming no information is 
available about eamings for those not working full time. Minicozzi then narrows 
the bounds by making assumptions about the upper and lower bounds of eamings 
for individuals according to their characteristics and current work status. 
Unfortunately the bounds which result from these assumptions are still wide at .12 
to .53. Having such wide bounds would make it very difficult to draw conclusions
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on the relative magnitudes of /? and£, which is why I prefer to use Heckman’s 
approach.
I present results which show the uncorrected regression coefficients for the 
sample of employed individuals and also results which correct for selection. Both 
are informative. The uncorrected estimates will show how parental income is 
related to the eamings of daughters and daughters-in-law with the current patterns 
of employment. However, the selectivity corrected results enable me to try to 
separate the influence of changes in the selection into employment from changes 
in assortative mating.
An additional way of exploring the influence of assortative mating versus 
changes in participation is to estimate some of the other parameters from the 
model for the full sample. To begin with, I measure the relationship between the 
educational attainments of partners, as a direct measure of a  for the two cohorts. 
Of course, couples will match on broader measures of human capital than 
educational attainment, so this will not provide a perfect estimate o fcr. An 
advantage of using education is that it is observed for the full population.
An alternative approach recognises the fact that matching and 
intergenerational investments are both modified through human capital. If we 
return to the model, it is clear that it also yields strong predictions about the 
relationship between human capital and parental education.
H»,=a  + Vw In Ywpr m + em where yr = n  / p H (6.13)
and
tt ,  „ parents .  SD"* 71 (6-14)+£*, whereG7 = (T——- —
SD pH
Consequently the relative magnitudes of y/ and crwill be informative 
about the extent of assortative mating. Again, this relies on the premise that the 
measures of educational attainment used here are good proxies for human capital.
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6.3 Data
The data sources for the empirical work in this chapter are the same as those used 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 
British Cohort Study (BCS). I rely once again on the incomes of the cohort 
members’ parents at age 16 as the explanatory variable. This variable has been 
discussed extensively in Chapter 4, and the same caveats apply here. As a single 
piece of information on income is being used to proxy for the permanent income 
of parents, we must once again assume that the bias introduced is similar for both 
cohorts.
Information about the eamings of cohorts is available at age 33 in the 
NCDS (1958 cohort) and at age 30 in the BCS (1970 cohort). At the same time, 
information was obtained about the cohort member’s partner, for both married and 
cohabiting couples. I use the questions on partner’s sex (I drop the few same sex 
couples in the sample), partner’s age, employment status, education and eamings. 
As information is only available on partner’s net eamings, I also use the net 
eamings of cohort members, rather than the gross eamings measure used in 
previous chapters. The education variable available for partners is not very 
satisfactory - we only know the age at which partners completed their full-time 
education. This is much less useful than the variables detailing qualification 
attainment which we have for cohort members, as educational outcomes for 
individuals who left school at the same age are quite diverse in the UK system, 
especially for those leaving school at age 16.
The data I use on the partner were obtained as part of the cohort member’s 
main interview, so partners were not necessarily involved in answering the 
questions about themselves48. However, we know both whether the cohort 
member’s partner was present in the room while the questions were being asked 
and whether the partner helped to answer these questions. In about 80 to 90 
percent of the cases where partners were present, they helped to answer the 
questions. However, there was a lot of variation by cohort and sex in the 
proportion of partners who were present when the questions were asked. Female 
partners are more likely to have been involved than male partners, although this
48 A separate questionnaire was administrated to the cohort members in the NCDS at 33, but this 
information is not used here, as it was not also collected for the BCS.
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difference narrowed across the cohorts. Around 50 percent of the wives/partners 
of NCDS men were present, while only 30 percent of BCS wives/partners were in 
the room. The female cohort members are less likely to have their partners 
present, with about 20 percent of them doing so in each cohort. I check the 
implications of these differences for my results.
The need for information on partners means that I drop some cohort 
members for whom this data is invalid. This leads to the samples used here being 
slightly smaller than those used in previous chapters. I discard observations with 
invalid information on partner’s eamings and employment (e.g. partners are 
working but no eamings are reported for them), and also where the partner is self- 
employed.
In Table 6.1, I describe the main variables used in my samples by cohort, 
sex and partnership status. The first feature to note is that rather more of the 
individuals from the earlier cohort have partners at the time of the survey. When 
the NCDS cohort is observed, 78 percent of males have partners and 79 percent of 
females. For the BCS, this has declined to 61 percent of males and 68 percent of 
females. There has clearly been a strong shift towards later partnership and this is 
compounded by the fact that the 1970 cohort is observed when three years 
younger than the 1958 cohort.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a stark illustration of this point by graphing 
the age at which individuals moved in with their current partner (for those that 
have one) in the two surveys. It is obvious that BCS individuals are forming 
partnerships later, and that for many of those who do not currently have partners, 
it is probably just a matter of time (the sample has been truncated). Those who are 
observed in partnerships in the BCS are likely to be those who have formed 
partnerships relatively early, implying that the selection into the sample of couples 
has probably changed between the cohorts. This selection is even more difficult to 
deal with than the selection into employment, but it is important to keep it in 
mind.
A further difference between the cohorts is the proportion of couples who 
are legally married. In the NCDS, this is 87 percent for men and 89 percent for 
women, whereas in the BCS it is much smaller, at 60 percent for men and 69
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percent for women. This change is a potential worry as the degree of commitment 
in a cohabiting relationship may vary considerably. Ermisch and Francesconi 
(2000) explore patterns of cohabitation using data from the British Household 
Panel. The evidence that cohabitation is a very temporary state is mixed. 
Cohabiting unions do tend to be short with 70 percent lasting less than 3 years, but 
62 percent of those who end their cohabitation are moving into marriage. There is, 
however, a strong negative relationship between the age at which the cohabitation 
began and the chances of dissolution, which means that the relatively young 
sample in the BCS are more likely to have temporary cohabitations. I check the 
sensitivity of my results to this shift.
In both datasets, men with partners are more likely to be employed and 
earn more (there is a growing literature on understanding this married-man wage 
premium, for example, Korenman and Sanders, 1991) The pattern with respect to 
education has switched however; in the NCDS, partnered men are more likely to 
have higher education, whereas in the BCS, those who do not have partners are 
more likely to be highly educated. This is likely due to the fact that the BCS 
sample of those with partners will include more of those who formed partnerships 
relatively early.
For women, there is little difference in the education levels of those with 
and without partners in the NCDS, while in the BCS, those with partners are less 
likely to have either very low or very high education. Women with partners have 
lower eamings in both cohorts. It seems that this is related to different 
employment patterns. The overall employment rates are higher in the BCS than 
the NCDS for both groups. But the relatively small differences in employment 
rates mask larger differences for full and part-time work. Of women with partners 
just one third work full time in the NCDS compared with a half in the BCS. I also 
report full-time equivalent eamings for women; this closes part of the gap 
between the eamings of women with and without partners, but not all of it.
The choice of full-time or part-time work is closely associated with the 
presence of children. Once again, there are marked differences between the 
cohorts with almost 70 percent of men with partners having children in the 
household in the NCDS compared with 60 percent in the BCS. For women with 
partners, the proportion with children is 77 percent in the NCDS and 65 percent in
169
the BCS. Many women without partners also have children in the household in 
both cohorts; this is 48 percent in the NCDS and 34 percent in the BCS.
6.4 Changes in Assortative Mating
I begin my empirical analysis by using the data to consider the extent of 
assortative mating directly. I measure the similarity of education levels within 
couples. As stated above, information available on partners’ education is limited, 
so I am only able to present the association between the education-leaving age 
within couples. Results are presented in Tables 6.2A (for sons) and 6.2B (for 
daughters), which show cross-tabulations of the education levels of the cohort 
members and their partners.
It is immediately clear that school-leaving ages are heavily clustered 
around age 16 in the UK, which limits the power of this approach. Also, the 
general increase in educational attainment noted in Chapter 5 is plain. In almost 
half of all couples in the NCDS, both partners left school at or below age 16, 
while in the BCS, this is just below 40 percent.
There are several ways of using these cross tabulations to infer the extent 
of assortative mating on education levels. A simple (but potentially misleading) 
approach is to add up the value of the cells for which couples have the same 
education group, or where they have the same or adjacent education groups. Using 
this approach, it appears that there has been a fall in assortative mating for both 
sons and daughters. The proportion in the samples marrying someone in the same 
education group (educational homogamy) rose from around 60 percent in the 
NCDS to 55 percent in the BCS.
As noted, the education levels of the cohorts have risen; individuals are 
now more likely to stay in school beyond age 16 and consequently the education 
distribution has become more dispersed. This means that if couples match 
randomly, we would expect to find fewer couples with the same education level in 
the BCS compared with the NCDS. The implications of this are shown by the 
figures in parentheses; these show the likelihood of each combination of 
education levels if partners’ education levels are independent. Assortative
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matching on education is demonstrated by the fact that the actual probabilities are 
higher than these along the diagonal.
An alternative measure of assortative mating is generated by dividing the 
actual proportion of couples with the same education group by the expected 
random proportion. This approach reveals a small rise in assortative mating. There 
are 1.409 times more NCDS sons with the same education group as their partner 
than would be predicted by random matching. In the BCS this number has risen to 
1.590. For daughters the relative odds of the daughter being in the same 
education group as her partner has increased from 1.392 to 1.485 between the 
cohorts49.
These results for the UK therefore show a small rise in assortative mating 
by education group. This is in line with the results of similar exercises found in 
Pencavel (1998) and Mare (1991) for the US. Both Pencavel and Mare use data on 
young husbands and wives from the 1940 census onwards to consider the 
association of educational levels within couples. Mare takes care to use models 
which take account of the changing distributions of education and finds evidence 
that part of the rise in homogamy can be explained by the falling gap between the 
age when young people leave education and the age of marriage.
Chan and Halpin (2003) use data from the General Household Surveys in 
1973, 1986 and 1995 to consider educational matching within marriage in the UK, 
and compare this with data from a number of sources for Ireland. Like Mare, 
Chan and Halpin use log-linear models to account for the changes in overall 
educational distributions. Chan and Halpin find a decrease in educational 
assortative mating for the UK, although their data focuses on earlier cohorts than 
those considered here. The authors argue that that this may be explained by the 
rise in the gap between school leaving and first marriage from the 1970s onwards 
in the UK (meaning that individuals are less likely to marry their class-mates), but 
do not offer further evidence on this. It seems unlikely that the reversal of this 
trend over the 1990s is a result of a closing of the gap between education and
49 We would not necessarily expect men and women to follow exactly the same patterns, because 
women tend to marry men slightly older than themselves. We can think of men and women bom at 
the same time as being part of slightly different (although overlapping) marriage markets.
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marriage as although education has lengthened on average, Figures 1 and 2 show 
that partnership formation is also increasingly delayed.
The evidence on educational matching therefore suggests that assortative 
mating has increased very slightly across the cohorts. This suggests that we might 
expect to see an increasing relationship between parental income and the 
education and eamings of sons-in-law and daughters-in-laws.
6.5 Education and Parental Income
The next stage of my empirical analysis considers the relationship between 
educational attainment and parental income for the cohort members and their 
partners.
As I have shown in Section 6.2, if educational attainment is a proxy for 
human capital, comparing these relationships can provide additional information 
about the extent of assortative mating. To reiterate,
So . If the relationship between parental income and education is
similar for the cohort member and their partner, this implies that assortative 
mating is strong.
In Table 6.3 I use Probit models to estimate the relationship between age 
left education and parental income for the cohort members and their partners. The 
models have parallels with those reported in Chapter 5 as I use two dependent 
variables; leaving school after age 16 (similar, but not identical, to staying on) and 
leaving at age 20 or older (close to university participation). Here I measure the 
linear relationship between log parental income and these two outcomes, and I 
report the marginal effect of log income on the probability of the two outcomes.
= a  + y/w In where y/ = n / pH (6.15)
and
n <sDHh
Hht = a  + 07J n  Yhr m + eu where®- =
Ph SD
(6.16)
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To provide a comparison, I report the models for single cohort members 
first and then for couples. The first two panels of Table 6.3 report these 
relationships for single sons and daughters in the cohorts. There is no strong 
evidence of a rise in the relationship between family income and educational 
attainment for single sons or daughters. For sons and daughters in couples, the 
strengthening relationship between parental income and educational attainment 
which was observed in Chapter 5 is more apparent, with a strong rise in the 
impact of family income on higher education participation.
Results for children’s partners indicate strong assortative mating, with 
strong relationships between parental income and partners’ education levels for 
both sexes and in both cohorts. Notably, these relationships have not changed 
between the cohorts, suggesting no increase in assortative mating, in contrast to 
the evidence in the previous section on educational matching.
6.6 Results on Changes in Intergenerational Mobility
Intergenerational Mobility o f Sons and Daughters in the UK
I begin my empirical analysis of eamings mobility by investigating the evidence 
on changes in individual intergenerational mobility for sons and daughters by 
partnership status. There are two motivations behind this exercise: the first is to 
understand more about intergenerational persistence for women and the second is 
to compare results for single individuals with those in couples.
Table 6.4 provides results for both the elasticity and partial correlation 
measures of intergenerational persistence. The results reported here for sons are 
on a slightly different basis from those reported in Table 4.2, as they are based on 
net eamings rather than gross eamings and the samples are smaller. Nonetheless, 
the increase in intergenerational persistence for sons is strong for both groups. It 
appears that the rise in intergenerational persistence is slightly stronger for sons 
with partners, with the partial correlation between sons’ eamings and parental 
income rising by .079 for single sons and . 111 for sons with partners.
The level of intergenerational persistence for men is very similar whether 
they have partners or not. This is not the case for women. The correlation between 
women’s eamings and their parental income at age 16 is considerably stronger for
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daughters who are single in their early 30s. In the BCS, the partial correlation is 
.327 for single daughters and .181 for those in couples; this difference is 
statistically significant. This indicates that the presence of a husband in the 
household is associated with a weaker intergenerational link for daughters’ 
earnings, perhaps because her actual earnings are more weakly tied to her 
capabilities. What is interesting to see is whether the intergenerational link is 
strong between the daughter’s husband and her parents; leading to a continued 
persistence in household income for daughters in couples.
The partial correlation measure of intergenerational persistence for single 
daughters shows a similar rise to that observed for sons. However due to the small 
sample sizes, the change is not statistically significant. There is essentially no 
change in intergenerational mobility at the individual level for daughters in 
couples.
There is a large difference between the p  coefficients and partial 
correlations for daughters. For both groups of daughters, the coefficients are 
considerably larger than the partial correlation; a feature not observed for sons. 
The contrast between these results shows the importance of adjusting for the 
changing variance of income for women. Equation (6.17) provides a reminder 
about the relationship between the elasticity and the partial correlation.
lnYP*nal,|iige (6.17)
(COrrinYP™'|age,mYnage) =  ^  ^
Therefore, the reason that the partial correlation is lower than the elasticity for 
both cohorts is because there is a wide dispersion of earnings among daughters. It 
falls further for single women in the NCDS because the dispersion of earnings is 
very wide in this early cohort. As Table 6.1 showed, more single women in the 
NCDS have child care responsibilities and a higher proportion work part-time, 
this will lead to a larger variance.
Taking the Table as a whole demonstrates that the large fall in 
intergenerational mobility observed for employed sons is not found for employed 
daughters. In a later section, I shall assess how robust this conclusion is when I 
take account of endogenous participation.
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Intergenerational Mobility fo r  Couples
I now provide the substantive results of this chapter, showing estimates of the 
intergenerational persistence of earnings for sons and daughters, their partners and 
for the couple as a whole (which I describe as family mobility). In Chapter 2, I 
described how the elasticity of couples’ earnings with respect to parental income 
(defined a s //)  can be decomposed, to demonstrate the contribution from the 
earnings of the cohort member and those of their partner. For couples where both 
partners are working, // = ( l - s ) / 3 + s S , where J3 is the elasticity between the 
child’s earnings and parental income and £ is  the elasticity between the partner’s 
earnings and parental income, and s is the share of earnings contributed by the 
partner. This decomposition makes it clear that a rise in the share of earnings 
contributed by the female partner will have implications fo r / / . If we assume that 
parental income is more strongly associated with the child’s earnings than those of 
the partner, an increase in the woman’s share will result in a fall in ju for sons and 
a rise in // for daughters.
The contribution of /? and S  to family mobility for all couples will also 
depend on the patterns of employment among couples. // = (1 - s ) f i + s S  will only 
be the case for couples where both partners work, while // = p  if only the cohort 
member works, and // = <? if the partner is the only member of the couple 
working. Table 6.5 shows the employment patterns for the couples in my sample, 
and the share of income provided by partners when both work. This Table makes 
it clear that the proportion of households where the female partners work has 
increased, as has the share of household earnings contributed by women when 
they do work. As a result, the relationship between partners’ earnings and parental 
income has become more important in determining the extent of intergenerational 
inequality for men, and less important in determining intergenerational persistence 
for women.
Table 6.6 provides results for/?, S  and // by cohort and sex. The results 
found in Table 6.4 for individual persistence are reiterated here. There is a strong 
rise in /? and in the partial correlation for sons, but no rise in intergenerational 
persistence for daughters. The crucial results in this Table are for the relationships
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between parental income and partners’ earnings. The results for Sw show that for
daughters the relationship between partners’ earnings and parental income is very 
strong, and also that it has increased significantly over time. The partial 
correlations show that the relationship between partners’ earnings and daughters’ 
parental incomes is stronger than that between parents and their daughters. This 
result is in line with others in the literature and suggests strong assortative mating. 
The partial correlations confirm the picture of a rise in<^: it increases by .062 
from .168 to .230 (a change which is significant at the 6 percent level).
The parent to daughter-in-law50 relationship has been less frequently 
studied in the literature. For the NCDS, this lack of attention seems justified as 
there is no significant relationship between parents’ incomes and the earnings of 
their daughters-in-law. However, this changes dramatically for the second cohort 
when the relationship between the parental income of the son and his partner’s 
earnings are of the same magnitude as they are between the parental income of the 
daughter and her partner’s earnings51. This is a very strong result, and implies that 
marriage is now an important way of generating persistence in economic status for 
men in a way which has long been considered to be the case for women. For 
example, the sociology study by Glenn, Ross and Tully (1974) describes female 
mobility entirely in terms of marriage and male mobility in terms of occupational 
change. This division clearly no longer holds.
The results for family mobility demonstrate that income persistence from 
parents to partners does contribute to intergenerational persistence. The rise in 
individual persistence observed for sons is magnified when his partner’s earnings 
are added. The rise in the partial correlation is .111 for his own earnings, and an 
even larger .179 for his earnings and his partner’s earnings combined. The 
influence of the rise in S  is magnified by the fact that partners are contributing a
50 From now on son-in-law and daughter-in-law also refer to daughter’s and son’s cohabitees.
51 In the data section, I discussed the accuracy of partners’ earnings reports, as in many cases these 
are given by the cohort member rather than by the partner themselves. I have checked if results 
differ depending upon who reports the partner’s earnings. There is one significant result. In the 
NCDS the partner-parents elasticity is stronger for sons’ partners if the partner was not present 
when the earnings question was asked. This implies that men tend to over-estimate the similarity 
between their wives’ earnings and their parental income. This implies that the NCDS sons’ partner 
elasticities, which are very low, may even be over-estimates.
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larger share of income in the second cohort. The increase in S  for the daughter’s 
partner has also led to an increase in family income persistence for daughters, 
although to a much smaller extent than for sons. The partial correlation associated 
with fi increases by a statistically significant .066. It is clear that partners’ 
earnings make an important contribution to the intergenerational persistence of 
incomes across generations.
In Section 6.2, I showed that the persistence between partner’s earnings 
and parental income will increase with assortative mating. Results from Table 6 
make it clear that this relationship has indeed increased, for both men and women. 
However, in order to distinguish the influence of assortative mating from changes 
in participation it is important to investigate how selection bias is influencing the 
results, and it is to this issue which I now turn.
Changes in Female Participation and Family Characteristics
It is very clear that the changing participation behaviour of women may influence 
my results for the intergenerational persistence of employed daughters and 
daughters-in-law; a self-selected sub-sample of the full population. Table 6.1 
showed a rise in the proportion of women employed in the BCS compared with 
the NCDS and an increase in the extent to which women work full-time when 
they do work. In this section I attempt to unpick the influence of selection into 
work and selection into full-time work on the results shown so far.
48 percent of employed women with partners work full-time in the NCDS 
while 66 percent work full-time in the BCS. As noted in the discussion of Table 
6.4, part-time work is likely to affect the adjustment between the coefficient and 
partial correlation, and it may also impact on the levels of persistence observed. 
As female partners who work part-time earn substantially less (approximately 
£500 a month in the BCS compared to £1200 for full-timers), a negative 
correlation between part-time work and parental income would contribute to 
persistence.
In Table 6.7, I report estimates of the intergenerational mobility 
parameters for women for full-timers only. The evidence from Tables 6.4 and 6.6 
for all employed women suggested an insignificant rise in intergenerational
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earnings persistence for single daughters, no change for daughters with partners 
and a large rise in the partial correlation of parental income with son’s partner’s 
earnings. When the sample is restricted to full-timers only, the increase in 
persistence for daughters disappears. There continues to be no change for 
daughters with partners52. For daughters-in-law there is still a large significant 
increase in ^although it is slightly smaller than for the full sample (.155 rather
than .179). Restricting the data to only full-time women explains only a small 
part of the most important change for daughters-in-law.
By restricting the sample to full-time workers I have added an additional 
sample selection, thereby potentially increasing the biases discussed in Section
6.2. As a first step to understanding these biases I relate participation and full­
time participation to parental income for women (daughters and daughters-in- 
law). In Table 6.8 I present probit marginal effects for the relationship of parental 
income with both employment and full-time employment. There is evidence for 
all women that the decision to participate is increasingly determined by the 
income of parents (or parents-in-law). For the BCS at least, selection into the 
intergenerational mobility sample is endogenous. This is likely to affect the results 
for women’s earnings mobility in Tables 6.4 and 6.6; with the implication that the 
BCS results may be over-estimated when women’s earnings are the dependent 
variable. In all cases the relationship between full-time work and parental income 
is stronger than between employment and parental income, and for single 
daughters and daughters-in-laws this relationship increases more across the 
cohorts than when part-time employment is included. This may provide an 
additional explanation for the rise in the relationship between parental income and 
daughter-in-law’s earnings in the employed sample.
In Table 6.9 I consider the implications of the initial selection of those in 
employment and the further selection of full-time workers only. I compare the 
estimated p  and 8  coefficients reported in Tables 6.4, 6.6, 6.7 with selectivity- 
corrected results for all the regressions where women’s earnings is the dependent 
variable. Panel 1 reiterates the uncorrected results for all those in employment, in 
panel 2 parallel estimates are shown from a Heckman selection model, where the
52 It is clear that part-time work explains much of the discrepancy between the partial correlations 
and regression coefficients in Table 4.
178
model is identified using the cubic index of the predicted probability of 
employment from a Probit. Panels 3 and 4 repeat this exercise for the selected 
sample of full-time workers only.
The appendix tables to this chapter show the results from the Probit 
models which predict employment and the coefficients on the polynomials of the 
predictions in the first stage of the Heckman correction model. The Probit models 
include parental income, own education, marital status and the number of children 
in the household, and for those with partners; partners’ education, employment 
status and earnings are also included. The estimates in Tables 6.9 are robust to the 
specification used, including the exclusion of partners’ characteristics, the 
specifications reported here are those which result in the most precise estimates. 
The appendix tables show that many of the variables in the Probit equation are 
significant when used to predict employment status, while the pseudo R-squared 
in these models which predict employment status vary between .1 and .3. The 
highest R-squareds are for the full-time employment equations, so it is clear that 
the explanatory variable are better at predicting the selection into full time work. 
This is reflected in the significance of the predicted probabilities in the first stage 
of the Heckman models, which are significant only for the selection into full-time 
work.
Table 6.8 showed the relationships between parental income and 
participation, this has given us some prior expectations concerning the probable 
direction of the biases from sample selection. These expectations are largely 
confirmed by the results in Table 6.9. It is the case that the employment selection 
leads to an overestimate of intergenerational persistence. This is stronger in the 
BCS sample. As a result, the estimates corrected for the selection into 
participation indicate a fall in persistence for daughters with partners and a 
smaller rise for daughters-in-law (the change in f5 is 089 rather than .169 for the 
uncorrected estimates). From these results it appears that half of the change in the 
persistence from parents to daughters-in-laws can be explained by the 
strengthening relationship between family background and employment.
For the estimates which include only those working full-time the 
selectivity correction has less impact. The change in persistence for sons’ partners 
is lower for full-timers, at .121, and the selectivity correction reduces this further
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to .083. For daughters, the results from the different specifications vary across the 
panels. While the results that corrected for the selection into employment showed 
a sizable (but insignificant) fall in persistence the results for full-timers only show 
no change at all, even when the selection into this sample is adjusted for. The 
conclusion must therefore be that it is hard to find strong evidence of a change in 
the extent of earnings persistence for daughters.
Vella (1998) provides a survey of models used to deal with sample 
selection. In his discussion, he notes that in the absence of a legitimate instrument 
to identify the selection mechanism, the identification rests only on the non- 
linearity of the Mills ratio. As a consequence, the standard errors on the adjusted 
coefficients will be inflated. It is clear that the results in Table 6.9 are suffering 
from this difficulty. We can see that the standard errors on the intergenerational 
coefficients are much lower in the models which correct for the selection into full­
time work, where the first stages work better than for those which correct for the 
selection into participation. The large standard errors have an important impact 
on how much we can say about changes in Sh. In the models corrected for the
selection into employment the corrected change in Sh cannot be distinguished 
from zero. In the models which correct for the selection into full-time work the 
increase in Sh is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. Both
models indicate that around half of the large increase observed in Sh in Table 6.6
is a consequence of changes in the selection into employment, however; the 
standard errors are too large to allow us to be statistically confident of this 
conclusion.
As stressed in my data section, there are other differences between the two 
cohorts which may have an impact upon my results. Table 6.10 tries to address the 
consequences of the increase in cohabitation. It is difficult to believe that the 
switch to more informal partnerships could be responsible for the growing 
importance of partners in intergenerational mechanisms - if anything, we might 
expect the effect to work the other way. Nonetheless, this Table repeats the 
analysis of Table 6.6 just for those couples who are legally married. There are 
some slight differences between married and cohabiting couples, but in general
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the patterns are very similar: there has been a strong rise in family income 
persistence for sons and a smaller rise for daughters.
One result which does stand out is that the correlation between the 
daughter-in-law’s earnings and her husband’s parental income is weaker for sons 
who are married in the second cohort compared to those who cohabit. The 
difference between Sh for married and cohabiting couples is significant at the 11
percent level. Ceteris paribus, the growth in cohabitation has contributed towards 
the increased importance of sons’ partners in leading to intergenerational 
persistence; however this is likely to be related to changes in participation as 
cohabiting partners are more likely to work and to work full-time.
6.7 Discussion
The main empirical findings in this paper are as follows:
• Evidence on assortative mating by education suggests that this has risen a 
little between the cohorts.
• However, there has been no rise in the relationship between parental 
income and partners’ education; this is strong for both men and women 
and in both cohorts.
• Intergenerational persistence has not increased as much for the sample of 
employed daughters as it has for the sample of employed sons. 
Attempting to correct for women’s participation decisions produces no 
evidence of any significant change for women.
• For daughters, the relationship between partners’ earnings and parental 
income is strong in both periods and it also has increased slightly over 
time.
• For sons, there has been a very sharp rise in the relationship between their 
partners’ eamings and their parental income. However, this appears to be 
partially explained by the stronger association between parental income 
and daughters-in-law’s participation in the second cohort.
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• As it is coupled with a rise in the number of female partners working and 
an increase in the share of income they contribute, the rise in the daughter- 
in-law’s elasticity leads to a large increase in the persistence of family 
income across generations for sons.
In order to interpret my results I return to the model presented in Section 
2. In this model I discussed how mobility can be interpreted in terms of the 
structural parameters of the intergenerational mobility model. For example, 
J3W = y j i / p H , where /3W is earnings persistence for daughters, yw is the return to 
human capital for women, is the weight placed on the daughter’s income in the 
parental utility function and p H is the cost of human capital. Partner persistence
7t SDHwfor sons (i.e. the elasticity for daughters-in-law) is Sh = yw— cr— — , where <7
Ph sd  h
is the correlation between the human capital of couples and SDH measures the 
dispersion of human capital.
One of the implications of this framework is that an increase in assortative 
mating will lead to an increase in S  relative to f t , ceteris paribus. For daughters
there is a small increase in Sw relative to J3W; while J3W is flat, Sw has increased
somewhat. This suggests a rise in assortative mating.
For sons and daughters-in-law the increase in Sh is very strong compared 
to Ph in the uncorrected sample. However, this change is much lower when the 
change in endogenous participation and full-time work is taken into account. 
Indeed it appears that Sh has fallen relative to J3h when results are corrected,
although this difference is not significant. This implies that changes in the 
selection into employment are behind the increasing relationship between the 
earnings of daughters-in-law and their husbands’ parental income, rather than 
changes in the pattern of marital matching.
The results so far indicate that any increase in assortative mating which 
has occurred through the 1990s in the UK is fairly weak. This is confirmed by the 
evidence using the education data. While matching on education has increased 
slightly when measured directly, there is no increase in the association between 
parental income and partner’s education level.
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VThere is one final piece of evidence to add to the jigsaw. An initially 
puzzling result is the smaller rise in the intergenerational persistence of daughters 
when compared with the strong increase in the persistence of income for sons. 
Within the setup of the simple model, this must be accounted for by a fall in the 
relative return to human capital for women. A decline in the return to human 
capital for women would also explain the smaller selectivity corrected change in 
persistence for daughters-in-law. The small increase in assortative mating is 
counteracted by the relative decline in the returns to education for women.
The return to education in the model refers to a permanent return rather 
than the one-off return observed in an earnings regression. Nonetheless an 
investigation of the return to education does show a fall in the earnings return for 
women. This is found in both simple regressions and in selectivity corrected 
models, while there is no evidence that there has been a fall in returns for men 
with partners53.
The result that earnings differentials by education level have declined for 
women is also found in these cohorts by Dearden, Goodman and Saunders (2003). 
Evidence from the Labour Force Survey shows no such change, with returns to 
education for 25-40 year old women extremely steady across the 1990s54. This 
implies that the fall in the intergenerational mobility for women may be cohort- 
specific, perhaps due to particular life-cycle effects and the three year age gap 
between the data collection. It will be interesting to observe if this persists for the 
next wave of data.
Taken together, my results point to a fairly modest increase in the extent of 
assortative mating in the UK through the 1990s. This is confirmed by the evidence 
using the education data. While matching on education has increased somewhat 
there is no increase in the association between parental income and partner’s 
education level. Apparently more important has been the growing association 
between potential wages, and by extension family background, in women’s 
participation decisions. This has been responsible for much of the new-found
53 Although it should be pointed out that women’s returns to education are much higher than men’s 
returns for both cohorts.
54 Thanks to Steve McIntosh for supplying these results.
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importance of wives’ earnings in contributing to the intergenerational persistence 
of sons’ household incomes.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature on intergenerational 
mobility in the UK. The first is to study how the changes in intergenerational 
mobility for women compare with those for sons, by comparing the 1958 and 
1970 cohorts. I find that trends for women do not show increasing persistence as 
observed for sons in Chapter 4. The second is to provide an up-to-date analysis of 
the contribution of assortative mating to intergenerational persistence. Previous 
studies have focused only on the contribution of women’s partners. This is clearly 
misplaced. For the cohort bom in 1970, the wives and partners of sons are making 
a substantial contribution to the intergenerational persistence of incomes across 
families. Marriage is now as strong a mechanism for securing economic and 
social advantage for men as it is for women, and this change has led to an 
additional fall in the family income mobility of sons.
The evidence presented here suggests that partnership formation magnifies 
the changes in individual earnings persistence observed in Chapter 4, leading to 
even greater intergenerational inequalities in family incomes. There is evidence 
that this is partly due to a small rise in assortative mating, while also a 
consequence of the growing influence of potential wages and family background 
on participation decisions. These changes may also have implications for cross- 
sectional household income inequality. Previous research has indicated that 
women’s earnings have an equalising effect on family incomes, (Cancian and 
Reed, 1996, for the US and Harkness, Machin and Waldfogel, 1997, for the UK). 
However, my evidence suggests that this may be reversing. Not only are wives 
earnings more strongly linked with their husbands’ family backgrounds, but 
partners of men from well-off backgrounds are more likely to work, and given 
participation, are likely to work longer hours. An investigation of these trends for 
household income inequality is firmly on the agenda for further research.
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of Samples by Partnership Status
Sons
NCDS BCS
No Partner Has Partner No Partner Has Partner
< GCSE A-C .324 .245 .249 .259
GCSE A-C .249 .231 .190 .201
A level .291 .360 .309 .298
Degree .136 .164 .254 .242
Proportion employed .738 .918 .835 .933
Monthly Earnings 1140 (612) 1342 (667) 1319(987) 1474 (990)
Monthly Parental 1334 (496) 1384 (492) 1460 (762) 1457 (725)
Income
Married - .873 - .606
Has kids in the .075 .682 .200 .609
household
Sample size 507 1783 853 1322
Daughters
NCDS BCS
No Partner Has Partner No Partner Has Partner
< GCSE A-C .318 .264 .297 .267
GCSE A-C .302 .333 .203 .239
A level .279 .293 .259 .279
Degree .101 .111 .241 .215
Proportion employed .665 .641 .722 .747
Proportion full-time .529 .313 .604 .492
Proportion part-time .136 .328 .118 .255
Monthly Earnings 814(743) 621 (435) 1057 (577) 909 (650)
Full time equivalent 911 (987) 862 (432) 1137 (565) 1085 (619)
earnings
Monthly Parental 1364 (552) 1385 (523) 1419(756) 1431 (684)
Income
Married - .898 - .689
Has kids in the .481 .776 .344 .647
household
Sample size 516 1889 766 1651
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
2. Full time equivalent earnings are defined as (weekly wage/hours)*40.
3. Earnings and income are expressed in 2000 pounds
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Table 6.2A: Assortative Matching on Age Left Full Time Education, Sons
NCDS sons
Age partner left full-time education
Age cohort Member 
left education
16 or 
younger
17 18 orl9 20 or above All
16 or younger .473 (.372) .060 (.037) .069 (.088) .021 (.090) .624
17 .052 (.058) .017 (.012) .018 (.014) .010 (.014) .098
18 or 19 .047 (.081) .025 (.016) .029 (.019) .035 (.020) .136
20 or above .025 (.086) .016 (.017) .025 (.020) .077 (.020) .144
All .596 .119 .141 .144
BCS sons
Age partner left full-time education
Age cohort Member 
left education
16 or 
younger
17 18 orl9 20 or above
All
16 or younger .372 (.276) .053 (.061) .097 (.112) .049 (.123) .572
17 .034 (.045) .025 (.009) .021 (.018) .014 (.020) .094
18 or 19 .056 (.073) .015 (.016) .047 (.029) .033 (.032) .151
20 or above .022 (.089) .013 (.019) .030 (.036) .119 (.040) .184
All .484 .106 .195 .215
Notes:
1. In parentheses are the probabilities of each outcome if the partners’ education levels are
independent.
2. Assortative mating index based on couples with the same education level is 1.409 for the
NCDS and 1.590 for the BCS.
3. Assortative mating index based on couples with the same or adjacent education level is
1.379 for the NCDS and 1.398 for the BCS.
4. Sample sizes are 1546 for the NCDS and 1305 for the BCS.
187
Table 6.2B: Assortative Matching on Age Left Full Time Education,
Daughters
NCDS daughters
Age partner left full-time education
Age cohort Member 
left education
16 or 
younger
17 18 orl9 20 or above All
16 or younger .499 (.405) .030 (.036) .038 (.063) .031 (.094) .598
17 .077 (.083) .015 (.007) .017 (.013) .012 (.019) .122
18 or 19 .060 (.110) .009 (.010) .035 (.017) .040 (.025) .162
20 or above .023 (.081) .006 (.007) .015 (.013) .075 (.019) .119
All .677 .061 .106 .157
BCS daughters
Age partner left full-time education
Age cohort Member 
left education
16 or 
younger
17 18 orl9 20 or above All
16 or younger .375 (.295) .024 (.032) .051 (.063) .027 (.088) .478
17 .086 (.074) .016 (.008) .010 (.016) .007 (.022) .120
18 or 19 .112 (.130) .015 (.014) .040 (.027) .039 (.039) .210
20 or above .043 (.118) .011 (.013) .027 (.025) .111 (.035) .192
All .617 .067 .132 .185
Notes:
1. In parentheses are the probabilities of each outcome if the partners’ education levels are 
independent.
2. Assortative mating index based on couples with the same education level is 1.392 for the 
NCDS and 1.485 for the BCS.
3. Assortative mating index based on couples with the same or adjacent education level is 
1.293 for the NCDS and 1.315 for the BCS.
4. Sample sizes are 1682 for the NCDS and 1622 for the BCS.
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Table 6.3: Relationships between Education and Parental Income
NCDS BCS Change Sample
Probit marginal effect of income 
on leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on leaving at age 20 or later
Single Sons
.259 (.062)
.131 (.045)
.322 (.038) 
.160 (.027)
.063 (.073) 
.029 (.052)
NCDS: 441 
BCS: 852
Single Daughters
Probit marginal effect of income 
on leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on leaving at age 20 or later
.257 (.058) 
.152 (.036)
.272 (.039) 
.168 (.027)
.015 (.069) 
.016 (.045)
NCDS: 460 
BCS: 766
Sons with Partners
Probit marginal effect of income 
on son leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on son leaving at age 20 or later
.247 (.034) 
.149 (.024)
.316 (.032) 
.222 (.023)
.069 (.046) 
.073 (.033)
NCDS: 1559 
BCS: 1322
Probit marginal effect of income 
on partner leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on partner leaving at age 20 or 
later
.218 (.032) 
.174 (.023)
.202 (.031) 
.199 (.024)
-.016 (.044) 
.025 (.033)
NCDS: 1765 
BCS: 1305
Daughters with Partners
Probit marginal effect of income 
on daughter leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on daughter leaving at age 20 or 
later
.240 (.032) 
.140 (.020)
.267 (.029) 
.254 (.021)
.027 (.043) 
.114 (.029)
NCDS: 1701 
BCS: 1651
Probit marginal effect of income 
on partner leaving after 16 
Probit marginal effect of income 
on partner leaving at age 20 or 
later
.211 (.029) 
.144 (.022)
.197 (.027) 
.162 (.021)
-.014 (.040) 
.018 (.030)
NCDS: 1864 
BCS: 1623
Note:
The coefficients shown are for separate Probit models of log parental education at age 16 on 
leaving school after age 16 (close to staying on) and of log parental education at age 16 on 
leaving education after age 20 (close to university participation).
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Table 6.4: Estimates of Earnings Mobility by Gender and Partnership
Status
Single Sons
Dependent Coefficient Partial Correlation
variable
1958
Cohort
1970
Cohort
1958 1970 
Cohort Cohort
Change Sample
Son’s P .191 (.056) .249 (.043) .178 (.052) .257 (.044) .079 NCDS: 374
earnings (.068) BCS: 712
Sons with Partners
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958
Cohort
1970
Cohort
1958 1970 
Cohort Cohort
Change Sample
Son’s P .186 (.025) .270 (.029) .176 (.024) .267 (.030) .111 NCDS: 1637
earnings (.039) BCS: 1234
Single Daughters
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958
Cohort
1970
Cohort
1958 1970 
Cohort Cohort
Change Sample
Daughter’s
earnings
P .429 (.102) .449 (.061) .243 (.057) .327 (.044) .083
(.072)
NCDS: 343 
BCS: 553
Daughters with Partners
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958
Cohort
1970
Cohort
1958 1970 
Cohort Cohort
Change Sample
Daughter’s
earnings
P .287 (.053) .262 (.040) .154(.028) .186 0028) .032
(.040)
NCDS: 1211 
BCS: 1233
Note:
Estimates are from regressions of log earnings at age 33/30 on log parental income at age 
16 with controls for parental age and age-squared.
Table 6.5: Household Composition and Earnings Shares
Proportion of Households NCDS Sons BCS Sons NCDS
Daughters
BCS
Daughters
Partner, only self works .364 .245 .045 .034
Partner, both works .608 .732 .646 .751
Partner, only partner works .027 .024 .308 .215
Sample size 1683 1264 1751 1571
Share of partners earnings 
when both work .317 .386 .680 .609
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Table 6.6: Household Earnings Mobility for those with Partners
Sons with Partners
Dependent
variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958 Cohort 1970 1958 1970 Change Sample
Cohort Cohort Cohort
Sons’ h .186 (.025) .270 (.029) .176 (.024) .267 (.030) .111 (.039) NCDS: 1637
earnings BCS: 1234
Partners’ .097 (.056) .306 (.037) .054 (.031) .233 (.028) .179 (.042) NCDS: 1070
earnings BCS: 955
Couples’ Vh .174 (.033) .342 (.031) .132 (.025) .311 (.028) .179 (.038) NCDS: 1683
earnings BCS: 1264
Daughters with Partners
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958 Cohort 1970 1958 1970 Change Sample
Cohort Cohort Cohort
Daughters’ P . .287 (.053) .266 (.040) .154 (.028) .186 (.028) .032 (.040) NCDS: 1211
earnings BCS: 1233
Partners’ Sw .206 (.027) .239 (.026) .168 (.022) .230 (.025) .062 (.033) NCDS: 1672
earnings BCS: 1518
Couples’ Hw .252 (.030) .302 (.028) .182 (.022) .252 (.023) .070 (.032) NCDS: 1751
earnings BCS: 1571
Notes:
1. Estimates are from regressions of log earnings at age 33/30 on log parental income at age 
16.
2. Partners age and age-squared are also added to the regression of partners earnings.
191
Table 6.7: Intergenerational Parameters for Full-Time Employed Women
Only
1958 Cohort 1970 
Cohort
1958
Cohort
1970
Cohort
Change Sample
Single Daughters
Daughters’
earnings
.255 (.060) .243 (.045) 
Daughters with Partners
.263 (.062) .265 (.049) .002 (.079) NCDS: 273 
BCS: 463
Daughters’
earnings
Av .233 (.043) .223 (.030) 
Sons’ Partners
.227 (.042) .257 (.034) .034 (.031) NCDS: 591 
BCS: 811
Sons’
partners’
earnings
Sh .123 (.042) .244(.029) .119 0040) .274 (.032) .155 (.052) NCDS: 562 
BCS: 668
Table 6.8: Parental Income and Participation
NCDS______ BCS_______Change_____Sample Size
Single Daughters
Probit marginal effect of parental 
income on daughter’s employment 
Probit marginal effect of income on 
full time employment
.158 (.052) .223 (.034) 
.201 (.056) .324 (.039)
.065 (.062) 
.123 (.068)
NCDS: 516 
BCS: 766 
NCDS: 516 
BCS: 553
Daughters with Partners
Probit marginal effect of parental 
income on daughter’s employment 
Probit marginal effect of parental 
income on full time employment
.015 (.028) .094 (.024) 
.060 (.027) .110 (.028)
.079 (.036) 
.050 (.039)
NCDS: 1889 
BCS: 1650 
NCDS: 1889 
BCS: 1650
Sons’ Partners
Probit marginal effect of parental 
income on partner’s employment 
Probit marginal effect of parental 
income on full time employment
-.009 (.030) .084 (.027) 
-.0001(.028) .143 (.030)
.093 (.040) 
.143 (.041)
NCDS: 1783 
BCS: 1322 
NCDS: 1783 
BCS: 1322
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Table 6.9: The Earnings Mobility of Women -  
Correcting for Endogenous Participation
Panel 1
Results for Employed Samples (as Tables 6.4 and 6.6)
Dependent variable NCDS BCS Change Sample Size
Daughters’ earnings P
Single Daughters
.429 (.102) .449 (.061) .020 (.119) NCDS: 343 
BCS: 553
Daughters’ earnings P*
Daughters with Partners
.287 (.053) .266 (.040)
Sons’ Partners
-.021 (.066) NCDS: 1211 
BCS: 1233
Sons’ partners’ earnings Sh .174 (.033) .343 (.031) .169 (.045) NCDS: 1070 
BCS: 955
Panel 2
Selectivity Corrected Results
Dependent variable NCDS BCS Change Sample Size
Daughters’ earnings P
Single Daughters
.141 (.167) .092 (.106) -.049 (.198) NCDS: 516 
BCS: 766
Daughters’ earnings P*
Daughters with Partners
.277 (.051) .165 (.060)
Sons’ Partners
-.112 0079) NCDS: 1889 
BCS: 1650
Sons’ partners’ earnings Sh .111 (.065) .200 (.060) .089 (.088) NCDS: 1783 
BCS: 1322
Panel 3
Results for Full-Time Employed Samples (as Table 6.7)
Dependent variable NCDS BCS Change Sample Size
Daughters’ earnings P
Single Daughters
.255 (.060) .243 (.045) .012 (.075) NCDS: 273 
BCS: 463
Daughters’ earnings Pw
Daughters with Partners
.233 (.043) .223 (.030)
Sons’ Partners
-.010 (.052) NCDS: 591 
BCS: 811
Sons’ partners’ earnings Sh .123 (.042) .244 (.029) .121 (.051) NCDS: 562 
BCS: 668
Panel 4
Selectivity Corrected Results for Full-Time Employed Sample
Dependent variable NCDS BCS Change Sample Size
Daughters’ earnings P
Single Daughters
.170 (.053) .113 (.048) -.057 (.071) NCDS: 516 
BCS: 766
Daughters’ earnings P„
Daughters with Partners
.200 (.039) .206 (.029)
Sons’ Partners
.006 (.041) NCDS: 1889 
BCS: 1650
Sons’ partners’ earnings Sh .108(.042) .191 (.034) .083 (.055) NCDS: 1783 
BCS: 1322
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Notes:
1. Selection corrected parameters are estimated using a two-step Heckman correction for 
selectivity.
2. The participation equation is identified using a cubic index of employment probability 
where the employment probability is modelled as a function of the woman’s education 
category, the number of children in five age groups, marital status, parents’ (or parents- 
in-law’s) income. For those with partners, partner’s education, employment status and 
earnings is also added.
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Table 6.10: Estimates of Earnings Mobility for Cohort Members and Their
Households, Married Sample
Sons
Dependent
variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958 1970 1958 1970 Change Sample Size
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Sons’ Ph .200 (.027) .278 (.038) .184 (.025) .298 (.040) .114 NCDS: 1420
earnings (.047) BCS: 753
Partners’ sh .098 (.061) .271 (.051) .053 (.033) .195 (.037) .142 NCDS: 896
earnings (.049) BCS: 554
Couples’ Ph .196 (.034) .325 (.039) .150 (.026) .310 (.038) .160 NCDS: 1452
earnings (.045) BCS0: 768
Daughters
Coefficient Partial Correlation
1958 1970 1958 1970 Change Sample
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Daughters’ P . .252 (.055) .222 (.053) .136 (.030) .149 (.035) .013 NCDS: 1066
earnings (.046) BCS: 832
Partners’ Sw .209 (.028) .243 (.033) .171 (.023) .234 (.032) .063 NCDS: 1508
earnings (.040) BCS: 1062
Couples’ Pw .243 (.032) .264 (.033) .177 (.225) .225 (.028) .048 NCDS: 1571
earnings (.037) BCS: 1089
Note:
Estimates are from regressions of log earnings at age 33/30 on log parental income at age 16.
I
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rAppendix to Chapter 7: First-stage Regressions for Heckman Corrections
Accounting for Selection
Table A.6.1 First-stage Regressions for Heckman Corrections Accounting for
the Selection into Employment
_________ Selectivity Corrected Results -  First Stage for Table 6.9 Panel 2_________
Single Daughters
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Parental income .226 (.155) .428 (.112)
No. children in household aged 0-2 1.273 (.478) -.419 (.112)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -1.260 (.201) -.921 (.196)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.441 (.083) -.654 (.130)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.333 (.102) -.170 (.392)
No. children in household aged 17-18 - 1.309 (.882)
Left school at 17 .294 (.214) .370 (.162)
Left school aged 18-19 .113 (.207) .443 (.142)
Left school 20 plus .455 (.244) .639 (.173)
Missing education information .033 (.204) -
Constant -.438 (.881) -1.763 (.173)
Pseudo R-squared .188 .173
Heckman Selectivity Correction
X 'P -16.87(13.75) -15.35 (12.77)
( X ' P f 24.40(17.42) 21.80(16.07)
( X ' p f -17.20(13.01) -13.86(1.18)
Constant 10.82 (8.95) 8.955 (8.177)
Mills Ratio -1.607 (.280) 1.251 (.206)
Daughters with Partners
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Married -.145 (.110) -.053 (.084)
Missing marital status -.120 (.361) -.168 (.728)
Parental income .079 (.097) .088 (.087)
No. children in household aged 0-2 -.455 (.100) -.703 (.056)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -.548 (.065) -.443 (.081)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.205 (.038) -.259 (.053)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.095 (.052) -.558 (.131)
No. children in household aged 17-18 -.379 (.420) -.056 (.717)
Left school at 17 .087 (.105) .197 (.121)
Left school aged 18-19 -.012 (.097) .075 (.100)
Left school 20 plus .214 (.123) .273 (.131)
Missing education information -.087 (.106) -
Partner left school at 17 .102 (.133) -.212 (.144)
Partner left school aged 18-19 .004 (.108) -.026 (.118)
Partner left school 20 plus -.061 (.103) -.042 (.125)
Ln partner’s earnings -.365 (.072) -.129 (.088)
Partner’s employment 3.451 (.524) 1.762 (.635)
Constant -.287 (.478) .088 (.504)
Pseudo R-squared .096 .190
Heckman Selectivity Correction
Predicated probability of employment -4.194 (8.190) -2.955 (4.529)
(Predicated probability of employment)2 8.333 (10.492) 6.021 (5.439)
(Predicated probability of employment) 3 -5.304 (8.068) -2.212(3.716)
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Constant 2.610(5.471) .9565 (2.725)
Mills Ratio -.822 (.099) -1.183 (.120)
Sons’ Partners
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Married -.201 (.096) -.026 (.086)
Ln Son’s Parental income .001 (.084) .158 (.091)
No. children in household aged 0-2 -.573 (.094) -.557 (.062)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -.498 (.064) -.699 (.095)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.181 (.040) -.252 (.068)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.105 (.069) -.173 (.123)
No. children in household aged 17-18 -.454 (.311) .289 (.520)
Left school at 17 .010 (.102) .285 (.141)
Left school aged 18-19 .121 (.098) .109 (.111)
Left school 20 plus .103 (.109) .045 (.128)
Missing education information -.116 (.099) -
Partner left school at 17 -.146 (.116) -.009 (.145)
Partner left school aged 18-19 -.231 (.107) .020 (.120)
Partner left school 20 plus -.033 (.115) .003 (.134)
Ln partner’s earnings -.134 (.082) -.196 (.098)
Partner’s employment 1.765 (.606) 2.313 (.712)
Constant .086 (.488) -.625 (.523)
Pseudo R-squared .084 .154
Heckman Selectivity Correction
Predicated probability of employment -5.365 (6.955) .197 (6.277)
(Predicated probability of employment)2 10.029 (8.844) 2.617 (7.674)
(Predicated probability of employment) 3 -7.023 (6.746) -.660(5.431)
Constant 3.646 (4.605) -.488 (3.896)
Mills Ratio -1.207 (.138) -1.071 (.132)
Notes:
1. Coefficients are from a probit model of employment.
2. Standard errors are in parenthesises.
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Table A.6.1 First-stage Regressions for Heckman Corrections Accounting for 
the Selection into Full-Time Employment
Selectivity Corrected Results -  First Stage for Table 6.9 Panel 4
Single Daughters
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Parental income .227 (.164) .561 (.111)
No. children in household aged 0-2* -1.703 (.250) -.343 (.116)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -1.273 (.268)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.850 (.104) -1.001 (.164)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.470 (.115) -.187 (.405)
No. children in household aged 17-18 - -1.124 (.875)
Left school at 17 .389 (.214) .582 (.156)
Left school aged 18-19 .382 (.212) .534 (.133)
Left school 20 plus .757 (.250) .894 (.163)
Missing education information .063 (.215) -
Constant -.712 (.935) 2.958 (.626)
Pseudo R-squared .322 .235
Heckman Selectivity Correction
Predicated probability of employment -4.676 (4.101) 9.486 (3.298)
(Predicated probability of employment)2 9.062 (4.812) -7.127 (3.701)
(Predicated probability of employment) 3 -4.977 (2.954) 4.294(2.196)
Constant 2.376 (2.247) -5.126(1.788)
Mills Ratio -.374 (.058) -.379 (0.708)
Daughters with Partners
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Married -.376 (.111) -.378 (.082)
Missing marital status -.633 (.392) -.618 (.665)
Parental income .159 (.088) -.031 (.084)
No. children in household aged 0-2 -.599 (.118) -.874 (.061)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -1.019 (.086) -.819 (.090)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.608 (.043) -.697 (.063)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.208 (.057) -.576 (.154)
No. children in household aged 17-18 -1.081 (.592) -.876 (.798)
Left school at 17 .103 (.113) .239 (.115)
Left school aged 18-19 .238 (.103) .119 (.098)
Left school 20 plus .426 (.127) .368 (.119)
Missing education information .099 (.119) -
Partner left school at 17 -.010 (.145) -.029 (.147)
Partner left school aged 18-19 .055 (.115) .167 (.114)
Partner left school 20 plus -.006 (.110) .155 (.116)
Ln partner’s earnings -.187 (.078) -.205 (.088)
Partner’s employment 1.727 (.563) 1.774 (.638)
Constant -.694 (.517) .869 (.638)
Pseudo R-squared .207 .307
Heckman Selectivity Correction
Predicated probability of employment -.968 (2.041) -1.133(1.787)
(Predicated probability of employment)2 5.102 (2.476) 4.793 (2.048)
(Predicated probability of employment) 3 -1.919(1.261) -1.581 (1.176)
Constant -.072 (.992) -.045 (.932)
Mills Ratio -.256 (.034) -.193 (.032)
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fSons’ Partners
Probit Employment Equation NCDS BCS
Married .027 (.092) -.084 (.085)
Missing marital status -.522 (.104) -1.307 (.764)
Ln Son’s Parental income -.027 (.092) .140 (.092)
No. children in household aged 0-2 -.939 (.124) -.889 (.067)
No. children in household aged 3-4 -.844 (.080) -1.028 (.113)
No. children in household aged 5-10 -.626 (.051) -.609 (.076)
No. children in household aged 11-16 -.179 (.081) -.278 (.126)
No. children in household aged 17-18 -.153 (.339) .422 (.476)
Left school at 17 .124 (.116) .273 (.137)
Left school aged 18-19 .334 (.105) .130 (.109)
Left school 20 plus .487 (.115) .423 (.125)
Missing education information -.016 (.111) -
Partner left school at 17 .101 (.131) -.058 (.143)
Partner left school aged 18-19 -.077 (.118) .150 0118)
Partner left school 20 plus .020 (.124) .040 (.130)
Ln partner’s earnings -.160 (.095) -.179 (.099)
Partner’s employment 1.749 (.691) 1.823 (.725)
Constant .091 (.537) -.600 (.537)
Pseudo R-squared .232 .277
Heckman Selectivity Correction
Predicated probability of employment .953(1.923) 2.734 (2.198)
(Predicated probability of employment)2 2.779 (2.314) 6.567 (2.539)
(Predicated probability of employment) 3 -1.241 (1.157) -2.589(1.495)
Constant -.601 (.923) .794(1.169)
Mills Ratio -.273 (.039) -.258 (.042)
Notes:
1. Coefficients are from a probit model of employment.
2. Standard errors are in parenthesises.
3. *In this specification children aged 0-4 are grouped to avoid difficulties of perfect 
prediction.
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fChapter 7: Assortative Mating on Parental Income -  Love and 
Money
7.1. Introduction
Marriage is a crucial institution with the potential to contribute to the persistence 
of economic and social status across generations and among social groups. As has 
been shown in the previous chapter for the UK, assortative mating leads 
individuals to marry people with similar levels of income to their parents, and this 
contributes to intergenerational income persistence. In this chapter I use unique 
data to explore intergenerational mobility and assortative mating in Canada. As 
well as providing a comparative perspective on the UK analysis in Chapter 6, 1 am 
able to show how couples match on parental income, and I interpret this as a new 
measure of assortative mating. This is the other side of the interrelationship 
between household formation and intergenerational mobility. Not only does 
household formation affect intergenerational mobility but parental characteristics 
also influence how couples match. Finally I explore how matching on parental 
income is related to characteristics; including the early dissolution of the union.
In many societies marriage partners have been explicitly chosen by the 
family to maximize the social position of their children; it is clear that this will 
result in couples having similar parental incomes55. At first glance, we may think 
that assortative mating by parental characteristics is not important in a modem 
society such as Canada where individuals generally choose their own marriage 
partner and marry for love. However, sociologist William Goode succinctly 
illustrates why this will not be the case.
Since the marriage population in the US (and increasingly as well as 
in other countries) is gradually segregated into pools with similar 
social class backgrounds, even a free dating pattern with some 
encouragement to fall in love does not threaten the stratification 
system. That is, people fall in love with the ‘right’ kind of people56
The Intergenerational Income Data (IID) generated by Statistics Canada 
(and already used in Chapter 3) provides an ideal opportunity to explore
55 The novels of Jane Austen and her contemporaries confirm the importance of this type of 
matching in early 19th century England. In traditional Indian society family background as 
represented by the caste system is important in determining marital eligibility for Hindu families.
56 Goode (1982) page 54
i
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wassortative mating on parental income. The dataset was established in order to 
provide evidence on the relationship between the incomes and earnings of parents 
and children. The derivation of the data from tax records means that the number 
of observations is extremely large and so a majority of the women in my sample 
observed in a partnership in 1998 also have their partners included in the sample. 
This enables me to match women with their own parents, their partner, and their 
partner’s parents; a wealth of information not available in any other dataset.
Before showing results for assortative mating by parental income, I 
examine the extent of intergenerational mobility for sons and daughters in Canada 
and the contribution of assortative mating to intergenerational mobility. I measure 
the relationship between parental income and the earnings of sons, daughters and 
their partners. This follows the analysis explored for the UK in the previous 
chapter, and emphasises the link between assortative mating and intergenerational 
mobility. As my sample is based on the cohort of women bom between 1967 and 
1970, the results can be compared with those from the 1970 cohort for the UK; 
this allows a return to the internationally comparative perspective taken in the 
early chapters of this thesis.
I begin to explore assortative mating explicitly by examining how 
individuals match on educational levels. As the IID is based on tax data and 
contains no information on educational attainment I use the Canadian Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to explore this question. I find substantial 
matching on education, apparently to a similar degree to that which is found for 
the UK.
In my initial analysis of assortative mating by parental income in Canada I 
compare the correlation of the incomes of the marriage partners’ parents with that 
between the earnings of partners themselves. I find that the correlation between 
the two sets of parents is similar to the association found between the members of 
the couple.
Measuring assortative mating using parental income correlations is a new 
venture for Canada. However, assortative mating by educational levels has been 
considered by Magee, Burbidge and Robb (2000). This paper uses twenty-five 
years worth of data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to analyse whether
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couples have become more or less strongly matched on education level over time. 
The authors find that, on average, the correlation between the education levels of 
husbands and wives is greater than .6. In addition, it appears to have fallen for 
young couples over the 1990s.
The connection between the economic status of couples’ parents has been 
considered for the UK by Ermisch and Francesconi (2002). In this paper (an 
earlier version of Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler, 2004, discussed previously) 
the authors regress Hope-Goldthorpe occupational scores of parents on those of 
parents-in-law. They find that the elasticity between the occupational indices of 
parents and parents-in-laws is around .16 while the intergenerational elasticity 
between parents and children’s occupational indices is around .2. There is 
evidence, therefore, that matching on parental status is strong.
If the links between parents-in-laws’ incomes is interpreted as a dimension 
of assortative mating, then we can make a number of predictions about how the 
extent of assortative matching will vary with the characteristics of couples. I 
consider the degree to which these predictions are borne out in the Canadian data. 
As we shall see below, the information available about characteristics is limited in 
the administrative data used here, but nonetheless the aspects I can observe 
confirm my expectations. Young people who form unions later appear to be more 
closely matched on parental income, as do those who are married rather than 
cohabiting and those brought up in urban compared with rural areas.
In the final section of empirical work I consider whether the strength of 
matching on parental income influences divorce and separation probabilities. I 
find that weaker matches between parental incomes are associated with early 
divorce. This analysis has a precedent in Weiss and Willis (1997) who use data on 
a cohort of American youth who graduated from high school in 1972 to 
investigate the determinants of divorce. Weiss and Willis find that individuals 
with similar education levels are less likely to divorce; this result is also true of 
common ethnicity and religion.
In the next Section I discuss the theoretical background and empirical 
approach used in this chapter. Section 7.3 describes the construction of the data 
set in some detail and reviews the evidence on whether the samples used are
202
representative of the full Canadian cohort. In Section 7.4 I present results on 
intergenerational mobility for individuals and couples in Canada, while Section
7.5 concentrates on presenting the results for assortative mating. Section 7.6 
concludes.
7.2. Theoretical Background and Estimation Issues
Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Mating
The motivating model used for the first part of this chapter is discussed in Section
2.5 and in Chapter 6, so I simply restate the main implications here. As before, 
marital sorting results in a positive correlation between the human capital of 
husbands and wives.
Corr(Hwi,H hi) = cr (7.1)
Combining this representation of marital matching with a simple model of 
intergenerational mobility generates a number of predictions about the 
relationships between the education and income of children and their partners and 
their parents’ incomes.
This model demonstrates how to interpret the intergenerational elasticity 
for sons and daughters and the intergenerational elasticity for the incomes of 
partner with respect to parental income. The resulting equations, presented in 
terms of the daughter’s parental income, ln Y£ mas, are:
In Ywl = a, + Pw ln Ym + £m where P „ = /iy J  PH (7 -2>
SDh* (7.3)
ln Yu = a 2 + Sw ln Ym + ewl where Sw = <r— / pH
In these equations n  is the importance of daughter’s income in her 
parents’ utility function, yw is the income return to human capital for daughters 
and pH is the price of a unit of human capital.
There is a strong relationship between flw (the intergenerational elasticity 
for daughters) and Sw (the intergenerational elasticity between daughter’s 
partner’s incomes and her parents’ incomes). The similarity between these
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parameters is clearly closely related to the extent of assortative mating, with larger 
G  meaning that /3w and Sw are closer to each other.
In addition, the model provides an interpretation for the relationship 
between the couple’s total earnings and one partner’s parental income. This is a 
weighted average of the two parameters J3W and Sw, with the weighting dependent 
upon the share contributed by each member of the couple.
•n(y« + K ,) = « j + K ln YS°""' + em where K  = 0 “ S)P« + sSw {1A)
As in Chapter 6 I shall estimate all of the individual intergenerational 
parameters/3W,S W, /3h , and Sh , as well as the measures of mobility for the couple 
Hw and juh . These parameters allow me to assess the degree of intergenerational
mobility and assortative mating in Canada, and compare it with the results for the 
UK.
Search Models and Assortative Mating
In Chapter 2 I discussed the predictions about assortative mating that emerge from 
assignment models of the marriage market. In particular Becker’s (1973, 1974) 
model predicts a positive relationship between characteristics which are 
complements in household production. This includes the education levels of 
partners, unearned income and attractiveness. It is also likely to include parental 
income as this will be related to characteristics such as education through 
intergenerational mechanisms (both endowments and investments). In addition, 
partners may match on parental income if bequests are complements in household 
production.
A further mechanism will operate if there are direct preferences to match 
with someone from a similar background. Fernandez et al (2004) explore models 
where individuals have intergenerational persistence in preferences about women 
working, meaning that men tend to marry women with the same work status as 
their mothers. It is possible that other preferences could be similarly transmitted 
leading to a direct connection between the parental incomes of partners. For all of
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these reasons we would expect to find positive assortative mating on parental 
income.
In the original assignment models of the marriage market searching for 
partners is costless, and the matches that form are stable; leaving no room for 
divorce or remarriage. In order to place the marriage market in a more realistic 
framework Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999) and Shimer and Smith (2000) 
formalise search and matching models of the marriage market to parallel the 
literature for the labour market. In these models search frictions mean that 
individuals meet only infrequently. They must decide to either accept each other 
or wait for the next potential match to come along. Due to these frictions 
individuals are willing to accept partners who are quite far from the perfect 
allocation, leading to weaker assortative mating than under a pure assignment 
model.
Consequently, assortative mating will be weaker for couples whose search 
is less intensive, perhaps because of higher search costs. In my empirical work I 
test a number of predictions that stem from this argument. We might expect that 
cohabiting partners, who might continue to search within cohabitation, may have 
weaker assortative mating. In addition, longer search will lead to a better match so 
variation in matching by age at marriage is considered. The cost of search may 
vary by region, and in particular is likely to be higher in rural areas.
Mortensen (1988) explores the predictions of search models for divorce 
and remarriage. In this framework there are two reasons for divorce. As noted 
above, search frictions mean that it is hard to find your ‘perfect’ partner, 
consequently matches may end if a better alternative is found, even if partners are 
fully informed about the quality of the match. Divorce is more likely if individuals 
are far from the optimal allocation. Alternatively divorce may result from 
uncertainty when individuals only learn about the quality of the match after 
marriage. In this case the probability of divorce will be positively related to the 
variance of the unanticipated part of match quality.
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) and Weiss and Willis (1997) have 
used similar frameworks to empirically investigate the covariates of divorce. The 
studies find that couples who are similar on the grounds of religion, education and
205
ethnicity are less likely to divorce. This confirms that couples who are less well- 
matched on characteristics (far from the optimal allocation) are more likely to 
split up. In addition, unexpected events such as infertility or deviations from 
expected wages are related to higher divorce probabilities, demonstrating the 
effect of unanticipated match quality.
If the extent of parental income matching acts as a signal of match quality 
this implies that we might expect that those who are well matched on parental 
income are less likely to divorce. This hypothesis is possible to test using the IID 
as partnership histories can be generated for individuals aged up to 30. This 
interpretation of assortative mating clearly rests on very strong assumption about 
the way the marriage market operates. It is obvious that unobserved match quality 
is an extremely important determinant of who marries and divorces, and that this 
may work to counteract differences in parental background. If we believe that the 
interpretation of assortative mating as a measure of match quality is too strong, 
there are alternative interpretations which can be placed on the finding that 
coming from similar parental backgrounds reduces the probability of union 
dissolution. For example, it could be that coming from similar family 
backgrounds lowers the variance of unanticipated shocks as individuals are better 
informed initially, in line with Mortensen’s (1988) second prediction.57
Estimation Issues
The first results I present here are comparable to those that formed the basis for 
Chapter 6. I measure the elasticity between the earnings of individuals and their 
parents’ income and between their partner’s earnings and parental income. 
Consequently similar empirical problems apply as in the previous chapter. Again I 
present the full set of results for both genders, meaning that estimates of 
intergenerational mobility must necessarily be based on current incomes. In 
Chapter 6 I discussed the biases introduced due to the endogenous selection into 
work for daughters.
57 Of course, it could also be that there is less tension in marriages when couples are well-matched 
on parental income.
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The income data used in this analysis is based on annual earnings data so 
there are fewer missing observations than is the case when using weekly data, as 
more individuals will work at some point during the year. Nevertheless, problems 
will still result, as fewer of the women in the sample will be working full-time 
full-year, so that their current income will approximate permanent income less 
well than it does for men. The main limitation of the IID is that very little 
addition information on the characteristics of individuals is provided, and the data 
does not include hours worked. Consequently, it is even more difficult to know 
how selection mechanisms might affect the results for Canada, and it is not 
possible to make the adjustments for selection that I used for the UK data. The 
UK evidence suggests this may cause the intergenerational elasticities to be 
upward biased when women’s earnings are the dependent variable.
One advantage of the IID data is that information is available for every 
year. This means I am able to experiment with using three year averages of 
children’s and partners’ earnings, as a measure of permanent income. While this 
will be a far from perfect proxy, it will remove some year-to-year fluctuations. 
However, there is a trade-off. As the most recent data in the IID is from 1998 and 
the sample is based on those bom from 1967 to 1970, this means that the youngest 
members of the sample are just 28 when the last earnings data is available. Taking 
three year averages means using earnings information for some individuals who 
are as young as 26. Haider and Solon (2004) have demonstrated that measuring 
earnings at a young age can lead to downward bias. In order to balance these 
concerns I report both results using the latest data from 1998 and using a more 
permanent measure of earnings averaged between 1996 and 1998.
Returning to the perennial theme of measurement error in the explanatory 
variable, the annual data available in the IID should be a better measure of 
permanent parental income than the weekly data relied upon in some of the other 
chapters. In addition, this data is averaged over five years from the year when the 
son or daughter was 14 until the year they turned 18. Both of these aspects of the 
data should help to reduce measurement error and lower the downward bias in the 
estimation of intergenerational persistence. Five year averages are used both in the 
intergenerational estimations and in the equations which estimate the relationships 
between the incomes of parents-in-law.
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7.3 Data and Description of Matching Procedure
Data Description
The data used in this chapter is from the Intergenerational Income Data (IID) a 
dataset which has already been described and used in Chapter 3. However, the 
importance of its structure to the estimation carried out in this chapter means that I 
shall provide a more extensive treatment here. The IID has been constructed from 
the Canadian Longitudinal Tax Records held by Statistics Canada. The tax records 
provide information on all income tax returns in Canada between 1979 and 1998. 
Information on names, addresses and ages included in the data allowed Statistics 
Canada to match individuals bom between 1963 and 1970 with their parents, this 
was possible provided both generations filed a tax return while the child was 
living at home in his or her late teens58.
As the data is based on administrative records its size is considerable: 
Statistics Canada estimate that the data includes around 70 percent of the relevant 
age group (Cook and Demnati, 2000). Another advantage of using data based on 
administrative records is that there is considerably less concern about 
measurement error and attrition although the unique structure of this data does 
bring with it additional worries, the main one being that the methods used to 
match the data may lead to some fundamental sample selection biases, a question 
I shall return to below.
A second disadvantage of the IID is that there are very few background 
characteristics available in the data. The information used here is restricted to 
what is given on the T1 tax return59. Very basic information is available about the 
individual; age, sex, marital status, spousal Social Insurance Number (SIN), 
whether the individual filed in French or English and some more demographic 
information concerning the family in the year the child is matched with their 
parents. The remaining variables are taken directly from the earnings and income
58 The precise structure o f the matching procedure is as follows: individuals are split into three 
cohorts, those aged 16-19 in 1982, those aged 16-19 in 1984 and those aged 16-19 in 1986. 
Individuals are matched with parents at any time in the five years surrounding 1982, 1984 and 
1986 for each cohort respectively.
59 Other data which has been matched into the IID records is employer information, which is 
matched through the T4 employer tax form, and geographic information matched in via the post­
code on the T 1.
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information required on the tax return. In this analysis the main variables used are 
total employment income (earnings), and “total income” which is the sum of all 
the income required to be declared on the T l. “Total income” is earnings, self 
employment income and asset income (including rents, interest, capital gains and 
dividends) plus transfers. Which transfers are included varies somewhat by year, 
for example welfare payments are included in later years, so they are present in 
the measure of total income for adult children’s income, but not in their parents’.
Individual Intergenerational Sample
Before considering assortative mating I present estimates of intergenerational 
mobility by gender and partnership status. For these models I use samples 
constructed on the same basis as those used to explore intergenerational mobility 
for Canadian sons in Chapter 3. These samples include all sons and daughters 
bom between 1967 and 1970. I extract two measures of income for the two 
generations: annual earnings and annual total income. Parental income is defined 
as the average of income when the child was 14 to 18.1 exclude income/earnings 
reports of less than $ 160 for parents and $2 for the adult children.
Matching Spouses
There are two features of the data which allow the matching of couples with both 
sets of parents. First, we have information on the SEN of spouses and cohabitees. 
Second, the near universality of the data means that many of the spouses/ 
cohabitees of those included in the data will have intergenerational records. A 
limitation is that SINs are not obtained for all cohabitees. Married individuals are 
always asked to state their spouse’s SIN on their tax return but individuals were 
not asked for their cohabitee’s SEN until after 1992. Also, the definition of 
cohabitation is more restrictive than in other surveys. Partners are defined as 
cohabitees if they are the natural or adoptive parent of the individual’s children, if 
they have lived together continuously for a year or had lived together for a year in
60 There is some bunching at very low levels of income and earnings in all years. It is important to 
take account of these observations as they are almost certainly a consequence of mis-measurement.
I have experimented with a variety o f methods and the precise approach used appears to make 
little difference to the results obtained.
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the past. This means that the matches found will miss the shortest cohabitations, a 
limitation which has advantages and disadvantages. The sample will not be 
representative of all couples, but results will not be distorted by the inclusion of 
very temporary cohabitations.
In order to construct the spousal sample I focus on daughters bom between 
1967 and 1970. I am then able to search for the ‘spouses’ for these women from 
the entire IID sample of men bom between 1963 and 1970, allowing for the fact 
that women often marry men somewhat older than themselves. I shall comment 
more on this feature of the match when I discuss how representative the data are.
1998 Spouse Sample
The first sample I use is couples who are married/cohabiting in 1998. The first 
stage is to match daughters who filed for tax in 1998 with their spouse’s tax return 
for 1998. Fortunately, 98 percent of those who declare themselves to be married 
or cohabiting in 1998 include their spousal SIN on their tax return. As shown in 
Table 7.1 there are 511,636 women bom between 1967 and 1970 in the dataset, 
294,251 of whom file tax returns in 1998 and state that they are married or 
cohabiting. 179,341 couples are matched on the basis of their 1998 returns, 60 
percent of all the women who report having partners in 1998. There may be a 
concern that by matching couples on the basis that both file in 1998 will introduce 
a selection bias. This would be a particular difficulty if women filed less than men 
because of weak labour market attachment. The evidence suggests this is less of a 
problem than we might imagine with 7 percent of males in the IID not filing in 
1998 compared with 11 percent of females. In order not to miss individuals who 
do not file in 1998 I adopt a second stage to the match based on all years on data. 
This adds an additional 5000 couples to the sample.
Divorce and Separation Sample
The first sample of couples I create is of all surviving partnerships in 1998. 
However, this will not enable me to explore the dissolution of partnerships. To do 
this I create a separate sample which matches couples in the year that the 
partnership is first observed in the HD, i.e. the first year that a spousal SIN is
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listed. This approach means that I am able to track all the partnerships listed by an 
individual, and match partners when they are included in the IID61. The obvious 
difficulty is that I am only able to match partnerships when the sample individuals 
are young, up to 31 at the oldest, so only early partnerships and dissolutions are 
included.
In my 1998 sample of couples I match both those who are legally married 
and those who are cohabiting. As the marital status “cohabiting” was not included 
on the tax return until 1992 this is not possible for the full relationship history, so 
before 1992 cohabiting partners are necessarily excluded. In my empirical work I 
deal with this is two ways. One approach is to use both types of partnerships but 
exclude any first observed before 1992, the second is to consider only those 
partnerships which resulted in marriage, and take the starting point from the year 
the individual first reported herself as married.
Are the IID Samples Representative?
Owing to the sample selections inherent in the intergenerational matching 
procedure employed in the construction of the dataset, it is important to establish 
that the samples obtained from the IID are representative of the population of 
interest. Individuals are only included in the sample if at least one parent files for 
tax in a year that the child is living at home and also files for tax. Compulsory tax 
filing in Canada means that children will file even if they are only undertaking 
part-time or holiday work while in education, but concerns remain. Families who 
are excluded from the IID may come from the lower part of the income 
distribution (parents have no labour market attachment, children are unemployed 
or work in the underground economy) or the upper end (children are in education 
and do not work at all). As explained by Oreopoulos (2003) the likelihood of the 
second outcome is reduced by the ability of those in full time education to obtain 
tax credits and deductions by filing.
Oreopoulos (2003) and Corak and Heisz (1999) both explore the 
representativeness of the IID. Oreopoulos finds that those who are missing from
61 Further work is needed to understand how this sample may be affected by the sample selection 
issues inherent in the IID.
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the IID tend to have somewhat worse socio-economic characteristics than the 
average while Corak and Heisz find that the IID is somewhat better than survey 
data at picking up observations at the very extremes of the distribution. In addition 
Corak and Heisz estimate a sample selection correction model for those who are 
matched to fathers and find that the correction makes essentially no difference to 
their estimates of intergenerational mobility.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present my own investigation of these issues. First, I 
compare the key characteristics of all women in the IID bom 1967 -  1970 who are 
single in 1998 with those with partners (according to the tax definition), and most 
importantly, those who I can match with partners in the IID. This will demonstrate 
whether the process of spousal matching employed introduces further biases to the 
IID sample. In Table 7.3 I show the characteristics of women from the same 
cohort observed in the 1998 SLID sample, again by partnership status. This 
demonstrates the features of the IID sample in comparison with a nationally 
representative, if small, sample.
My comparison of single women in the HD with those with partners 
(Table 7.2) indicates that women with partners are slightly less likely to file 
positive earnings, and have somewhat lower earnings and parental income (this 
likely to be a result of a negative relationship between parental income and the 
age at which women form partnerships). More interesting is the comparison of all 
women with partners with women matched with their partners in the IID. There is 
evidence that daughters and their parents who are matched are slightly better off. 
Their own earnings are on average $400 higher than all women with partners, and 
their parents’ incomes are $1000 greater. This is not surprising. If we believe that 
the IID in general has a slight bias to those with higher incomes then it is no 
surprise that restricting the sample to those with partners in the IID will strengthen 
this bias.
The evidence that my sample may be skewed towards the better off is 
confirmed by the figures in Table 7.3, which shows the characteristics of women 
bom between 1967 and 1970 in the 1998 SLID. For both single women and those
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with partners average annual earnings in 1992 dollars are about $l,500-$2,000 
higher for the IID samples than they are in the comparable samples in the SLID62.
The SLED data shows the consequence of the strict definition of a 
cohabiting couple in the tax data. The proportion of the sample that is recorded as 
having partners is larger in the SLID than in the IID sample, and a lower 
proportion of women in partnerships is married rather than cohabiting in the SLED 
compared with the IED63.
The SLED data can also be used to provide information on partner’s age 
for the women in this cohort. This is important as the structure of the IID means it 
is only possible to match up those spouses bom between 1963 and 1970. Of 
women bom between 1967 and 1970 with partners in 1998, 72 percent marry men 
bom between 1963 and 1970. Assuming that the age distribution of partners is the 
same in the IED as in the SLID (a strong assumption as the definition of 
cohabitation used to construct the samples is not comparable) and given that we 
know that the HD covers 70 percent of the cohort, I would expect to match just 
over 50 percent of women with their partners. In fact, I match 63 percent. This 
suggests either that women in the IID are more likely to be cohabiting with or 
married to men bom between 1963 and 1970 than those in the SLID, or that the 
coverage rate for these partners is higher than 70 percent. A higher than average 
coverage rate for the partners of women in the sample suggests that the 
probability of women and their partners being in the IID is positively correlated.
7.4. Results on Intergenerational Mobility
Intergenerational Mobility fo r  Sons and Daughters in Canada
Table 7.4 shows the intergenerational mobility of sons and daughters in Canada 
by partnership status. This provides a background to the discussion of the 
contribution of assortative mating to intergenerational persistence, and allows a
62 There is also some evidence o f a different regional composition in the two samples. The IID has 
a lower proportion o f the sample than the SLID in Ontario and British Columbia. A lower 
proportion in the IID in Montreal and Vancouver is found in Corak and Heiss and is attributed to 
the exclusion of recent immigrants from the IID.
63 As access to the SLID is restricted, at this stage it is not possible to construct a sample in which 
cohabitation is defined in a way more similar to the tax data. This will be attempted in subsequent 
analysis.
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comparison to be made between Canada and the results for the UK shown in the 
previous chapter.
All the results indicate comparatively high mobility in Canada, as shown 
in Chapter 3 and in line with Corak and Heisz (1999). Estimates in Table 3.3 
when two year averages of parental income are used as the explanatory variable 
showed that the intergenerational correlation in the US and UK is around .3. The 
estimates shown for sons and daughters in Table 7.4 are closer to .15. This is 
despite the fact that the five-year averages available in the Canadian data would 
encourage us to think the Canadian estimates are less attenuated by measurement 
error. Parameters are higher when average measures for 1996-1998 are used, 
showing that even for young people averaging earnings over several years reduces 
downward bias.
Here we are interested in how estimates compare for sons and daughters 
and for those who are single compared with those in couples. The elasticities 
suggest that intergenerational persistence in Canada is approximately equal for 
sons and daughters; however the correlations show that persistence for men is 
stronger than for women. Although the difference in the correlations is small the 
large sample size means that it is statistically significant for those in couples. 
Results based on the average dependent variable show that the intergenerational 
correlation for sons with partners is .185 (.002) compared with .168 (.002) for 
daughters with partners.
In all but one case, Table 7.4 reveals that intergenerational mobility is 
weaker for those in couples than for single individuals, for both men and women. 
For women this may be because lower annual hours among married women are 
correlated with low parental income. Another explanation is that the difference 
between single and partnered individuals is associated with age within the cohort: 
single individuals are likely to be younger and this is associated with lower 
estimates of earnings persistence. This will be investigated in further work.
Comparing these results with those for the UK from Chapter 6 paints a 
mixed picture. As already noted, intergenerational persistence is low in Canada
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compared to results for a similar cohort in the UK64. However, one common 
factor which emerges from the analysis of intergenerational mobility in the UK 
and Canada is that the intergenerational mobility of own earnings is greater for 
daughters in couples. As in the UK, this motivates the analysis of the role of sons- 
in-law in contributing to persistence in Canada.
In this section I have explored the relationship between the earnings of 
adult children and parental income. The tax data available means that there are a 
number of alternative income measures which could be used as both the 
dependent and explanatory variable. For reasons of space I do not show the full 
range of results here. However, one particularly striking result is that in every case 
but one (daughters in couples) the elasticity and correlation between the child’s 
total income and total parental income are stronger than those between the child’s 
earnings and parental income. In the total income specifications the 
intergenerational correlation approaches .2. This implies that parental 
endowments and investments affect welfare in ways additional to labour market 
performance.
Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Mating
The next step in the analysis is to examine how assortative mating and individual 
intergenerational mobility interact to drive intergenerational persistence between 
families. In Table 7.5 I use the matched sample of those in couples in 1998 to 
show results for individual intergenerational mobility, alongside the elasticity 
between partners’ earnings and parents’ income and between parental income and 
the total earnings of the couple. For the UK, results for the 1970 cohort (shown in 
Table 6.6) demonstrate that partners’ incomes were strongly related to 
individuals’ parental income and that this was true for both sons and daughters. 
This contributes to a picture of strong intergenerational persistence over total 
family earnings.
The first two panels of Table 7.5 show results where the daughter’s 
parental income is used as the explanatory variable. As the IID data also provides
64 It is notable that results for Canadian sons are of a similar magnitude to those for the earlier UK 
1958 cohort (NCDS) in Tables 4.2 and 6.4.
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information on her partner’s parental income the lower panels report estimates for 
the same sample where her partner’s parental income is used as the explanatory 
variable. Such a comparison was not possible using the UK data.
Turning first to the results for individual persistence, it is reassuring that 
these are very similar to those obtained for all sons and daughters in couples in 
Table 7.4. Even though the descriptive statistics in Table 7.2 showed that women 
who are matched with their partners tend to be slightly better off, this suggests 
that the rest of the results presented for matched couples should not be biased by 
selection into this sample.
The easiest way to evaluate the contribution of assortative mating to 
intergenerational persistence is to see how /? (individual persistence) and // (the 
persistence for the couple as a whole) compare, if /z > f t  this indicates that adding 
partner’s earnings to the story is increasing measured intergenerational mobility. 
In all cases the partial correlation measure of /z exceeds/?. This is more 
pronounced for women than men.
The fact that assortative mating makes a more important contribution to 
intergenerational persistence for women is in line with the traditional view that 
marriage is important in securing the social position of women, but less important 
for men. In this data this comes about for two reasons. First, the correlations 
between daughters’ earnings and parental income and their partners’ earnings and 
parental income are almost equal for daughters; whereas for sons they are more 
dissimilar. Secondly, partners contribute a larger share of the household income 
for daughters, around 37 percent of household income, the importance of this os 
shown by the decomposition of couple’s earnings persistence, /z = (1 -  s)fl + s S .
Results for the UK showed that for the second cohort, at least, partners’ 
earnings play an important role in generating intergenerational persistence for 
both men and women, although the importance of partners’ earnings was stronger 
for daughters. These conclusions are replicated for the analysis of a similar cohort 
of Canadians.
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7.5 Results on Assortative Mating
Assortative Mating by Education
In this section I consider assortative mating directly. As the IID has little 
information about personal characteristics, I cannot compare my new approach to 
measuring matching based on parental income with a more standard model of 
matching based on education. I therefore begin by using the SLID to investigate 
matching on education level. Again, this replicates one of the approaches taken to 
the analysis of the British cohort data in Chapter 6.
In Table 7.6 I demonstrate the distribution of educational attainment for 
the sample drawn from the SLID. This sample is based on 1998 data and includes 
all couples where the ‘wife’ is aged 25 to 40 at the time of the survey. The 
tabulation of education levels reveals a strong concentration of the sample at the 
‘further education’ level; almost half of both the male and female partners are in 
this category. It also demonstrates that women tend to be slightly more educated 
than men in this sample, being less likely to drop out of school, and somewhat 
more likely to obtain a degree.
Table 7.7 shows the relationship between the education levels of couples 
in this sample. The first number displayed in the upper panel is the proportion of 
couples with each combination of education levels. In parentheses I show the 
proportion expected in each cell if education levels are independent within 
couples. This compares the actual distribution with the counterfactual distribution 
if there were random matching. The lower panel makes this comparison more 
explicit by showing the ratio of the two (in other words, how much more likely 
the combination is for couples than would be expected).
As in the UK, there is evidence of assortative mating by education levels. 
In all cases the number on the leading diagonal of the lower panel is greater than 
one, indicating that individuals are more likely to marry those with similar 
education levels. Also, cells that are further away from the leading diagonal have 
smaller ratios. For example, combining the independent probabilities that men and 
women drop out means that 2 percent of couples would be formed of men and 
women who are both drop outs. In fact 5 percent of couples have this outcome, 
meaning it is more than two and-a-half times more likely than we would expect.
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Similarly, 3 percent of couples would be expected to consist of a ‘drop-out’ 
husband and a graduate wife, less than 1 percent of actual couples have this 
combination.
In order to aggregate the results shown in Table 7.7 I calculate the 
proportion of couples which share the same education level and compare this with 
the proportion expected to do so if education levels were independent. I find that 
49 percent of individuals match with someone in the same education group, while 
32 percent would be expected to do so. Taking the ratio of these gives 1.514, the 
aggregate measure of assortative mating on education. Expanding the definition of 
matching to also include those who match with a partner in the adjacent education 
group reduces this measure to 1.174. While the distribution of education levels is 
clearly very different in the UK, it is still possible to compare these aggregate 
measures. The numbers derived in Tables 6.2A and B for the British Cohort Study 
range from 1.5 to 1.6 for those in the same category and 1.3 to 1.4 for those 
marrying someone in the same or adjacent group. The conclusion of this 
comparison is that the extent of assortative mating on education in the UK and 
Canada appears to be similar.
Assortative Mating by Earnings, Income and Family Background
Table 7.8 reports elasticities and correlations between alternative measures of 
economic status for couples in the IID65. Three sets of results are presented, those 
for earnings and incomes for the couple in 1998, results for these measures 
averaged over 1996-1998, and results for five year averages of parents’ and 
parents-in-laws’ earnings and income. The elasticities and partial correlations 
provide average measures of assortative mating, meaning that it is straightforward 
to compare the extent of assortative mating by different variables.
In Becker’s analysis of assortative mating, he predicts that individuals will 
match negatively on wages and positively on unearned income, because wages are 
substitutes in the production of market goods. However, negative matching on 
wages will only be found if all of the correlation between wages and non-market 
productivities can be stripped out, as these will be complements in producing
65 Descriptive statistics for this sample are shown in the appendix.
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household goods. We would expect to find an unconditional positive relationship 
between the wages of a couple. The first model in Table 7.8 uses annual earnings 
rather than wages, these include the impact of joint household labour supply 
decisions, complicating the story even further.
The strongest correlation observed between partners’ income or earnings 
is for the three year average of earnings: the correlation in this measure between 
‘husbands’ and ‘wives’ is .16. Assortative mating is stronger on own earnings 
than on own income. However, the correlations between the market and total 
income of partners are difficult to interpret as in some cases joint assets may be 
assigned to one partner on the tax return in order to attain the optimal tax 
treatment. As expected, the use of averaged measures of incomes raises the 
observed correlation between couples66.
The lower panel of the Table reports the elasticities and partial correlations 
of daughter’s parental income with respect to her partner’s parental income. It is 
clear that the extent of matching on parental income is very similar to the extent 
of matching on earnings within a couple. The correlation between earnings with 
the couple is .16 while the correlation between parental incomes is .19. Results for 
parental income are stronger than they are for parents’ earnings, illustrating that 
total resources drive matching on parental characteristics.
Ermisch and Francesconi (2002) explore the correlation in occupational 
indices of parents using data from the UK, and find it to be around .16, slightly 
lower than the correlation in occupational status between parents and their 
children in the same sample. For Canada, the correlation between the incomes of 
parents-in-law is .19. This is stronger than the relationship between parental 
income and children’s earnings but very similar to the correlation in total incomes 
between generations, which I find to be close to .2. This implies that, in Canada, 
the degree of horizontal income persistence (between parents-in-law) is similar to 
the degree in vertical income persistence (between parents and children).
66 The sample sizes are smaller for the second panel as not all couples were couples in all years, 
but differing sample sizes do not explain the difference between the single year and averaged 
results.
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Variations in Assortative Mating
Table 7.9 shows how assortative mating on parental income varies with some of 
the characteristics observed in the IID. The motivation behind this is to test if 
assortative mating on parental income is low in cases where we would expect 
search to be less intensive. I therefore test the relationship between assortative 
mating and the following variables: cohabitation, age at the start of the 
relationship and urban/rural residence. The Table shows the coefficient on 
daughters’ partners’ parental income in a regression of her parent’s income, and 
the coefficient on this variable when interacted with the characteristic of interest. I 
do not show partial correlations to account for different variances, as this 
adjustment has little effect for the parents-in-law results.
Cohabitation in Canada, as in many other developed countries, has risen 
rapidly over recent years. Wu (2000) provides an extremely thorough 
investigation of this change, the possible reasons behind it and its implications. 
Between 1981 and 1996 the number of families that included an unmarried couple 
rose from 1 in 17 to 1 in 7 (Wu 2000: pi). As shown in Table 7.2, in my sample 
15 percent of the matched couples are in cohabiting unions rather than marriages. 
How can these cohabiting unions be interpreted? Clearly they do not have the 
legal standing of marriages and we may therefore expect they will, on average, be 
entered into more casually. In addition, cohabitations are frequently short: half 
end within three years. However, the majority of cohabitations that end within 
three years become marriages, this implies that cohabitations (particularly for the 
young) can be thought of as trial marriages. Wu (2000: p3) puts this explicitly in 
terms of assortative matching.
...cohabitation can be seen to perform the function of a ‘trial
marriage’, weeding out the ‘bad matches’ from the assortative
matching process and keeping the good ones.
With this hypothesis in mind we may expect cohabiting unions to have 
lower associations between parents-in-laws incomes than marriages. The first 
result shown in Table 7.9 shows that this is, indeed, the case: while the average 
elasticity between parents-in-law’s incomes is .183 the elasticity for those in 
cohabiting unions is .03 lower than for those who are married. This result has 
indirect support from studies examining matching for couples in the US 1990
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census. Both Blackwell and Lichter (2000) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) find that 
correlations between the education and race of partners is lower among cohabiting 
couples.67
The second hypothesis I test is whether the parents-in-law elasticity varies 
with the age at which the partnership is formed. The educational homogamy 
literature (Mare, 1991, Chan and Haplin, 2003, and discussed more fully in 
Chapter 6) has stressed the importance of the number of years between age at 
marriage and age left education as determining the closeness with which couples 
match on educational level. If marriages form soon after school leaving age they 
are more likely to be with former class-mates, implying a negative relationship 
between the closeness of matching and age at marriage. Other studies have 
stressed that a later age at marriage means that individuals have searched more. 
Weiss and Willis (1997) show that a later age at first marriage is associated with a 
lower probability of divorce.
The second result presented in Table 7.9 shows the interaction between the 
age the relationship began and the parents-in-law elasticity. This interaction is 
small, but significant; for every year that individuals wait before beginning a 
partnership the association between their parental incomes is increased by .002, so 
if individuals wait five years the elasticity is increased by .01. This provides some 
support for the Weiss and Willis finding that longer search leads to a ‘better’ 
match.
Another dimension on which theory has implications is population density. 
If assortative mating is interpreted as the outcome of a search process we would 
imagine that young people in rural areas will find it more difficult to match. Once 
again this hypothesis finds backing in the IID data; the elasticity of daughter’s 
parental income with respect to her partner’s parental income is .018 lower for 
daughters who grew up in rural areas. This result is robust to controlling for 
province and for province interacted with partner’s parental income.
We might also be interested in how mobility varies by region, particularly 
for Quebec, as it is culturally the most different of the provinces. A feature of
67 Of course this result has other possible interpretations which lie outside a search framework. It 
could be that individuals from similar family backgrounds find more family support for their union 
and therefore are encouraged to marry more often/earlier.
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family formation in Quebec is extremely high rates of cohabitation and low rates 
of marriage in the province. Wu (2000: 47) shows that in 1996 almost 25 percent 
of unions in Quebec were cohabitations compared with around 10 percent in the 
rest of Canada. I find that Quebec is fairly typical in the extent of assortative 
mating on parental income. To explore this further, I have checked if there are any 
differences by the official language used on the tax return. There is slight 
evidence that those who file in French have a lower match on parental income. 
However, this small effect is driven by comparing Quebec with the rest of 
Canada, and there is no effect for francophones outside Quebec.
The results presented in Table 7.9 show that the extent of matching on 
parental income varies along some dimensions of daughters’ and parents’ 
characteristics. In terms of cohabitation, age at union and rural residence these 
variations are consistent with a search framework of the marriage market where 
the extent of parental income matching provides a measure of assortative mating.
Divorce and Assortative Mating
If the extent of parental income matching provides a measure of match quality we 
should expect that those couples who are more closely matched have more stable 
relationships and are less prone to divorce and separation. This final empirical 
section explores this question using partnership histories for daughters. As 
described in the data section this enables us to have information on all partners 
who are also included in the HD since 1992 (and their parental incomes) and all 
marital partners who are within the IID. By using information about spousal SIN 
and marital status I am able to observe if the daughter is still with each partner by 
1998.
Table 7.10 provides descriptive statistics on partnership formation and 
disillusion for both samples. The lower panel of Table 7.10 presents the 
descriptive statistics for all marriages from 1986 onwards. Few marriages begin in 
the early years of the survey and this rises steadily through the data, peaking in 
1993 when 12.4 percent of marriages begin. It is clear that early marriage is an 
important determinant of whether a partnership lasts; annualized divorce and 
separation rates are higher for those who marry early.
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In the lower panel descriptive statistics are considered for the post-1992 
sample. These reveal some difficulties of definition. The divorce rates indicate 
that partnerships formed more recently are much more likely to end in divorce or 
separation. Of partnerships formed in 1992 4 percent of couples are divorced by 
1998 and 12 percent are separated, this is .07 and 2 percent per year respectively. 
Of those formed in 1997 8 percent are divorced by 1998 and 21 percent separated. 
While we might anticipate that cohabitations are short and frequently end in 
separation, it seems unlikely that the result for divorces is correct, particularly as 
it is not found for the sample of marriages. My explanation is that people who are 
actually cohabiting are reporting themselves as divorced with reference to an 
earlier relationship68. This problem means that the results for cohabiting couples 
should be treated with more caution than those for the sample of marriages.
The relationship between divorce, separation and parental income 
matching is explored in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. Table 7.11 considers all marriages. 
In the first column of the Table I control only for the ages of the daughter, her 
partner and both sets of parents. I find that those partnerships which end in 
divorce had a substantially lower correlation between the parental incomes of the 
woman and her partner, the coefficient on the interaction is -.056 (.008) and there 
is also a negative relationship between separation and matching on parental 
income, at -.017 (.007) in the last column. In the remaining columns I attempt to 
control for explanatory factors which may be related to both partnership 
dissolution and the extent of assortative mating. Adding controls for province and 
the year in which the couple began cohabiting does reduce the interaction effects 
but they remains strong at -.049 (.010) for divorce and -.17 (.007) for separation.
Table 7.12 considers the sample that began their partnerships in 1992 or 
later, as before, and in addition, whether the couple are legally married or not. 
Once again there is a strong negative interaction effect between divorce and 
parental income, while there is no difference between the extent of matching for 
couples who separate compared with other couples. As noted above, these results 
should be treated with caution, but the fact that they are similar to the more solid 
data for marriage is reassuring.
68 An alternative way to consider the end of cohabitations would be to look at changes in the 
reported spousal SIN.
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Evidence for Canada strongly suggests that couples who are more closely 
matched on parental income are less likely to divorce or separate. It is possible 
that this result is driven by particularly high divorce probabilities for couples from 
very different backgrounds. To explore this, I divide parental incomes into 
quintile for both partners and compute divorce probabilities by parental income 
pairs. I do this by comparing the probability of divorce for a couple if divorce was 
independent of the interaction of parental income and compare this with the 
actually divorce probability for couples with that combination of parental income 
quintiles. As shown in the appendix tables A.7.2 and A.7.3 I find no clear pattern 
that the relationship between parental income matching and divorce is non-linear.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter and the one which preceded it I have attempted to evaluate the 
contribution of assortative mating to intergenerational correlations in household 
earnings. Analyses that take account of the role of partners’ income are rare in the 
intergenerational income mobility literature and I am able to add results from two 
more countries, Canada and the UK, to build upon the recent analysis for the US 
conducted by Solon and Chadwick (2002). As in Solon and Chadwick, assortative 
mating is shown to add an important dimension. The partial correlations between 
the couple’s earnings and parental income are higher in both cases than the 
correlations between individual earnings and parental income. In both cases recent 
data shows this effect to be more important for the intergenerational persistence of 
women, but it is also important for men, an aspect overlooked in previous 
investigations.
Due to the unique data available for Canada I am able to explore the level 
of matching on parental income within couples. This provides evidence on a new 
dimension through which parents and children are linked. I show that matching on 
parental income is substantial; indeed the correlation between parents-in-laws’ 
incomes is very similar to the correlation found in income for parents and their 
offspring in Canada.
This finding is interesting in itself; however, owing to the correlation of 
parental income with many other characteristics of the two partners, I interpret the
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match on parental income as a general purpose measure of assortative mating. 
Consequently, I test a number of hypotheses which would emerge from a search- 
theoretic framework. In all cases the results justify my approach; the extent of 
assortative mating rises with the length of search (age at which the partnership is 
formed) and the thickness of the market (urban v rural area) and weaker 
assortative mating is associated with a higher probability of the match dissolving.
This preliminary exploration of parental matching has opened up a number 
of avenues for future research. It is clear that some of my analysis requires 
development to firm up the mechanisms through which the match on parental 
income operates. It is also true that the theoretical link between divorce and the 
extent of assortative mating on parental income should be formalised. 
Nonetheless, the fact that my empirical results are in line with the intuitive 
predictions of search models encourages me to pursue this line of investigation. In 
addition, it would be extremely interesting to explore these issues using data 
which contained more information about the characteristics of parents and 
children; in this regard Nordic register data has interesting possibilities69.
69 R0ed and Raaum (2003) provide an interesting discussion of the development and use of these 
data in Norway.
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Table 7.1: Number of Daughters Matched
Number Proportion of the Cohort
Women bom 1967-1970 511,636 -
Women who file in 1998 483,908 .945
Women cohabiting/married 
in 1998
294,251 .575
Women matched with men 179,341 .351 (.609 of those with
from the IID, bom 1963- 
1970, both file in 1998
partners in 1998)
Women matched with men 2,452 .005 (.008 of those with
from the IID, wives only file 
in 1998
partners in 1998)
Women matched with men 
from the IID, husbands only 
file in 1998
2,596 .005
Women matched with men 
from the IID, bom 1963- 
1970
184,389 .360
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Table 7.2: Characteristics of the Matched Sample Compared 
With All Women in the IID
All Single All Women Women
Women With Partners Matched with 
Partners
Married - .815 .843
>$2 Earnings Filed in 1998 .861 .821 .819
1998 Earnings 23,510(15,413) 22,111 (40,063) 22,545 (16,506)
>$2 Market Income Filed in .897 .885 .883
1998
1998 Market Income 23,836(17,252) 21,994 (49,290) 22,444 (37,010)
>$2 Total Income Filed in .986 .916 .909
1998
1998 Total Income 23,665 (16,393) 23,073 (46,808) 23,612(33,169)
Average of Parental Earnings 51,049 (41,153) 49,752 (37,643) 50,543 (37,942)
14-18 years
Average of Parental Market 56,711 (55,087) 54,693 (62,801) 55,791 (53,815)
Income 14-18 years
Average of Parental Total 56,095 (53,400) 54,912 (57,349) 56,183 (50,571)
Income 14-18 years
Parental Province
Atlantic Provinces 10.39 10.57 10.80
Quebec 21.76 25.65 24.53
Ontario 40.31 37.23 38.88
Prairies 16.05 17.11 17.07
British Columbia 11.24 9.24 8.57
Territories 0.24 0.21 0.15
Sample 171,59 269,940 171588
Notes
1. Income and earnings are all expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars, standard deviations are 
in parentheses.
2. Samples are restricted to those daughters for whom parents report incomes of >$1 in all 
years used for the average. However samples used in the calculation of each mean differ 
slightly as only observations with valid measures for that variable are used (ie >$1 for 
parents and >$2 for daughters).
3. The high standard deviation for 1998 earnings among all women with partners is inflated 
by some large observations above the 90th percentile for this group. If observations above 
the 99th percentile are eliminated the means and standard deviations for all women all the 
IID become 22,854 (13,743) and 21,361 (13,684) for earnings, 23,008 (14,170) and 
20,982 (14,236) for market income and 22,928 (13,706) and 22,120 (14,107) for total 
income.
4. Earnings are total employment income.
5. Market income is employment income plus self employment income plus asset income.
6. Total income is the sum o f all the income sources listed on the tax return, the components 
included vary somewhat by year.
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Table 7.3: Characteristics of Women in the SLID in 1998
Women Born 1967-1970
Single____________ With a Partner
Proportion of Sample .353 .647
Proportion Married - .786
Worked During the Year .854 .821
Earnings 21,958(15,414) 19,808 (14,240)
Market Income 21,650(15,635) 19,724(14,272)
Atlantic Provinces .079 .074
Quebec .189 .252
Ontario .449 .363
Prairies .133 .173
British Columbia .149 .138
Partners aged 28-31 - .639
Partners aged 28-36 - .717
Sample Size 637 1524
Notes:
1. All figures are weighted to population means using the 1998 cross-sectional weight.
2. Once again earnings and income are in 1992 Canadian dollars.
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Table 7.4: Intergenerational Mobility in Canada by Gender
and Partnership Status
Sample
1998 Earnings as Dependent Variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation Sample
Single Sons 
Sons in couples
.188 (.003) .137 (.002) 203,688 
.193 (.003) .155 (.002) 229,406
1996-1999 Averaged Earnings as Dependent Variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation Sample
Single Sons 
Sons in couples
.151 (.002) .155 (.002) 166,846 
.160 (.002) .185 (.002) 208,999
1998 Earnings as Dependent Variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation Sample
Single Daughters 
Daughters in Couples
.188 (.004) .130 (.003) 147,589 
.212 (.004) .127 (.002) 221,593
1996-1999 Averaged Earnings as Dependent Variable
Coefficient Partial Correlation Sample
Single Daughters 
Daughters in Couples
.149 (.003) .149 (.003) 126,488 
.178 (.002) .168 (.002) 196,875
Notes:
1. Explanatory variable is parents’ combined total income averaged over the years when the
son or daughter was aged 14 to 18.
2. Only parental reports over $1 and daughter/son-in-law reports over $2 are included in the
estimations.
3. Controls are included for age for both generations.
4. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 7.5: Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative Mating
Dependent variable
Women’s Parents’ Income as the Explanatory 
Variable
Elasticity Partial Sample 
Correlation
Women’s 1998 Earnings .207 (.005) .124 (.003) 131,337
Men’s 1998 Earnings S  .148 (.003)
W
.120 (.003) 143,899
Couple’s 1998 Earnings u  .182 (.003)r*w .158 (.003) 155,444
Women’s Parents’ Income as the Explanatory 
Variable
Elasticity Partial
Correlation
Sample
Women’s 1996-1998 Earnings R  .174 (.003)f w .163 (.003) 98,983
Men’s 1996-1998 Earnings S  .130 (.003)
W
.150 (.003) 112,901
Couple’s 1996-1998 Earnings u  .166 (.002) r*w .190 (.003) 125,735
Men’s Parents’ Income as the Explanatory Variable
Elasticity Partial Sample
Correlation
Men’s 1998 Earnings A .165 (.003) .140 (.003) 143,899
Women’s 1998 Earnings A .147 (.004) .093 (.003) 131,337
Couple’s 1998 Earnings Mh .177 (.003) .163 (.003) 155,444
Men’s Parents’ Income as the Explanatory Variable
Elasticity Partial Sample
Correlation
Men’s 1996-1998 Earnings A .152 (.002) .185 (.003) 112,901
Women’s 1996-1998 Earnings A .128 (.003) .126 (.003) 98,983
Couple’s 1996-1998 Earnings Mh .162 (.002) .195 (.003) 125,735
Notes as for Table 7.4.
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Table 7.6: The Education Levels of Couples in the SLID
Men Women
High School Drop Out .158 .112
High School .164 .190
Further Education .480 .484
Completed Degree .199 .212
Sample 6,339 6,339
Notes:
1. Data is from the 1998 SLID
2. The sample used here is o f all couples (both married and cohabiting) where the wife is 
aged 25-40 at the time of the survey in 1998.
3. Cross sectional weights are used to derive all proportions
Table 7.7: Evidence for Assortative Mating on Education from the SLID
Woman’s Education
Man’s Education Drop Out High School Further Completed
Education Degree
Drop Out .049 (.018) .042 (.030) .060 (.077) .007 (.033)
High School .019 0018) .051 0031) .085 (.079) .009 (.035)
Further Education .041 (.054) .083 (.091) .274 (.232) .083 (.102)
Completed Degree .003 (.022) .014 (.038) .067 (.096) .115(.042>
Ratio of Actual to Predicted Proportions
Woman’s Education
Man’s Education Drop Out High School Further Completed
Education Degree
Drop Out 2.722 1.366 .789 .212
High School 1.055 1.645 1.076 .257
Further Education .759 .912 1.181 .814
Completed Degree .136 .368 .698 2.738
Notes:
1. The numbers in parentheses are the proportion of couples we would expect to observe in 
that cell if matching was random (predicted proportion).
2. As for Table 7.6.
3. Sample size is 6339.
231
Table 7.8: Measures of Assortative Mating on Earnings and Income
Regression of woman’s 1998 income on partner’s 1998 income
Beta Partial Correlation Sample Size
Earnings .125 (.004) .093 (.003) 136,839
Market Income .130 (.004) .082 (.003) 157,451
Total Income .116 (.004) .070 (.002) 163,303
Regression of woman’s 1996-8 income on partner’s 1996-8 
income
Beta Partial Correlation Sample Size
Earnings .196 (.004) .160(.003) 98,524
Market Income .193 (.004) .138 (.003) 116,879
Total Income .180 (.004) .122 (.003) 124,405
Regression of 5 year average of woman’s parental income on 
partner’s parental income
Beta Partial Correlation Sample Size
Earnings .111 (.002) .153 (.003) 125,981
Market Income .166 (.002) .187 (.003) 149,730
Total Income .182 (.002) .192 (.002) 160,058
Notes:
1. The sample in the second panel is smaller than the sample in the first panel because not 
all o f those who are together in 1998 were together in 1996 and 1997.
2. The income/earnings measure for all three years must be >2 for both spouses. However, 
these more stringent sample restrictions are not responsible for the higher correlations for 
the average measures.
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Table 7.9: Variations in Assortative Mating by Characteristics
Regressions on Daughter’s Parental Income on her Husband’s Parental Income
Variation by Marital Status
Husband’s Parents’ Income .183 (.003)
Husband’s Parents’ Income x Cohabiting -.028 (.005)
Variation by Age Relationship Started
Husband’s Parents’ Income .123 (.019)
Husband’s Parents’ Income x Age relationship started .002 (.0008)
Variation by Growing Up in a Rural Area
Husband’s Parents’ Income .142 (.003)
Husband’s Parents’ Income x Rural -.018 (.004)
Notes:
1. All regressions control for age effects and main effects alongside the interactions 
specified.
2. Controls for province are added to the regression by urban/rural. The results do not 
change if controls for province*husbands parental income are also added (the rural 
interaction is reduced slightly to -.017 (.005)).
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Table 7.10: Descriptive Statistics for Divorce and Separation
All Partnerships Started >=1992
Year First Observed Proportion of Proportion Divorced Proportion
Sample by 1998 Separated by 1998
1992 .184 .039 .121
1993 .198 .038 .119
1994 .173 .039 .138
1995 .166 .044 .157
1996 .151 .057 .183
1997 .127 .079 .206
All Marriages Started >=1986
Year First Observed Proportion of Proportion Divorced Proportion
Sample by 1998 Separated by 1998
1986 .007 .293 .245
1987 .020 .240 .218
1988 .043 .207 .191
1989 .073 .169 .183
1990 .102 .134 .162
1991 .110 .101 .140
1992 .118 .067 .113
1993 .124 .048 .091
1994 .119 .030 .083
1995 .113 .014 .077
1996 .095 .006 .066
1997 .078 .001 .067
Notes:
1. Sample sizes are 117,532 for the first panel and 130,919 for the second panel.
2. The sample used in the upper panel consists of all partnerships formed in 1992 or later. 
There are therefore some individuals with multiple partnerships. 95% of observations are 
for women with only one partnership included in the sample.
3. The sample used here is the lower panel is of all marriages formed in 1986 or later. There 
are therefore some individuals with multiple partnerships. 96% of observations are for 
women with only one partnership included in the sample.
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Table 7.11: Assortative Mating, Divorce and Separation, Post-1992
Partnerships
Dependent Variable: Daughters’ 
Parental Income
Husband’s Parents’ Incomes .174 (.003) .148 (.003) .145 (.003)
Husband’s Parents’ Income x -.064 (.010) -.058 (.010) -.056 (.010)
Divorced by 1998
Husband’s Parents’ Income x -.007 (.006) -.002 (.006) -.005 (.006)
Separated by 1998
Main effects of divorce and Yes Yes Yes
separation
All age controls Yes Yes Yes
Ever married dummy Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies No Yes Yes
Year Started Cohabiting No No Yes
Dummies
Sample Size 117,532 117,532 117,532
Note:
Controlling for daughter province rather than parents province gives results o f .145 (.003), - 
.054 (.010) .001 (.006)
Table 7.12: Assortative Mating and Divorce for Those Ever Married
Dependent Variable: Parental Income
Husband’s Parents’ Incomes .182 (.003) .152 (.003) .144 (.003)
Husband’s Parents’ Income x -.056 (.008) -.049 (.008) -.049 (.008)
Divorced by 1998
Husband’s Parents’ Income x -.025 (.007) -.019 (.007) -.017 (.007)
Separated by 1998
Main effects of divorce and Yes Yes Yes
separation
All age controls Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies No Yes Yes
Year married Dummies No No Yes
Sample Size 130,919 130,919 130,919
Note:
Controlling for daughter’s province rather than parents province gives results o f .145 (.003), - 
.047 (.008) -.015 (.0065)
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Appendix to Chapter 7: Further Descriptive Statistics
Table A.7.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Couples Sample
Women Matched 
with Partners
Partners
>$2 Earnings Filed in 1998 .821 .900
1998 Earnings 22,571 (16,479) 39,430 (35,900)
>$2 Market Income Filed in 1998 .884 .968
1998 Market Income 22,470 (38,978) 39,860 (41,802)
>$2 Total Income Filed in 1998 .910 .978
1998 Total Income 23,645 (33,940) 40,641 (40,290)
Average of Parental Earnings 
14-18 years
Average of Parental Market 
Income 14-18 years 
Average of Parental Total 
Income 14-18 years 
Sample
50,612 (37,988) 
55,880 (54,231) 
56,281 (50,857) 
160,058
49,811 (39,129) 
55,039 (54,423) 
56,389 (51,959) 
160,058
Notes
1. Income and earnings are all expressed in 1992 Canadian dollars, standard deviations are 
in parentheses.
2. The sample is restricted to all couples where the daughter and her partner’s parental 
incomes are >$1 in all years.
3.
Table A.7.2. Divorce Rates by Parents’ Income Quintiles
Daughter’s parental 
quintile
Sample divorce rate Partner’s parental 
quintile
Sample divorce 
rate
Bottom 0.046 Bottom 0.048
2nd 0.049 2nd 0.050
3rd 0.049 3rd 0.049
4th 0.052 4th 0.049
Top 0.0 Top 0.045
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Table A.7.3. Threshold Effects and Divorce
Divorce rates by parental quintiles
Husband’s Wife’s parents’ quintile
parent’s Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
quintile
Bottom 0.043 0.046 0.043 0.054 0.060
2nd 0.044 0.051 0.050 0.059 0.044
3rd 0.052 0.047 0.049 0.046 0.051
4th 0.045 0.052 0.054 0.053 0.041
Top 0.052 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.037
Ratio of actual to predicted divorce rates
Husband’s Wife’s parents’ quintile
parent’s Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
quintile
Bottom 0.904 0.962 0.907 1.164 1.216
2nd 0.906 1.037 1.000 1.161 0.902
3rd 1.076 0.981 0.981 0.910 1.117
4th 0.942 1.057 1.074 1.036 0.902
Top 1.160 1.020 1.019 0.981 0.816
Notes:
Cells show the ratio of the actual proportion of couples in the cell getting divorced 
compared with the prediction of this proportion if there were no interaction effect 
between the cells, i.e if 6% of couples with the wife’s parents in the bottom quintile 
obtain a divorce and 4% of couples with the husband’s parents in the top quintile obtain a 
divorce, the prediction for a couple with this combination would be the average of those 
two, or 5%.
A ratio of >1 therefore means there is a higher probability of divorce than we would 
expect.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
The New Labour Governments from 1997 onwards have put social justice as one of 
the central tenets of their political philosophy. As with many political concepts this is 
to a certain extent a catch-all - used to describe the merits of many policies. However, 
one aspect which is returned to repeatedly is the value of making sure that all children 
have the chance to fulfil their potential; a concept clearly connected to 
intergenerational income mobility. In a recent speech setting out New Labour’s vision 
for a third term, Alan Milbum emphasised a commitment to equality of opportunity.
There is a glass ceiling on opportunity in this country. In our first two terms we 
have raised it. In our third term we have to break it. I believe we can do more in 
a third term to create an inclusive economy and the opportunity society than we 
were able to in our first two.70
With social mobility a policy goal du jour at the start of the 2005 general election 
campaign, this thesis provides a particularly timely discussion of intergenerational 
income mobility in the UK. In addition, I place my discussions firmly in an 
internationally comparative framework, and conduct new analysis of how 
intergenerational relationships are affected by (and affect) household formation.
The first question I address is how the level of intergenerational mobility in 
the UK compares in an international framework; comparing findings on sons from 
UK data with methodologically equivalent estimations for the US, West Germany and 
Canada. In general, this analysis supports the picture painted by comparing the 
evidence from single country studies. The US and UK appear to have fairly low 
mobility, while mobility in West Germany is moderate and Canada appears to be the 
most mobile of these countries.
This investigation does reveal a number of new points, however. First, there 
are some clear differences in the estimations depending on whether parental income 
or father’s earnings is used as the dependent variable, which suggest opportunities for 
further research. Also I consider the contribution made by education to 
intergenerational persistence. It appears that the low mobility in the US is related to
70 Alan Milbum MP's speech to the Fabian Society on Sunday January 16 2005. Milbum is currently 
Chancellor of the Duchy o f  Lancaster and in charge of the Government’s election strategy.
the high earnings returns to education, while both in the UK and the US the strong 
relationship between parental income and educational attainment is notable.
My cross-country analysis also teaches an important lesson about what we do 
not know. The standard errors in my analysis are quite large for all countries apart 
from Canada. This means that the only strong conclusion which can be taken from 
this strictly comparable investigation is that mobility in Canada is greater than in the 
US and UK. Corak (2004) provides a recent survey of the literature on cross-country 
comparisons, which attempts to make adjustments to the estimates to account for non­
comparability in the estimation approaches. Corak’s approach leads to qualitatively 
similar results to the ones I find, and also allows the examination of more countries 
than I consider. However, the assumptions made to ensure comparability are likely to 
add to the uncertainties caused by sampling variation, and no standard errors are 
provided for the preferred estimates. An advantage of my approach is that the 
uncertainties caused by sampling variation are made explicit, even if the results 
initially appear to be less concrete.
The second empirical chapter of my thesis also approaches intergenerational 
mobility from a comparative perspective, but this time comparing changes over time 
for the UK and US. In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that there have previously been few 
studies addressing the change in mobility over time. The studies on income mobility 
that have been carried out to date for Norway, Finland and Canada have pointed either 
towards no change in mobility or an increase. In sharp contrast, the data reveals a 
very clear picture of falling mobility for the UK; when comparing sons bom in 1958 
with those bom in 1970.1 also revisit the data for the US where previous studies have 
pointed towards an increase in mobility. I find no evidence of a change when 
comparing cohorts bom between 1949 and 1970 and while there is evidence of a 
small decline in persistence followed by a steep rise in later cohorts, there is 
insufficient information to be confident that these are the result of anything but 
sampling variation. This indicates that the findings of a rise in mobility from previous 
studies do not appear to be robust given the data available. There is certainly no 
evidence of a strong and significant fall in intergenerational mobility in the US to 
mirror the one found for the UK.
Motivated by the finding of a large increase in intergenerational persistence 
for British men, I examine the role of education in generating the level and change in
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intergenerational persistence for the UK. My findings are striking. Despite the 
expansion of the number of students undertaking higher qualifications, the 
distribution of these opportunities has been skewed towards students from higher 
income backgrounds. This partially explains the reduction in intergenerational 
mobility found for the UK.
As part of my exploration of the relationship between education and parental 
income I attempt to provide some evaluation of the mechanisms that lie behind 
intergenerational persistence. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the classic models of 
intergenerational mobility highlight inherited characteristics and investments as the 
twin mechanisms through which income is correlated across generations. If the 
investment mechanism is important we will find a causal relationship between 
parental income and educational attainment. Finding that income matters in and of 
itself has two important implications; first prices and returns will influence 
intergenerational mobility as parents are making decisions about investments. Second, 
government policies on redistribution will influence the outcomes of poorer children. 
I find that there are causal impacts from parental income to educational attainment; 
but these are small compared to the differences in education observed between those 
from rich and poor backgrounds. This appears to support the Government’s emphasis 
on tackling educational inequalities directly rather than through redistribution.
The first part of my thesis followed the majority of the literature on 
intergenerational mobility in stressing the relationship between individual earnings 
and parental income. But consumption (and thereby utility) depends upon both the 
individual’s own income and his or her partner’s income. Only very few studies have 
considered the role of partners’ earnings in generating intergenerational persistence. 
In those that have been carried out (e.g. Chadwick and Solon, 2002, Atkinson et al, 
1983 and Lam and Schoeni, 1994) the focus has been very strongly on the 
relationship between women’s fathers’ earnings and her husband’s earnings, largely 
ignoring the relationship between women’s earnings and both their own parental 
income and the parental income of their partner. In the final chapters of my thesis I 
widen my consideration of mobility to take into account the contribution to 
intergenerational mobility made by partners, and I look symmetrically at the role of 
sons, daughters, husbands and wives.
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For the UK, I revisit the findings on changes in intergenerational mobility for 
sons and add an analysis for daughters to this picture. I find that the decrease in 
intergenerational mobility is not as strong for daughters as it is for sons. When I add 
partners’ earnings and examine the persistence in family earnings between the two 
generations, I find that the change in mobility for sons is even stronger than first 
thought. It is clear that for the later cohort the earnings of sons’ partners have become 
as closely related to parental income as they are for daughters’ partners, a particularly 
striking finding given that the literature had focused entirely on the relationship 
between daughters’ partners and their parents up to this point. This ‘daughter-in-law 
persistence’ adds substantially to the extent of intergenerational persistence for sons.
For Canada, I am able to build upon this further. Using a very large dataset 
based on tax returns I am able to, for the first time, link the incomes of both sets of 
parents for many couples. In this dataset, as for the UK, I find strong links between 
partner’s earnings and parental income for both men and women. Once again 
assortative mating makes a strong contribution to intergenerational persistence. A new 
dimension to the intergenerational relationship is explored by considering the way 
that couples match on parental income. This shows that not only does choice of 
partner influence the correlation between children’s and parents’ incomes, but that 
parental income has a bearing on how couples match.
I find that the correlation between parents-in-laws incomes is .2; 
approximately the same as the intergenerational income correlation in Canada. 
Treating this correlation as a new measure of assortative mating, I am able to make a 
number of predictions about the way in which the extent of assortative mating varies 
according to characteristics. I find some support for a search theoretic approach to the 
marriage market, as couples who we would predict to have searched less have a 
weaker association between their parental incomes. In addition, I show that couples 
who are less similar in terms of their parental income are more likely to separate.
This thesis has examined a number of important aspects of intergenerational 
mobility, but naturally, unanswered questions remain for further research. Many 
commentators have made the link between inequality and immobility, partly 
encouraged by comparing the high mobility and low inequality found in Nordic 
countries with the high inequality and low mobility found in the US and UK; this 
pattern appears to be confirmed by my findings. However, results over time fit less
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well with this story. I show a fall in intergenerational mobility in the UK but fairly 
steady mobility in the US over a period when income inequality was rising rapidly in 
both countries. This implies either that mobility and inequality are not closely 
connected or that there was some off-setting factor in the US. A more formal 
treatment of the relationship between inequality and mobility would help us to 
understand the underlying forces behind these changes.
There is strong evidence to suggest that individual income mobility has fallen 
for sons in the UK, a finding which has been responsible for some of the recent policy 
interest in this question. In my analysis, I consider the role of education in 
contributing to this change. While I find that changes in the distribution of educational 
attainments have a role there is also a strong rise in the unexplained component of 
intergenerational persistence. If policy is to be better directed, it is important to learn 
more about this unexplained component. One hypothesis is that non-cognitive skills 
may be acting as a transmission mechanism. If children of richer parents have better 
‘soft’ skills, and the rewards to these in the labour market are increasing, this provides 
another route through which intergenerational persistence will grow stronger. I plan to 
investigate this aspect of mobility using the British cohort data that collected 
information about behaviours and skills during childhood.
The third dimension of my thesis which I would like to develop in future 
research is whether results on household formation and intergenerational inequality 
have implications for cross-sectional inequality. As partners’ incomes have become 
more strongly correlated with parental income, it may also be the case that the 
correlation of own income has become stronger with the couple, implying greater 
cross-sectional household income inequality.
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Appendix: Attrition and Item Non-response in the British Cohort 
Studies
A.I. Introduction
All intergenerational analysis relies on having accurate information about parents and 
children. In particular, it is important that the data provide good estimates of the 
permanent status of those in both generations. In order to obtain this researchers 
prefer information which measures the status of parents and children when both 
generations are approximately the same age, meaning that the observation points are a 
number of years apart. There are three methods of obtaining this data. The first is to 
ask adult children about their parents’ status when they were growing up, this is likely 
to be fraught with measurement difficulties. The second is to use a longitudinal survey 
so that parents’ and children’s variables are self-reported in the year of interest. The 
third method is linking administrative records; the advantage of this method is that 
existing data can be used to create intergenerational data even if it was not designed 
for this purpose originally.
The main difficulty associated with longitudinal survey data is sample 
attrition. For example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics has now been running for 
37 years, this is a long time to continue to keep track of families; in addition, it is easy 
to imagine that over such a long time period a large number of households may refuse 
to continue. The problems which result from attrition are a form of sample selection, 
exactly as discussed previously in the context of measuring intergenerational mobility 
for daughters. If survey attrition is non-random it is plausible that the parameters 
obtained from intergenerational analysis are not the same as would be observed for a 
fully representative sample. Item non-response has precisely the same effect; although 
individuals do not drop out of the survey completely, missing data on crucial variables 
means that the parameters of interest cannot be estimated for the full sample.
Survey attrition and item non-response could be potentially damaging to 
almost all of the estimates in this paper. The cohort studies and the BHPS for the UK; 
the PSID for the US and the GSOEP are all longitudinal surveys. Indeed, the only 
data which is excluded from this concern is the Canadian IID, as it is based on 
administrative data the IID should be safe on this score.
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In this Appendix I focus on the extent and implications of attrition and non­
response in the British cohorts; the NCDS and BCS. The reasons for my focus on 
these data are obvious to some extent; three of the chapters in this thesis are 
concerned with changes over time between estimates derived from these datasets; if 
attrition and non-response patterns differ substantially across the cohorts then this is a 
concern. In addition, the long intervals between the surveys (as much as 14 years for 
the BCS) mean that attrition may be particularly severe. In the next section I elaborate 
on why attrition and non-response may cause problems when measuring 
intergenerational mobility. In Section 3 I provide a brief overview of the evidence on 
the extent of attrition in the other datasets used in this thesis before spending the 
remainder of this Appendix analysing the implication of these problems in the British 
cohort studies.
A.2. The Problem of Attrition and Non-Response
In order to provide a brief illustration of the potential implications of attrition in 
longitudinal data I shall restate Manski’s interpretation of the problem of sample 
selection discussion in Section 6.2. The relationship of interest is between the child’s 
outcome y and their parental income jc, however y and x are only observed for 
individuals who have not attrited and for whom there is information on the key 
variables (namely parental income and adult earnings), these useable observations are 
denoted by z = 1 .
The true parameter of interest will be a weighted average of the one observed 
in the data (when z = 1) and the one which is unobserved due to attrition and non­
response (wherez = 0). As discussed in Chapter 6, if E(y \x , z  = 0) can take any 
value this means that very little is know about £(y|jc)for the full sample. The 
problem is worsened when the proportion of observations in the z = 0 sample is high,
i.e. where there is substantial attrition or non-response.
E[y\x] = E[y\x , z  = l]P(z = l \ x )  + E[ y \x tz=0]P(z = 0\x)  (A.l)
As £’(y|jc,z = 0) is by definition unobserved it is extremely difficult to 
understand the impact of attrition without making some strong assumptions. One 
solution is to use a Heckman selection equation identified by an instrumental variable 
which is correlated with z but not y. However, if selection into the sample is based on
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unobservables which are correlated with y, such as conscientiousness, it is hard to 
think of a valid instrument. Instead, my approach is to simply explore the extent of 
attrition and non-response to find the probability that z = 0 in both cohorts. I then 
explore the extent to which this impacts on the characteristics of the sample, in an 
attempt to make some comments about the difference between 
E(y | x, z = 0) and E{y | x, z = 1).
The extent to which the sample characteristics are affected by attrition is also 
important for a different, but related, reason. In Chapter 2 I discussed the 
implications of homogenous samples for the estimation of intergenerational mobility. 
I demonstrated that if the explanatory variable has a lower variance in the observed 
sample than in the target population this will tend to exacerbate the impact of 
measurement error and attenuate the estimates. Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) 
demonstrate that using representative samples has an important impact on increasing 
the estimate of intergenerational persistence for the US. If those with high and low 
incomes are more likely to attrite then the difficulties usually associated with 
homogenous samples may be present even when initially nationally representative 
surveys are used.
A.3. Evidence on Sample Attrition in the Other Datasets Used
Patterns of attrition in the PSID are explicitly considered by Becketti et al (1988) and 
Fitzgerald et al (1998a and 1998b) while Brown et al (1996) review a number of 
studies on the overall quality of the data. The impact of attrition has been studied by a 
number of methods; by comparing the distributions of key variables with those from 
the Current Population Survey, by considering the evolution of key PSID variables as 
the sample changes and by comparing the relationships between variables for those 
who later attrite and those for those who stay in the sample. There is no doubt that 
there have been substantial losses over this long panel. Brown et al (1996) tell us that 
by 1992 only around half of the original sample who was still living continued to 
participate. Comparisons of the sample with the CPS generally indicate that this 
attrition is random as the PSID remains fairly representative on a number of 
dimensions. Fitzgerald et al (1998b) compare intergenerational correlations measured 
at young ages for the full sample and those who later attrite. There is some evidence
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that intergenerational correlations in education are somewhat weaker for those who 
later leave the survey; however the differences they find are small (coefficients vary 
by about 5 percent), and no significant differences between these groups are found for 
intergenerational income correlations.
Less has been written about the implications of attrition for the GSOEP, 
however the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), which carries out the 
survey, produces its own regular updates on quality of the data. Speiss and 
Pannenberg (2003) show that between 1984 and 2000 the sample of individuals (the 
relevant years used in Chapter 3) was reduced by 45 percent. The impact of this 
attrition is unclear, however Haisken-DeNew et al (2002) show that it is associated 
with family instability (separation, moving etc), living in a large city and low income.
The final longitudinal survey used in my thesis is the BHPS. This panel is 
short by comparison with the others used, and the gap between the observations of 
parental income and educational attainments used in Chapter 5 are small, this means 
that attrition should be less of a concern. Ermisch and Francesconi (2004) discuss this 
question and report that while 12 percent of the sample was lost between the first and 
second waves, response rates have subsequently been at 95 percent of the second 
wave sample. As we shall see, the response rates in the British Cohort Studies are 
nowhere near as high as this. This indicates a potential problem with the analysis in 
Chapter 5 which treats the British cohorts and the BHPS as comparable. It is 
therefore particularly reassuring that the trends found for these data are confirmed by 
the cross-sectional Family Expenditure Survey which, by definition, does not suffer 
from attrition problems.
A.4. Description of Attrition and Non-Response in the Cohort Studies
In this section I demonstrate the extent of the attrition and non-response problems in 
the British cohorts and then proceed to note the impact of these problems on the 
means and variances of some of the variables of interest.
Plewis et al (2004) provide a very detailed account of the changing samples in 
the cohort studies. This paper also provides an account of the how the tracking of the 
survey respondents develops over the life of the cohorts. The initial target samples for 
the cohorts were all babies bom in Great Britain between 3rd and 9th March 1958
246
while the British Cohort study included all those bom between 5th and 11th April 
1970. In the follow-up sweeps up to age 16 the samples also included individuals 
bom outside Britain but living in Britain at the time of the survey. Individuals remain 
part of the target sample until death or emigration. This means that even if an 
individual is not included in the sample in sweep t they will be included in the target 
sample for sweep t+1.
Attrition
Table Al shows how the sample sizes evolve across the sweeps of the surveys for 
both cohorts. These include all individuals, including those who eventually die or 
emigrate and those who enter the sample later as immigrants (for more detail on this 
see Plewis et al, 2004). I present all the analyses by sex, as while the analysis on 
education in Chapter 5 is presented for both sexes pooled, the results in the other 
chapters are presented for men and women separately.
Table Al reveals a steady fall in the NCDS sample size over time. The total 
number of cohort members is 18,553 but by the final sweep available at age 42 only 
about 60 percent of this number were included in the survey. There is evidence to 
suggest that women are less likely to attrite than men, with around 6 percent higher 
response rates for women in the adult surveys. This Table also demonstrates the 
impact of the survey methodology, as individuals remain in the sample frame even if 
they miss a sweep it is possible for the sample size to increase as well as decrease 
between surveys. It is clear that this occurs between the age 16 and age 23 sweeps. It 
is not possible that this is a result of the addition of new immigrants to the cohort as 
this practice stopped after age 16.
In the bottom panel of Table Al similar figures are displayed for the BCS 
sweeps. Once again, women are less likely to drop out of the survey than men; the age 
30 surveys include 56 percent of all men in the cohort and 65 percent of all women. 
These proportions are very similar to those for the NCDS at age 33 where 57 percent 
of men are included compared with 64 percent of women. In this regard, then, the 
two cohorts appear to be fairly similar in the extent of their attrition. The age 16 data, 
however, appears to be more problematic in the BCS than the NCDS. In this sweep 
only around half of the parents of the sample cohorts were interviewed. This fact is
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disguised by looking at the numbers of individuals who are classed as present in this 
survey (5815 males and 5797 females) but as all the survey instruments had low 
response rates this understates the problems at age 16. It is not clear what is behind 
the difficulties in the BCS cohorts at age 16.
Item Non-response
Table A2 gives the response rates for some variables of interest. This is calculated for 
cohort members who were included in the relevant survey. We might expect that 
questions about money might be particularly likely to suffer from item non-response, 
and this proves to be the case. For the NCDS, just over three quarters of those with 
parental information have valid responses for the parental income variable. This 
compares to almost a hundred percent response rates for the adult questions on 
employment and education. The cohort members’ earnings variables also have fairly 
low response rates. There is valid earnings information for .68 of men and .55 of 
women; but in many cases missing data is accounted for by the unemployed and those 
in self-employment. By comparing the proportion of those in the survey at 33 who 
have earnings variables with the proportion employed at the time of the survey, the 
response rates to the earnings questions are shown to be about 6 percentage points 
lower than they should be.
The patterns shown for the BCS in the lower panel of the Table are fairly 
similar to those described for the NCDS. Even though the proportion included in the 
age 16 sweep is smaller for the second cohort the proportion of the parents included 
who respond to the parental income question is very similar to the figure for the 
NCDS, at around three quarters. This is lower than the comparable figure for the age 
10 survey, where 85 percent of parents who responded to the survey gave income 
information. In Chapter 5 I use information from the age 16 sweep where possible to 
find out whether the child stayed on at school, this was supplemented with 
information from age 30 when it was missing. Table A2 demonstrates that only 60 to 
70 percent of those in the age 16 survey gave this information; the imputation from 
age 30 was therefore quite substantial. The response rates in the BCS adult surveys 
are similar to the NCDS with the gap between the proportion employed and the 
proportion providing earnings information being 6 percent once more.
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Effects o f Attrition and Non-response on Sample Size
The evidence presented so far points to several points of concern about the quality of 
the data used in my intergenerational analysis for the UK. All of my analysis relies on 
parental income at age 16 as the key explanatory variable, while this variable has 75 
percent response rates among parents in both cohorts who were included in the 
relevant survey, just 60 percent of parents in the NCDS and 50 percent of parents in 
the NCDS were included in the age 16 sweep.
Table A3 presents the combined implications of non-response and attrition, 
and demonstrates how I arrive at the samples which are used for intergenerational 
analysis. It is clear that limiting the samples to those who have parental income data at 
age 16 has a huge effect on the samples. Just under half of the NCDS sample and less 
than 40 percent of the BCS sample meet this restriction Surprisingly, the proportion 
of females is higher than the proportion of males even though parents are responsible 
for answering this question; this suggests that the cohort members may be influencing 
their parents’ decisions about participation in the survey. It is notable that the age 10 
income data in the BCS is much more frequently reported; with information available 
for almost 70 percent of the cohort. I shall make use of this below.
The remainder of the Table shows how the samples reduce further when I 
focus on those individuals with information on outcome variables. First I look at 
education as the outcome variable, as in Chapter 5. Education information was 
obtained at age 23 for the NCDS and age 30 for the BCS, this means that there is a 
longer time over which attrition can occur in the BCS; when this restriction is applied 
is it clear that a larger proportion of the sample is lost for the BCS; the effective 
sample sizes in the BCS are now less than a third of all cohort members.
To obtain the intergenerational income samples used in Chapters 4 and 6 I 
must restrict the samples to those with information on parental income and the child’s 
own earnings. This means adding the additional restriction that the child is an 
employee in the age 33/30 survey. For the NCDS, the focus on earnings means 
incorporating the impact of attrition between age 23 and 33; resulting in another large 
drop in the effective sample. For the BCS additional restriction does not reduce the 
BCS sample by substantially more, as education and earnings information is taken 
from the same survey. Consequently, the gap between the proportions of the sample
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that can be used in the intergenerational analyses closes across the cohorts. In both 
cases around 20 percent of the sample is usable.
There is some variation in the consequences of the sample selections across 
sex for the cohorts. As demonstrated previously, women do not attrite as often as 
men; and this applies to the parental data as well as in the adult sweeps. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 6 women are less likely to participate in the labour market 
meaning that we are less likely to have information on their earnings. Table A3 
shows how these factors influence the final sample sizes. In the NCDS the 
employment restriction means that the final samples for women are a smaller 
proportion of all cohort members than they are for men. As more women work in the 
BCS the reverse is true; the samples are slightly larger for women.
Effects o f Attrition and Non-response on Sample Characteristics
It is clear that a combination of non-response and attrition leads to quite small 
samples for intergenerational analysis in the British cohort studies; at least when 
judged against the sample sizes of the full cohorts. It is also apparent that the 
magnitude of the sample losses is quite similar across the cohorts, although the 
reasons for the losses differ slightly. However, these observations do not tell us very 
much about the sample composition is affected, if the attrition and non-response is 
entirely random then it can be assumed to have no impact on the parameters obtained 
in the main chapters of this thesis.
Tables A4, A5A and A5B demonstrate how the means and standard deviations 
of a selection of variables differ as restrictions are placed on the samples. For clarity, I 
repeat the sample restrictions as used in Table A3. The variables relate to all of the 
sweeps available for the cohorts, and are chosen on the basis of their relevance to 
either parental status on children’s outcomes. Clearly it is important to include some 
variables from early sweeps as these will not have been affected by later attrition; 
consequently I choose father’s social class from the first sweep71 and children’s test 
scores in reading and maths from the second72. I also consider parental income, 
despite the fact that I have shown this variable to be substantially affected by non-
71 Age 7 for the NCDS and age 5 for the BCS. This variable is measured in reverse, a low index 
indicates high social status.
72 Age 11 for the NCDS and age 10 for the BCS.
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response itself. From the adult sweeps I consider final education level in the early 30s 
and weekly earnings.
This investigation produces many numbers, and a variety of interesting 
patterns are revealed. A primary concern is the impact of missing information on 
income at age 16. The evidence presented in these tables suggests that there are some 
differences across the two cohorts. Looking at fathers’ social class, the average status 
of cohort members is lower for those who have information on parental income, than 
for the full sample (the index rises), in the BCS the reverse is true, the index falls 
indicating higher social status among those who answered the income question. The 
results for test scores show that while those with parental income information tend to 
have higher percentile rankings for reading and maths in both cohorts, this effect is 
more severe for those in the second cohort compared to the first.
Further restricting the sample to those who have education variables shows the 
impact of sample losses as the cohorts move into adulthood. In both cohorts average 
parental status and test scores rise once more, indicating that attrition is concentrated 
on those from the lower part of the distribution of parental income and adult earnings. 
Once again however, this effect appears to be more pronounced for the BCS cohort 
than the NCDS. Fathers’ mean social class rises from 3.81 to 3.78 for males in the 
NCDS compared with 3.51 to 3.46 in the BCS.
There also appears to be some changes in the composition of the samples 
when they are restricted to only those who are employed at 33/30; however I do not 
want to focus too much on the selection into employment, as this is a separate issue 
from attrition and non-response. A more instructive comparison is to compare the 
characteristics of those in employment with those in employment who had valid 
information on wages; as demonstrated in Table A2, this is another point where a 
number of observations are lost. If anything, the missing earnings observations appear 
to come from those with poorer characteristics but the differences observed are not 
large.
In terms of the overall sample selections, there is evidence that final samples 
for both cohorts have higher parental status and child outcomes than if non-response 
and attrition did not affect the surveys. Unfortunately, from our point of view, there is 
also some evidence that this problem is more acute in the BCS than the NCDS. To
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illustrate: the average social class index of the NCDS is 3.76 for all male cohort 
members compared with 3.73 for the intergenerational sample; in the BCS the 
difference is 3.55 compared with 3.40.
In section A3 I noted that an additional problem engendered by attrition and 
non-response is that the variance in the samples can be reduced; lowering the ‘signal 
to noise’ ratio and worsening the downward bias associated with measurement error. 
I have included the standard deviations in Tables A4-A5B in order to evaluate this 
hypothesis for the cohorts. There is no doubt that a decline in the standard error as we 
move down the rows of the tables is observed for many of the variables shown. 
However, it does not appear to be that this effect is large and nor does it seem to be 
stronger in the BCS than in the NCDS.
While the descriptive patterns are interesting they are not very informative 
about the consequences of sample selection for attrition, as it is very difficult to learn 
about E(y  | x ,z  = 0). As we have shown one of the main concerns is the effect of 
limiting the samples to those who have parental income data at age 16 in the BCS. 
However the BCS also contains information about parental income at age 10. By 
comparing the intergenerational parameter based on age 10 data (/310) for those who 
have age 16 income and those who do not I can evaluate how intergenerational 
relationships compare across the z = 0 and z - 1 groups. This is similar to the 
analysis presented by Fitzgerald et al (1998) for the PSID and it relies on the 
assumption that intergenerational relationships measured at age 10 and age 16 have 
the same relationship with non-response for income at age 16.
The evidence from this exercise is quite encouraging, /?10does not vary
significantly by missing data at age 16. If anything, the evidence suggests that 
attrition and non-response are biasing estimated intergenerational persistence 
downward in the BCS. The partial correlation between earnings at age 30 and parental 
income at age 10 is .225 (.019) for the maximum sample of 3185 observations and 
.202 (.027) for the 1708 individuals who have parental income at age 16. This 
suggests that the stronger intergenerational persistence observed in the BCS compared 
with the NCDS is not a consequence of missing data at 16.
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A.5. Conclusions
In this appendix I have catalogued how attrition and non-response influence the final 
samples used in my intergenerational analysis for the UK. It is unfortunately the case 
that missing data is a substantial problem for both the NCDS and BCS cohorts, with 
only 20 percent of the total number of observations being usable for my analysis. For 
the BCS in particular it appears that the selections made result in a sample which has 
higher parental status and better child outcomes than the full sample. Many of the 
difficulties associated with the BCS sample appear to be a consequence of particularly 
high levels of missing data for parental income at age 16; to the best of my ability I 
am able to show that this should not bias my overall result that intergenerational 
mobility has fallen in the UK.
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Table A l: Attrition in the Cohort Studies
National Child Development Study
Males Females
All cohort members 9593 8960
In at age 7 7913 (.825) 7493 (.836)
In at age 11 7874 (.821) 7444 (.831)
In at age 16 7545 (.787) 7102 (.793)
In at age 23 6267 (.653) 6270 (.700)
In at age 33 5606 (.584) 5799 (.647)
In at age 42 5628 (.587) 5789 (.646)
British Cohort Study
Males Females
All cohort members 9644 8904
In at age 5 6787 (.704) 6300 (.707)
In at age 10 7711 (.800) 7165 (.805)
In at age 16 5815 (.603) 5797 (.651)
In at age 30 5405 (.560) 5740 (.645)
Notes:
1. The proportion of the total sample is in parentheses.
2. For the childhood sample responses are calculated on the basis o f parental contributions, as 
these contain the data relevant for my analysis. In some cases the school questionnaire was 
returned when the parental questionnaire was not completed.
Table A2: Item Non-Response in the Cohort Studies
National Child Development Study
Proportion in the relevant sweep with a valid observation
Males Females
Income at 16 .607 .607
Staying On observed at 23 .996 .998
Education Information at 23 .999 1
Employment Status at 33 .996 .997
(Employed at 33) .745 .613
Usable Earnings at 33 .664 .553
British Cohort Study
Proportion in the relevant sweep with a valid observation
Males Females
Income at 10 .840 .846
Income at 16 .613 .623
Staying On observed at 16 .588 .665
Education Information at 30 .994 .995
Employment Status at 30 .991 .992
(Employed at 30) .785 .692
Usable Earnings at 30 .727 .631
Notes:
1. Usable earnings observations refers to the proportion of cohort members included in the age 
33/30 sweep who are employed at the time of the survey and report a valid earnings 
observation (some earnings observations are dropped in the cleaning process).
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Table A3: The Combined Effect of Attrition and Non-Response
National Child Development Study
Variables Proportion of all cohort members
Males Females
Income at 16 .478 .482
Income at 16 and Education at 23 .378 .402
Income at 16 and Employed at 33 .276 .267
Income at 16 and Earnings at 33 .226 .202
Income at 16, Education and Earnings .199 .183
British Cohort Study
Proportion of all cohort members
Males Females
Income at 10 .671 .681
Income at 16 .370 .406
Income at 10 and 16 .313 .346
Income at 16 and Education at 30 .271 .330
Income at 16 and Employed at 30 .229 .256
Income at 16 and Earnings at 30 .205 .214
Income at 16, Education and Earnings .205 .214
Income at 10 and 16 and Earnings at 30 .177 .183
255
Table A4: The Impact of Attrition and Non-Response on Sample Characteristics - NCDS
Males
Father’s Social 
Class (Age 7)
Reading Percentile 
(Age 11)
Maths Percentile 
(Age 11)
Parental Income 
(Age 16)
Education Category 
(Age 33)
Earnings (Age 
33)
All Cohort Members 3.76(1.25) 48.10(29.58) 49.52 (29.62) 317.27(118.46) 4.17(2.62) 423.98 (252.28)
[7228] [7257] [7255] [4584] [7137] [4034]
Income at 16 3.81 (1.21) 48.97 (29.52) 50.66 (29.94) 317.27(118.46) 4.26 (2.58) 423.35 (260.98)
[3904] [3988] [3987] [4584] [4030] [2325]
Income at 16 and 3.78(1.21) 50.29 (29.42) 52.09 (29.06) 320.77(117.25) 4.28 (2.57) 427.11 (256.64)
Education at 23 [3139] [3204] [3203] [3633] [3633] [2058]
Income at 16 and 3.73(1.21) 53.35 (28.73) 55.21 (28.61) 321.98 (114.97) 4.82 (2.41) 434.06 (262.67)
Employed at 33 [2149] [2157] [2157] [2438] [2436] [2171]
Income at 16 and 3.73(1.21) 54.06 (28.65) 56.00 (28.54) 323.06(113.72) 4.89 (2.40) 434.06 (262.67)
Earnings at 33 [1919] [1921] [1921] [2171] [2169] [2171]
Income at 16, Education 3.73(1.21) 54.51 (28.66) 56.25 (28.40) 323.65(113.07) 4.94 (2.37) 437.24 (257.16)
and Earnings [1698] [1699] [1699] [19091 [1909] [1909]
Females
Father’s Social Reading Ability Maths Percentile Parental Income Education Category Earnings (Age
Class (Age 7) (Age 11) (Age 11) (Age 16) (Age 33) 33)
All Cohort Members 3.76(1.24) 48.41 (28.22) 48.69 (28.45) 319.02(123.20) 4.00 (2.63) 203.90(161.39)
[6888] [7257] [6874] [4317] [7027] [4127]
Income at 16 3.81 (1.23) 48.94 (28.21) 49.79 (28.35) 319.02(123.20) 4.06 (2.58) 198.28 (151.20)
[3715] [3778] [3776] [4317] [3949] [2415]
Income at 16 and 3.79(1.22) 49.74 (27.92) 50.89 (28.15) 320.85 (122.55) 4.08 (2.57) 199.00(153.19)
Education at 30 [3144] [3196] [3195] [3600] [3600] [2167]
Income at 16 and 3.76(1.20) 51.37 (27.09) 53.09 (27.12) 322.84(125.06) 4.48 (2.46) 213.93 (159.53)
Employed at 33 [1789] [1826] [1826] [2050] [2050] [1808]
Income at 16 and 3.74(1.21) 51.84 (26.92) 53.40 (27.02) 323.80(125.90) 4.51 (2.47) 213.93 (159.53)
Earnings at 33 [1574] [1606] [1606] [1808] [1808] [1808]
Income at 16, Education 3.77(1.20) 51.84 (26.85) 53.65 (27.03) 323.30 (125.78) 4.50 (2.46) 214.55 (161.23)
and Earnings [1437] [1469] [1469] [1642] [1642] [1642]
256
Table A5A: The Impact of Attrition and Non-Response on Sample Characteristics -  BCS Males
Father’s Social Class Reading Percentile Maths Weekly Education Weekly
(Age 5) (Age 10) Percentile (Age Parental Income Category Earnings
10) (Age 16) (Age 30) (Age 30)
All Cohort Members 3.54(1.27) 47.59 (28.19) 50.60 (29.68) 332.00(171.42) 4.69 (2.60) 439.59 (299.94)
[6350] [6605] [6029] [3569] [5363] [3934]
Income at 10 3.55 (1.26) 48.20 (28.88) 51.22 (29.58) 333.17(168.50) 4.69 (2.59) 436.38 (280.43)
[5081] [5513] [5093] [3016] [4327] [3200]
Income at 16 3.51 (1.27) 50.73 (28.99) 53.63 (29.71) 332.00(171.42) 4.90 (2.55) 449.22 (316.28)
[2837] [2969] [2733] [3569] [2606] [1986]
Income at 10 and 16 3.51(1.27) 51.05 (28.81) 53.93 (29.66) 333.17(168.50) 4.92 (2.54) 449.22 (307.95)
[2485] [639] [2445] [3016] [2250] [1715]
Income at 16 and Education 3.46(1.27) 52.27 (28.73) 55.15 (29.32) 339.20(171.45) 4.90 (2.55) 449.14(316.34)
[2134] [2224] [2060] [2611] [2605] [1985]
Income at 16 and Employed at 3.41 (1.25) 53.98 (28.53) 56.73 (29.14) 342.72 (169.09) 5.13(2.48) 449.44 (316.80)
30 [1721] [1811] [1679] [2093] [2087] [1978]
Income at 16 and Earnings at 3.40(1.26) 54.40 (28.46) 57.09 (29.10) 343.72 (169.35) 5.16(2.47) 449.44 (316.80)
30 [1632] [1716] [1593] [1978] [1972] [1978]
Income at 16, Education and 3.40(1.25) 54.42 (28.46) 57.10(29.10) 343.79(169.38) 5.16(2.47) 449.36 (316.86)
Earnings [1631] [1715] [1592] [1977] [1973] [1977]
Income at 10 and 16 and 3.40(1.26) 54.55 (28.48) 57.26 (29.08) 345.00(166.90) 5.19 (2.46) 448.64 (308.40)
Earnings at 30 [1443] [1546] [1438] [1709] [1703] [1709]
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Table A5B: The Impact of Attrition and Non-Response on Sample Characteristics -  BCS Females
Father’s Social 
Class (Age 5)
Reading 
Percentile (Age 
10)
Maths Percentile 
(Age 10)
Weekly Parental 
Income 
(Age 16)
Education 
Category 
(Age 30)
Weekly Earnings 
(Age 30)
All Cohort Members 3.55 (1.27) 51.63 (28.19) 47.85 (27.69) 330.57 (170.70) 4.60 (2.63) 288.20(191.33)
[5875] [6171] [5678] [3618] [5703] [3628]
Income at 10 3.57(1.25) 51.91 (27.99) 48.08 (27.50) 328.74(166.10) 4.63 (2.61) 288.63 (193.63)
[4711] [5197] [4823] [3088] [4601] [2956]
Income at 16 3.53(1.27) 54.02 (28.13) 50.21 (27.52) 330.57(170.69) 4.73 (2.62) 292.76(199.37)
[2851] [3015] [2801] [3618] [2939] [1911]
Income at 10 and 16 3.55 (1.25) 54.06 (28.01) 50.32 (27.31) 328.74(166.10) 4.76 (2.60) 290.88 (200.90)
[2491] [2701] [2521] [3088] [2529] [1639]
Income at 16 and Education 3.51(1.26) 54.27 (27.73) 51.07 (27.26) 334.60(168.78) 4.73 (2.62) 292.79(199.37)
[2360] [2477] [2314] [2942] [2938] [1911]
Income at 16 and Employed at 3.44(1.28) 57.91 (26.57) 53.87 (26.62) 342.88(167.88) 5.08 (2.53) 292.81 (199.61)
30 [1686] [1726] [1612] [2059] [2057] [1903]
Income at 16 and Earnings at 3.43(1.27) 58.31 (26.45) 54.52 (26.56) 345.55 (169.24) 5.13(2.52) 292.80(199.61)
30 [1552] [1587] [1482] [1903] [1901] [1903]
Income at 16, Education and 3.44(1.27) 58.31 (26.45) 54.52 (26.56) 345.55 (169.24) 5.13(2.52) 292.80(199.61)
Earnings [1552] [1587] [1482] [1903] [1901] [1903]
Income at 10 and 16 and 3.45(1.26) 58.29 (26.44) 54.42 (26.37) 342.27(164.14) 5.16(2.50) 291.75 (210.14)
Earnings at 30 [1356] [1428] [1339] [1632] [1631] [1632]
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Notes for Tables A4 and A5:
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
2. Sample sizes are in square brackets.
3. The father’s social class variable has six categories
1 Professional
2 Intermediate
3 Skilled Non-manual
4 Skilled Manual
5 Semi-skilled
6 Unskilled
A fall in the social class variable therefore indicates an increase in average status.
4. The education variable has nine categories:
0 No qualifications
1 Lower academic e.g. poor CSEs
2 Lower vocational e.g. HGV license
3 Intermediate vocational
4 Intermediate academic e.g. O levels
5 Advanced vocational e.g. GNVQ
6 Advanced academic e.g. A levels
7 Higher vocational e.g. professional qualifications
8 Higher academic e.g. degree
5. Earnings and parental income data is reported in 2000 prices.
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